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Preamble: Troubling Encounters 
This book is a testament to a journey through social-scientific and 
judicial case-making practices. It concentrates, first, on the truths 
and facts sociologists have produced about legal practices. That 
is, it is interested in the question of how sociologists have sought 
to make their case about these judicial practices. It is concerned 
with the questions of what these social-scientific observers have 
seen when they cast their eyes on these practices; how they have 
seen what they have seen, and which realities they have enacted in 
their approaches. Second, this book concentrates on the ways 
judges, clerks, administrative personnel and case files in a Dutch 
criminal court become instrumental in judicial ways of finding out 
‘what really happened’ and ways of qualifying these events legally. 
As such this book is also an attempt to describe these judicial ways 
of case-making. Third, it also aims to account for and reflect on the 
ways this case - the book you are holding in your hands - is made, 
and an attempt to work through the necessary methodological 
and conceptual challenges that accompany the making of such a 
case. Taken together, these questions produce an account of a 
close encounter with the ingredients of judicial case-making 
practices - case files, clerks, judges, courtrooms, routines, and 
procedures - as well as a story about sociology and the Law, 
knowledge and judgment, more generally.  
1 Is/Ought Conundrums 
Knowledge and judgment, after all, tend to be treated as radically 
distinct species. On the one hand, there is knowledge, which 
emerges when we let the world speak for itself and adjust our 
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expectations - our theories, our stories - accordingly. Judgment, 
in contrast, consists of retaining our normative expectations even 
when these are breached, when the world disappoints them (Cf. 
Luhmann 1992). The distinction between knowledge and 
judgment is between that which passes as valid under the 
governing logic of facts - de facto - and that which passes as valid 
under the governing logic of norms - de jure. In this capacity, 
knowledge and judgment, de facto and de jure, are mapped quite 
closely onto the difference between Science and Law. Even 
though both Science and Law can be understood as ‘two 
institutions for making order’ (Jasanoff 2007: 761), both are 
fundamentally at odds on their relationship with the world. If 
Science seeks to know, Law seeks to intervene. Science 
represents, Law decides.  
This demarcation between kinds of statements (is versus 
ought) and kinds of practices (Science versus Law) has some 
practical use, not least because it safeguards and protects these 
practices against each other. After all, is it not frightening to 
imagine a science that is blind to reality, concerned only with 
passing judgment? How tyrannical would such a science be! And, 
is it not ridiculous to require verdicts to be subjected to scientific 
tests of factual accuracy? We all know how scientists can never 
seem to agree on anything, how no scientific judgment is ever the 
last word … We wouldn’t be able to make decisions! The 
distinction between de jure and de facto helpfully ensures the 
identity and distinctness of these practices - especially necessary, 
perhaps, given the fact that both practices draw so uneasily on a 
similar vocabulary of proof, validity, facts and truth, similar rituals 
of verification in juries of peers, and similar-sounding appeals to 
the necessities of capitalized abstractions of (scientific or legal) 
Law and Order. The binary pairs of fact/norm, is/ought, 
Science/Law help to manage both this potential for 
miscommunication and, importantly, judgment in the name of 
science, and truth in the name of the norm. 
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Yet like all binary pairs, however, these distinctions do not 
only contain, but also create trouble - most crucially, of course, for 
those people, things or practices that do not fit wholly and neatly 
into either of its classificatory slots. In this capacity, such troubles 
are good to think with,1 as they put the self-evidence of such 
distinctions in doubt. Let me introduce you to one such occasion 
for thinking. Its principal ingredients? Three social-scientific 
researchers; one peer-reviewed study of sentencing disparities in 
Dutch criminal courts; some newspapers; a political actor here 
and there; public shock; and most importantly: a weary, even 
disgruntled judiciary. 
2 Speaking Truth to Law 
It is March 2012, and my fieldwork among the files, 
administrative staff, clerks and judges of a lower criminal court in 
the Netherlands upon which this book is based is yet to 
commence. Aside from some exploratory interviews with both 
practising and retired judges, I have yet to gain entry to the 
criminal court where I hope to study judicial decision-making 
practices. It is in this month, too, that a brief controversy about 
precisely these judicial decision-making practices evolves in the 
pages of Dutch newspapers (see e.g. NRC 2012, March 14; NRC 
2012, March 15; Algemeen Dagblad 2012, March 14). The 
immediate cause for the media attention is the publication of a 
social-scientific study of sentencing disparities in the Dutch 
Jurists’ Magazine [Nederlands Juristenblad or NJB]. This study, 
which was developed and published by three researchers 
associated with Leiden University Wermink, de Keijser and 
Schuyt (2012a), had found that lower-court magistrate judges 
[Dutch: politierechters] tend to punish certain defendant 
populations more harshly than others. These lower-court 
magistrate judges, the authors demonstrated, are more likely to 
opt for an unconditional prison sentence in cases involving 
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foreign-looking and non-Dutch speaking defendants than in cases 
involving Dutch-looking and Dutch-speaking defendants.  
The study was received with puzzled shock. How could this 
be? Does the Law not promise equality before the Law? Do 
judges not aim to treat like cases alike? In an editorial, the 
politically centrist NRC Handelsblad for instance concluded that 
the ‘intuitive judge has been caught out’ (NRC 2012, March 15) 
and that ‘lady Justice’s blindfold’ seems an ‘illusion, not a self-
evident professional characteristic’. Emphasizing that ‘judges are 
not immune to stereotypes’, it suggested that further large-scale 
studies should be conducted, and raised the following questions: 
Are criminal law judges sufficiently aware of the influence of 
negative stereotypes? Is there attention paid to such issues 
throughout their education and collegial feedback [intervisie]? Do 
people correct each other there or is this study a bolt from the blue? 
Are there, moreover, enough criminal law judges with a non-Dutch 
cultural background? (NRC 2012, March 15). 
In the wake of this media attention, not only did the National 
Minority Counsel (LOM) express their shock with the study’s 
conclusions, members of Parliament, Recourt (PvdA, centrist 
Labour Party), Dibi (the Green Left) and van der Steur (VVD, 
the largest Liberal party) each submitted sets of formal questions 
to the then Minister of Security and Justice [Minister van Veiligheid 
en Justitie] Opstelten. These questions concentrated on whether 
the Minister shares the researchers’ conclusions ‘that negative 
stereotyping with regards to defendants with a foreign appearance 
play a role in their greater likelihood of receiving a harsher 
sentence’, and the document queried what actions the Minister 
would undertake to make sure that ‘judges do not weigh the 
defendant’s appearance in their sentencing decisions anymore’2 
(Kamerstukken II 2011/12). In response, the Minister mobilized 
the help of the Scientific Research and Documentation Centre 
(WODC), whose critical appraisal of the study informed his 
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formal reply to the Parliament. In that document, Minister 
Opstelten doubted the study’s validity, stating that 
relevant variables that are often weighed up in the punishment stage, 
like having a permanent home address and a steady income, possible 
drug addiction, and flight risk, have not been included in the 
research. […] Furthermore, variables like the severity of the case, 
[the defendant’s] criminal record, and custody have not sufficiently 
been controlled for. A large measure of uncertainty surrounds the 
strength of the reported correlations (Ministerie van Veiligheid en 
Justitie [Ministry of Security and Justice] 2012: 2).  
It is for these reasons, the Minister concluded, that ‘the model 
used diverges from the practice of judgment’, and that, for now, 
the robust conclusions drawn about the choice of punishment by 
police judges with regard to persons with a foreign appearance 
are, on the basis of these research materials, insufficiently 
justified. (id.: 2).  
3 Judges Speaking Back 
While the controversy died a somewhat silent death in the media, 
its conclusions would linger on among members of the judiciary. 
The Council for the Judiciary [Raad voor de Rechtspraak], for 
instance, asked the Leiden researchers to design and execute a 
more methodologically sophisticated study into the judicial 
decision-making processes (see de Rechtspraak 2015: 6). Two 
practising judges, furthermore, replied briefly to the study’s 
findings in the same Dutch Jurists’ Magazine later in 2012 (Bade 
and van der Nat 2012: 973). There, the two judges pointed out 
that it may be defendants’ lack of income and lack of permanent 
home-address, not their foreign looks, that could plausibly 
account for judges’ choice for a prison term. Provocatively, the 
judges suggest that ‘the research seems partial’, even raising the 
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question whether the ‘researchers have any idea how a judge 
arrives at a sentencing decision?’ (id.: 973).  
In many of my later conversations with judges I would 
encounter similar frustrations. Many of them felt that the authors 
of the study did not appear to know much about judicial 
decision-making practices. And as a result of that lack of 
familiarity, it was suggested, the researchers had failed to do 
justice to their work. In fact, the study had rendered their own 
work practices alien and unrecognizable. All in all, its portrayal of 
their practices seemed partial at best, and distorted at worst. 
Judge Beech, frustrated but lucid, for instance commented that: 
At no point do I sideline the law just because I see that a defendant 
is from an ethnic minority. That is just ridiculous, and I resent the 
implication. I don’t recognize what we do in what they are saying. Listen, we 
have our ways of dealing with cases: we have the information, we 
have the files. That and the law is what is important to us.  
Placing knowledge of individual cases and the Law in the hands 
of judges themselves, Judge Beech contests the researchers’ 
credentials - what do they know anyway? - as well as the accuracy 
of their portrayal of judicial practices. Appealing to local 
knowledge - ‘we have the information, we have the files’ - Judge 
Beech suggested that the study’s portrayal of judicial practices is a 
highly specific kind of portrayal; a portrayal that distorts these 
practices beyond all recognition. It is as if the researchers were 
speaking about a different reality than that of the judges. The study 
and its aftermath among the members of the judiciary, then, 
points in the direction of a controversy over knowledge, 
recognition, and perhaps even respect. Perhaps the researchers 
merely sought to speak the truth, but their study was received as 
both a distorted picture and indictment of judicial decision-making 
practices. But - to paraphrase judicial discomfort - what do they 
know anyway? And by extension: who are they to judge? 
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4 Thinking with the Trouble 
The study had clearly touched a nerve. Now, it may be tempting 
to make sense of judges’ frustrations with reference to their 
professional ‘blind spots’ and their professional pride. Of course 
they are hurt, or anxious, or frustrated, the argument may go: 
after all, the study debunks a dearly held professional engagement 
with equality before the Law. Neither is it uncommon, 
sociologists might add, for people to exhibit some discomfort at 
having been turned into objects of study - especially so if the 
sociologist manages to lay bare some inconvenient truths, for 
instance that a social practice that promises equality in actual fact 
reproduces social inequalities. Of course, this approach to the 
controversy places the researchers in a privileged, epistemic 
position vis-à-vis the judges studied. While judges may think they 
treat like cases alike, in actual fact they reproduce social 
inequalities. And while the Law may want to keep up the 
appearance of equal treatment, its promise is just that: an 
appearance beyond which the social scientists find a more 
fundamental truth. ‘Forgive them, for they know not what they 
do’: this is one way to make sense of the controversial status of 
the study among the practising members of the Dutch judiciary. 
After all, knowledge is expressly not what the Law is seeking. It 
merely seeks to judge, and in so doing must remain blind to the 
social determinants and consequences of judgment. Meanwhile, 
who is to blame social scientists for telling the truth? Surely their 
account should not be taken to be a judgment? Reading the 
controversy this way, we manage to reinstate the imperative that 
judges judge, and scientists speak the truth. In a way, this first 
way of dealing with the controversy denies its existence, suggesting 
that judges may simply be ‘sore losers’ who better stick to their 
trade - judgment - while sociological observers stick to theirs - 
truth telling. No category mistakes have to be made, no crossings 
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between law and science, between knowledge and judgment, have 
to occur (Latour 2013).  
But such crossings do in fact occur - otherwise there would be 
no controversy here to begin with. We might just need another 
way to deal with the controversy, then; a way that takes judges’ 
objections quite seriously. For something we do not consider, if 
we are content to side-line these concerns as merely ‘hurt 
feelings’, is that these judges might quite simply be right. That is: it 
might just be the case that social-scientific accounts do much 
more than simply ‘tell the truth’ about a singular world. Indeed, it 
might just be the case that social-scientific accounts are rooted in 
active and specific interventions in the world, and that they shape 
the world about which they speak. What the judges are getting at, 
I think, is this performative dimension of knowledge-generating 
practices, that is the way knowledge-making practices shape and 
delineate their object in specific ways, perhaps even doing so in 
ways not easily commensurable with other ‘ways of world-
making’ (Goodman 1978). As such, the judges’ discomfort points 
to a first conceptual trouble which is central here: the trouble 
presented by the fact that social-scientific accounts do more than 
just ‘tell the truth’ about the world. Taking this controversy 
seriously, then, demands that we try to understand and account for 
these performative effects of our knowledge practices (Haraway 
1988).  
Given the controversy, here is a second thing to consider: 
judges may also be right to question social-scientific researchers 
about what they think they know about judicial practices. To 
reiterate Bade and van der Nat’s (2012) provocative question: do 
we have any idea as to how judges arrive at a sentencing decision? 
That is, how do ‘we’ - social scientific observers - tend to 
understand these decision-making practices, and crucially: what 
are we missing out on? Staying with the troubling controversy 
hence calls for a critical and reflexive account of the work our 
own observations are doing in rendering judicial practices 
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intelligible. Such an account would also, to my mind, attend to 
perplexities and aporias - a-poros, that which we do not manage to 
pass through - in our understanding of these practices. Especially 
provoking, in this case, is the contrast drawn between sociological 
understandings of judicial practices and ‘our own way of dealing 
with cases’. While sociologists may have one way to ‘deal with 
cases’, what are judges’ ways to deal with cases? Judge Beech’s 
comments point to concrete practices of ‘case-making’: of having 
‘all the information, and the files’, so that judges may come to a 
sense of what it is they must do. In that capacity, her comment 
also points to ‘epistemic practices’ (Lynch 1993) within these 
judicial practices, that is for instance local ways of evaluating 
evidence, of constructing a story, of attributing plausibility to 
different scenarios, and of arriving at an operative sense of the 
truth of the matter. The controversial study missed out on 
precisely these local ways of finding out what happened, local 
ways of ‘seeing the case’, local ways of deciding on punishment. 
Can we develop tools to remain sensitive to these local practices 
of case-making? 
On a theoretical level, then, the controversy complicates a 
convenient mapping of judgment and knowledge onto, 
respectively, the Law and Science. There is more to social-
scientific accounts than just facts: they seem to be active in the 
making of worlds. There is, on the other hand, more to judicial 
practices than just judgment: there, too, an operative sense of 
‘what really happened’ must be arrived at. Scientific practices do 
not yield mere representation; neither are judicial practices 
indifferent to the facts. In a way, both are case-making practices: 
ways to shape, delineate, and organize facts, and ways 
consequential to the realities these facts are ostensibly drawn 
from. These case-making practices represent the troubles and 
impurities that dwell at the borders of our demarcations: the fact 
of performativity in scientific, representational practices on the 
one hand, and on the other, that fact of epistemic practices within 
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judicial practices. My efforts consists of staying with these 
troubles (Cf. Haraway 2016) and to see how these ways of case-
making proceed in action. 
5 Three Questions 
All in all, the three central questions raised in this book are the 
following: 
The first problematic is both specific and general, in that it 
wants to attend to the specifics of the aforementioned study, but 
also seeks to situate it vis-à-vis conceptualizations of the 
relationship between sociology and the Law more generally. What 
are the limitations and productivities of sociological descriptions 
of the Law anyway? Can the effort to define, describe, and know 
the Law do justice to the Law at all? What do these descriptions 
render visible and make possible - and what do they render 
invisible, and impossible? How, in other words, are sociological cases 
made about the Law, and what realities are hence enacted? 
The feeling, among judges, that their practices are being 
misrepresented of course raises the question whether there are 
different ways to represent these practices, grounded perhaps in 
different empirical engagements with judicial practices. Reading 
the exasperated question whether ‘the researchers have any idea 
what our practices look like’, as an invitation, I aim to develop 
conceptual and empirical means to take seriously the everyday 
practices of case-making in a criminal court. How are cases dealt 
with, taking into account both ‘the Law’ and, to speak with Judge 
Beech again, ‘the information, the files’? In other words, how are 
judicial cases made in actual practices? 
Questions multiply further as I allow these questions to affect 
my own knowledge-seeking practices. What does it take, 
methodologically and conceptually, to account for the case I 
myself am making? How do I position myself in relation to these 
legal practices and the dense packing of sociological descriptions 
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around these practices? Do I need to accept a scientific role as a 
producer of facts, and facts only - or may I try to rearticulate just 
what it means to do description? How, in the midst of these case-
making practices, do I make my case?  
6 Abstract Accounts and the Concreteness of Practice 
Staying with these troubles and trying to answer these three 
questions is, in this case, also an effort to stay with the concrete. 
While the theoretical chapters that will precede my empirical 
inquiries will elaborate this point in more detail, for now it must 
suffice to say that the mapping of knowledge onto Science and 
judgment onto Law has the unfortunate side effect of rendering 
the concrete practices of both ‘Law’ and ‘Science’ difficult to 
apprehend.  
For instance, once we adopt a conception of Law as really 
being about judgment and Science as really about truth, it is 
tempting to slide into the suggestion that Law is only about 
judgment and Science only about facts - and that other, more 
troubling practices are therefore out of bounds. As we will see 
throughout Chapter 1: Contemplating the Law, this tendency - to 
slide from the ‘really’ to an ‘only’ - is very much with us today and 
exercises a strong conceptual pull on both legal positivists and 
social-scientific observers of the Law. Their attempts to radically 
distinguish between the normativity of the Law and the factuality 
of science, as I will show, either slide into purification, in which - 
with Kelsen (1960, 1981); Marx (1887); see also Hunt 2002) and 
Black (1972, 1976) - the distinction between Law and Science is 
rigidly asserted; or this distinction evolves into a problematic 
perspectivism with Hart (1958, 1994 [1961]) and Bourdieu (1987), 
within which different conceptions of the Law are argued to be 
rooted in the observer’s location ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the Law. 
Even Latour’s sociology of Law (2013, 2010) falls prey to this 
tendency towards purified abstraction, particularly so in his 
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Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013). While he traces a trajectory 
through the concrete practices taking place in the highest 
administrative Court of France - the Conseil d’État - his 
sociology of Law, too, is one that reinstates, after all his 
ambulations, the distinction between Law and Science, hence 
purifying them both of troublesome noise.  
Tracing the fact-norm distinction through these debates, I 
zoom in on a tendency William James (1909) calls ‘vicious 
abstractionism’. This intellectual tendency proceeds by way of 
‘singling out some salient or important feature’ of a ‘concrete 
situation’ - truth in the concrete situation that is science, 
judgment in the concrete situation that is the Law - after which 
we reduce ‘the originally rich phenomenon to the naked 
suggestions of that name abstractly taken, treating it as a case of 
“nothing but” that concept’ (James 1909: 110). In so doing we 
miss out on the opportunity to do justice to concrete troubles: 
truth-making in legal practices, and world-making in scientific 
practices. This is not to say that all abstraction is necessarily 
wrong - James quips, for instance, that without abstractions we 
merely ‘hop on one foot’ (id.: 109). After all, it is only in the 
encounter between the abstract and the concrete that we manage 
to make ourselves capable of inquisitive movement:  
using concepts along with the particulars, we become bipedal. We 
throw our concept forward, get a foothold on the consequence, hitch 
our line to this, and draw our precept up, travelling thus with a hop, 
skip, and jump over the surface of life at a vaster rapider rate (James 
1909: 109).  
While we need both the abstract and the concrete to move about 
at all, then, abstractions may also fail us in our attempts to ‘hop, 
skip and jump’. Faced with the troubling presence of 
performativities in social-scientific accounts and truth-making 
within legal practices, the abstracted accounts highlighted in 
Chapter 1 do not organize and order concrete experience 
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satisfactorily, and as such fail to operate as ‘tools to think with’, 
and think through, the specificity and concreteness of the 
practices we encounter (Stengers 2005). That is, if we accept that 
the Law is really, and only, about judgment, we miss out on the 
opportunity to study and trace how, within legal practices, 
knowledge of the reality it seeks to judge is arrived at. To be more 
precise: once we purify our conceptions of Law to include only 
that which we call legal and exclude ‘the remainder of things’ 
(Whitehead 1953: 73) we encounter in concrete experiences, we 
have lost the ability to do justice to these concrete, if troubling, 
practices. The same goes for our understanding of scientific 
practices. If we accept the dictum that Science is really and only 
about faithful representation of the world out there, we have lost 
the ability to do justice to the performative dimensions of our 
knowledge practices. Abstracted ‘hyper-explanations’ of the 
object ‘the Law’ (Dupret, Lynch and Berard 2015) such as the 
ones highlighted in this chapter, in other words, disregard the 
concrete.  
Chapter 2: A Guide for the Perplexed is devoted to giving 
conceptual flesh and bone to this turn towards the concrete. The 
conceptual movement I make there is in many ways indebted to 
pragmatist philosophy and its sociological incarnations, i.e. 
ethnomethodology and actor network-theory in particular. There, 
I show that one way out of the Law-Science conundrum - and 
with that, one way to stay with the troubles - is to rethink first 
what, concretely, we do when we do ‘description’ and ‘representation’, 
and second, what concretely goes on in sites, settings or practices we 
point to as locations of ‘the Law’. Crucially, this chapter is not 
meant as a way to transcend the opposition between sociologists 
and legal positivists, but rather as a way to find concrete paths to 
follow when a reliance on the capitalized abstractions of Law and 
Science are failing us. Thinking of both ‘scientific description’ and 
‘the Law’ in concrete terms, I suggest, allows us to salvage both 
modest description - something social scientists are sure to 
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welcome - and the practical robustness of legal practices - an 
appreciation of which is sure to matter to judicial decision-
makers. Of course, this salvaging comes at a certain cost. On the 
one hand, it will require, on the researcher’s part, an 
accountability (Haraway 1988) with regards to the things we do 
in, with, and to realities when we make knowledge. On the other 
hand, we will also need to include in our accounts of ‘the Law’ 
those non-human things crucial to ‘the Law’s’ practical operation, 
and especially of that entity which transports and transforms facts 
with regards to the case: the case file.  
7 Hopping, Skipping, Jumping: One Journey, Four  
 Interventions 
With an emphasis placed on concrete legal practices and the 
concreteness of social-scientific representation, the journeying 
can commence. After all, there is no arriving at truth without 
travelling roads. My ambulations take off with the Leiden study 
once more. Equipped with a vocabulary to do justice to its 
performative dimensions, I will raise the question how this study 
enacts judicial decision-making practices in Chapter 3: Dealing with 
Difference. What are the consequences of treating judicial cases as 
bundles of legal and social characteristics? How is the promise of 
‘equality before the Law’ operationalized? How is ‘the Law’ itself 
reconfigured as a result of its analyses? And what kind of 
population - of cases, of individuals - does this analyses 
presuppose? Together, these questions bring us closer to 
zooming in on a crucial performativity of social-scientific 
accounts of judicial practices, especially those assisted by 
quantitative measurement and statistical analyses; that is, how this 
analysis groups together individual cases as ‘the same’ and 
‘different’ in ways that are not necessarily commensurable with 
the enactment of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in these legal 
practices themselves.  
Preamble 
 15 
Sensitized to the specificity of this mode of enacting judicial 
practices, I will then take you with me into ‘the field’: a criminal 
court in the Netherlands. There, I traced the practices the Leiden 
study sought to make intelligible, that is the practices of 
magistrate judges [politierechters]. These judges preside over the 
court proceedings on their own (as opposed to judges in the 
‘multiple chamber’, which is composed of three judges), and 
adjudicate and sentence the relatively mild offenses, punishable 
with up to one year in prison. Their caseloads, I would learn, are 
high, and their work practices paced. Dealing with the vast 
majority of criminal court cases nationally (in 2010 for instance, 
magistrate judges dealt with roughly 85 per cent of all criminal 
court cases, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2010), these 
police judges combine the role of fact- and Law-finder. And in 
that capacity, they are assisted by clerks - who prepare their cases 
for them and who take notes during the court session - but also 
by their files. Indeed, entering the court is in many ways an 
encounter not only with human actors, but also with the non-
human ingredients of bureaucratic practices: case files. Informal 
conversations with many of its practising judges, clerks, and 
administrative personnel, observations of courtroom proceedings, 
careful ‘shadowing’ of 14 judges in their preparatory, file-based 
work practices and their decision-making in court, as well as a 
study of (or rather: struggle with) over 250 individual case files 
confronted me with entirely different ways of case-making. That 
is, while the Leiden study emphasizes inputs and outputs to the 
judicial decision, I now found myself in the middle of a specific 
ecology of practice (Cf. Stengers 2005), a world composed of 
humans and non-humans, of spoken and written words, of rather 
docile subjects - defendants placed before the Law - and of 
recalcitrant objects - case files that are never quite as easily 
navigable and readable as one would like. In this specific ecology 
of practice, I followed up on the Leiden study to open the ‘black 
box’ of judicial decision-making and see how the Law proceeds in 
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action. Yet I quickly found that there is not one answer to that 
question, not one way towards a solution.  
Take for instance that most visible, most studied, most 
dramaturgically rich dimension of legal practices: the court 
session. There, I learned, accounts are elicited, truth and 
falsehood are at stake, and the ‘soul’ (Foucault 1977) of the 
deviant subject becomes a matter of empirical interest: is s/he 
really sorry? Is he or she remorseful? Curiously, however, while the 
social-scientific study of remorse in legal settings has generally 
testified to its crucial importance to legal decision-makers, it has 
neglected to delve into the way it is enacted in court. How, in 
other words, do defendants manage to ‘perform remorse’ in 
court? How do judges make sense of defendants’ remorsefulness? 
How is it weighed and evaluated - and what are its consequences 
to judicial decision-making? In Chapter 4: Situating Remorse3 I delve 
into these questions, drawing especially on informal conversations 
with judges and in-court observations. With this emphasis on the 
morally dense texture of judicial practices, I also encounter a way 
of case-making that operates on the basis of narrative: cases are, 
first and foremost, conceived of as stories. Or rather, as I learned, 
instances of recurring, ‘typical’ stories, within which defendants’ 
remorsefulness is itself made sense of, weighed, and evaluated.  
This emphasis on narrative is one way to describe legal 
practices in a different register: a register that recognizes that 
cases are made in reference to more or less typical narratives. Yet 
this, however, is not a final account. Concrete judicial practices 
are not just about stories. Moving back and forth between the 
court’s ‘frontstage’ - the publically accessible court session - and 
its ‘backstage’ - the offices of administrative staff, clerks and 
judges - I encountered episodes of quiet ‘face-to-file’ interaction 
(Scheffer 2005). In my emphasis on verbal interaction in court 
and the production of narrative, I seem to have produced a hiatus 
once again, for my emphasis on co-presence and language was 
not easily transposed onto these quiet episodes of desk-work. 
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There, there were no defendants, no lawyers, no public 
prosecutor, but there were only the traces of past bureaucratic 
actions gathered together in the case file. This is where I found 
‘the Law’ in its most materially robust sense as well: here, central 
are not fleeting words, but the written report; not intangible 
sound, but heavy paper files and digital interfaces. It is also the 
setting where judges told me they try to ‘see the case clearly’ prior 
to the court session. But how do they do so? Chapter 5: Visualizing 
Cases4 is an account of these ‘visualization practices’ as they take 
place in relation to the file, and especially the techniques judges 
have developed to ‘navigate’ files accurately and efficiently. 
Crucially, it also pays attention to the extra-textual affordances of 
the case file. Tracing the way taken-for-granted visualizing 
practices were disrupted as an effect of the digitization of case 
files over the summer of 2013, it zooms in on the medium-
specificity (Lanzara 2009) of judicial ‘visualization practices’. In 
doing so, it also puts in doubts suggestions that judicial work is 
found only in the ‘head of the actor’ (Garfinkel 1967). Judicial 
thinking and seeing, I suggest, involve both ‘eye’ and ‘hand’. 
‘Behind’ the story-telling in court put centre stage in Chapter 3, 
this chapter adds the socio-material visualization practices of ‘the 
case’. 
Yet here we run into another aporia once again. Yes, the case 
file may be a recalcitrant entity in the material sense - especially if 
it is digitized. Yet this is not its only recalcitrance, it seems. For in 
both judges’ pre-trial preparation practices and in court itself, the 
file also resists smooth truth- and sense-making not because it is 
either a paper or digital object but because it is an object with a 
complex history and an uncertain future. Whereas the preceding 
chapter has taken the case file as an object immediately present in 
the here-and-now of ongoing practices, Chapter 6: Folding Times, 
Doing Truths5 highlights the case file not as a materially, but as a 
temporally recalcitrant object. It traces the case file’s procedural 
and institutional history, paying attention in particular to the way 
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these histories are evoked and negotiated in court. Drawing on 
M’charek’s notion of the folded object (2014), I show how the 
case file becomes implicated in struggles over ‘what really 
happened’, and distinguish between two modes in which it does 
so: on the one hand, the legal case file acts as an innocent 
transporter of facts and truth; on the other, it becomes visible as 
an object that has actively transformed and delineated the case in 
question. In the first situation, truth-production draws on the 
documents present in the file, treating these as neutral containers 
of evidence; in the second case, the documents themselves are 
interrogated, a process of interrogation that crucially includes the 
histories, routines, and decisions these documents render 
invisible. In so doing, this chapter offers yet another appreciation 
of the concreteness and coproduction of legal procedure and 
fact-making over and against accounts that treat either as 
subservient (in which case, only procedure qualifies as properly 
legal), or accounts which rigidly separate the two (in which case, 
procedure is only a ‘legal context’ for truth-making). 
8 The Law Multiple 
Throughout these four empirical chapters, then, I highlight how 
each mode of engaging with the Law defines and delineates the 
Law, and I further seek to situate such definition and delineations 
by concentrating on how these are mediated by methods, 
instruments, and procedure. These concerns include my own 
instruments, methods and positionings, for which reason the 
chapters offer not only substantive contributions to different 
bodies of research, but also analyses of the performative effects 
of situated observations of, and collaborations with, the Law. In 
other words, I aim to account for the effect my own methods of 
observation have on the way I enact ‘the Law’, and retrace the 
steps I have taken throughout my ambulations in through its 
corridors and offices.  
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Now, all journeying must come to an end - this we all know 
(Cf. Lévi-Strauss 1961). The real question is: how do we end our 
journeying? Looking back, what have we learned? Looking 
forward, what concepts may allow us to hop, skip and jump some 
more? This question is a conceptual challenge, as the 
aforementioned four interventions, taken together, demonstrate 
that ‘the Law’ - that abstract being - is in a very real sense 
something else depending on our concrete collaborations with it. 
Sometimes it is an input-output mechanism distributing justice 
over population groups. With a sociological, cross-sectional ‘view’ 
of the Law we lose all sense of legality at all, even though we may 
be happy to see many cases at once - or at least, the ‘factors’ of 
which they are composed and the outputs they yield. At other 
times, it is a morally charged practice of story-telling. In the 
emphasis on the processes taking place in the quintessentially 
legal courtroom, we encounter morals within which the 
distinction between legal culpability and moral responsibility is 
continually at stake. Then again, it is also a practice of paper-
shuffling, in which judicial visualizations of the case prove reliant 
upon social and material infrastructures. Lastly and yet again, 
these legal practices are also practices of writing and erasing 
histories, or of observing procedure and the facts simultaneously. 
With legal procedure, often branded so uniquely legal, comes 
simultaneously the question of facts, truths, and the relationship 
between documentary as well as ‘actual’ realities. How do we 
make sense of this multiplicity?  
One way to make sense of multiplicity, Mol (2002) teaches us, 
is to hierarchize: to say only one of these accounts captures ‘the 
Law’ best, while the others are derivative, flawed, mere 
approximation. In a way, this is a route that retreats into purified 
generalities once more: there can only be one true being to the 
Law. The other, more productive, route however is to retain this 
multiplicity in enactments of the legal, and to come up with a 
conception of ‘the Law’ that allows researchers to make sense of 
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this multiplicity. In order to do so we need not, I argue in Chapter 
7: Productive Fictions for the Study of the Law, abstracted hyper-
explanations of presumably singular objects, but humble accounts 
of hyper-objects. In that last chapter, I propose to use the notion 
of the hyper-object as a productive fiction to make sense of the 
Law in its multiplicity. Hyper-objects, according to Morton 
(2013), are objects that are tentacular, devoid of a centre, and 
stretched out. Hyper-objects are both inter-subjective and inter-
objective: not only a product of intersubjective understanding, 
but materially dense knottings and practices. Of course, they are 
slightly mysterious, but not because they have a hidden centre, 
but because of their sheer scale: they are simply too large, too 
stretched out across time and space, to apprehend in full. The 
Law, to speak with Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 45) is always 
partially in ‘the office next door, or behind the door, on to 
infinity’. This conception of the Law as hyper-object demands 
situated, humble accounts. In other words, the notion of the 
hyper-object forces us to situate and account for our 
collaborations: we will never be able to claim we have 
apprehended the Law in its totality, yet we need not sacrifice 
description entirely. With this conception of the Law as an hyper-
object we may not ignore what we do not know, we can’t quite 
aim to purify too hastily and recklessly, we can’t continue to 
mistake parts (‘this legal practice’, ‘this scientific practice’) for 
wholes (‘all legal practices’, ‘scientific practices in general’). Such a 
conception is situated and for that reason sensitive to the fact 
that every inside is another outside; that it is not moving into 
phenomena that matters but moving through them. With hyper-
objects, the point is not in arriving but in the journey itself.  
Waarvan akte. 
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NOTES
 
1 My thinking here is informed by Donna Haraway (1988), in particular by her 
use of the figure of the cyborg to simultaneously think through nature and 
culture, and the body and technology, and is indebted, in its mode of 
response, to efforts that try to think and take seriously the in-between, the 
marginal, or the hybrid. In Chapters 1 and 2, I will give conceptual flesh and 
bone to this kind of thinking, particularly in relation to pragmatist 
(re)conceptions of the subject-object binary.  
2 Both quotes are from Minister Opstelten’s answers to Recourt’s set of 
questions; Opstelten referred to the other members of Parliament in his 
answers to Recourt’s questions, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 
2012: 1-6. 
3 Parts of Chapter 4, as well as parts of its arguments, are published as 
Oorschot, I. van, Mascini, P. and Weenink, D. (2017), “Remorse in 
Context(s): A Qualitative Exploration of the Negotiation of Remorse and its 
Consequences” in Social & Legal Studies 26(3): 359-377. 
4 Parts of Chapter 5, as well as parts of its arguments, have been published as 
Oorschot, I. van (2014a) “Seeing the Case Clearly: File-Work, Material 
Mediation and Visualizing Practices in a Dutch Criminal Court” in Symbolic 
Interaction 37(4): 439-457. 
5 Parts of Chapter 6, as well as parts of its arguments, have been published as 
two venues: the first, Oorschot, I. van (2014b) “Het Dossier in Actie: Vouw- 
en Ontvouwpraktijken in Juridische Waarheidsvinding” in Sociologie 10(3): 
301-318, the second, Oorschot, I. van and Schinkel, W. (2015) ”The Case 
File as Border Object: On Self-reference and Other-reference in Criminal 
Law”. in Journal of Law & Society 42(4): 499-527. 
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1 Contemplating the Law 
1 ‘Before the Law’: An Allegory (But not of the Law Itself) 
In the ninth chapter of Kafka’s The Trial (1924), Joseph K. 
encounters a priest. The priest, who happens to double as prison 
chaplain, is one of the many characters Joseph K. will meet in his 
search for justice. The priest relates to Joseph K. the ‘opening 
paragraphs of the Law’. It is a story about waiting, wandering, 
and hesitating before the Law: 
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man 
from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the 
gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The 
man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in 
later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.” At the 
moment the gate to the law stands open, as always, and the 
gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see 
through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, 
he laughs and says: “If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my 
prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most 
lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each 
more powerful than the other. I can’t endure even one glimpse of the 
third.” The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: 
the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he 
now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large 
pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar’s beard, he decides that 
it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The 
gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in 
front of the gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many 
attempts to be let in, and he wears the gatekeeper out with his 
requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him briefly, questioning 
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him about his homeland and many other things, but they are 
indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he 
always tells him once more that he cannot let him inside yet. The 
man, who has equipped himself with many things for his journey, 
spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the 
gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am 
taking this only so that you do not think you have failed to do 
anything.” During the many years the man observes the gatekeeper 
almost continuously. He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this one 
seems to him the only obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the 
unlucky circumstance, in the first years thoughtlessly and out loud, 
later, as he grows old, he still mumbles to himself. He becomes 
childish and, since in the long years studying the gatekeeper he has 
come to know the fleas in his fur collar, he even asks the fleas to 
help him persuade the gatekeeper. Finally his eyesight grows weak, 
and he does not know whether things are really darker around him or 
whether his eyes are merely deceiving him. But he recognizes now in 
the darkness an illumination which breaks inextinguishably out of the 
gateway to the law. Now he no longer has much time to live. Before 
his death he gathers in his head all his experiences of the entire time 
up into one question which he has not yet put to the gatekeeper. He 
waves to him, since he can no longer lift up his stiffening body. The 
gatekeeper has to bend way down to him, for the great difference has 
changed things to the disadvantage of the man. “What do you still 
want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.” 
“Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is it that in 
these many years no one except me has requested entry?” The 
gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying and, in order to reach 
his diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one else 
can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m 
going now to close it.”  
Much has been said about this story, which - as one commentator 
suggested - is precisely as impenetrable and opaque as the gated, 
guarded, and walled Law of which it speaks (van Houtem 2010: 
286; see also Derrida 1992). Aside from precisely that mystery - 
what lies behind those walls? - what is perhaps the most striking 
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is absence of action on the part of the man from the countryside. 
His primary act seems to consist of the decision ‘to put off 
deciding: he decides not to decide, he delays and adjourns while 
he waits’ (Derrida 1992: 195-196). It is also a man who decides to 
wait before the gates of the Law, even when its gates were always 
already open … The man from the country never needed a key to 
the Law’s gates, then, but only: to make a decision. 
This book is a testament to my decisions as I found myself in 
the presence of the Law. Kafka’s story helps to situate these 
decisions conceptually and assists in demonstrating the points 
this book will make. I will not use this story as an object to be 
interpreted, nor, strictly speaking, as a story that tells us 
something about the Law. If we wish to read it as a metaphor,1 I 
suggest, it is not a metaphor for the Law itself, but rather for 
those who seek to know it, enter it and see it. Read this way, 
Before the Law is evocative of a descriptive desire to know and 
expose the Law, while it at the same time demonstrates the sheer 
perplexities, confusion, and contradictions in which this 
descriptive desire has tended to result.  
In this chapter, I concentrate on these perplexities, and show 
how these are rooted in the demarcation between norm and fact; it 
is this distinction, after all, that presents the Law as an object of 
description to begin with. Tracing both sociological as well as 
legal-positivist answers to the question, what is the Law?, I show 
how commentators’ abstract, purified modes of answering this 
question leads to the sacrificing of either the Law or scientific 
description. That is, while some suggest that Law is indeed 
amenable to scientific description, something uniquely legal 
seems to escape their accounts. Meanwhile, those that seeks to 
rescue some crucial and unique legality tend to insulate that 
specific quality against description itself. And while these two 
positions are extreme indeed, more moderate ‘perspectivist’ 
solutions, in which the two conceptions of the Law are 
understood as rooted in the observer’s ‘perspective’ or viewpoint, 
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similarly face the choice between saving the Law or rescuing 
description. Like the man from the countryside, commentators of 
the Law seem to have become stuck in a state of agitated 
contemplation where the wish to describe and ‘enter the Law’ is 
met, again and again, with deferral (‘not yet’) that slides into 
negation (‘not ever’). Hence, this response is largely one of 
awestruck contemplation animated by the will to know or to see - 
but a will that also runs into the limitations of description itself.  
Now, definitional exercises in general tend to lead to 
conundrums of a foundationalist or tautological character, and 
this foundationalism and tautology is certainly going on in the 
debates I am about to discuss here. Yet something else is going 
on here too. Or rather, two additional things are going on here: 
the first, an emphasis on purity - ‘pure’ Law, ‘pure’ description or 
theory - and the second, an unmediated understanding of ‘vision’ 
and knowledge. Taken together, these two dimensions yield 
accounts abstracted from both concrete legal practices and 
concrete practices of description and of ‘seeing’. It is precisely 
therefore that these conceptual tools do not enable me to do 
justice to the concrete noise and troubles present in legal practices 
of case-making and sociological practices of case-making. For 
one, an emphasis on description or ‘vision’ within scientific self-
understanding hardly accounts for the performative work that 
social-scientific accounts of the world, and of judicial practices in 
particular, are doing. Second, an insistence on Law’s normativity 
or legality does not help me understand legal modes of finding 
out the facts about ‘what really happened’ in different cases. 
These troublesome presences make the foundational distinction 
between norms and facts, de jure and de facto, highlighted in this 
chapter highly problematic. The ‘habits of thought’ I highlight, 
then, do little to ‘give to the situation the power to make us think’ 
(Stengers 2005: 185). And as the demand to that we think and not 
merely recognize (id.: 185) captures quite precisely the ethnographic 
task, I must therefore develop and elaborate different tools for 
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thinking. That is, if description fails in the face of the Law we 
must scrutinize both what we mean when we speak of and study 
‘the Law’ and what we do when we do ‘Science’.  
I do so in Chapter 2, where I look for inspiration in the story 
that envelops Before the Law - that is The Trial. In that chapter, I 
will set the theoretical stage to begin asking not what the Law is, 
but instead highlight the question, how, where, and when the Law 
is done. Instead of relying on ‘looking inside’, I will suggest that 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are not to be taken for granted as 
unproblematic epistemic positions, but are mediated 
accomplishments in their own right; accomplishments, 
furthermore, that actively shape, delineate, and produce legal as 
well as social realities. Lastly and importantly, instead of accepting 
the regulatory distinction between norms and facts or Law and 
Science, I aim to stay with two realities that trouble such 
demarcations: on the one hand, the performativities of social-
scientific inquiry and on the other, legal modes of truth 
production.  
However, let us first return to Kafka’s mysterious Before the 
Law and to the habits of thought of which it is evocative. A word 
of warning: the following discussion is deliberately unfaithful to 
disciplinary boundaries that separate the sociology of Law from 
jurisprudential and legal thought, and it does not aim for 
exhaustiveness or exegesis. What concerns me is first, the habit of 
thought that postulates that an understanding of Law should be 
both descriptive and move beyond appearances; second, the habit 
of thought that understands different conceptions of Law to be 
due to perspective. The authors selected to exemplify these 
strands of thought are noteworthy not because they are 
representative of a consensus shared between legal scholars and 
sociologists of Law, but precisely because they embody more 
extreme conceptualizations and problematizations of the Law. 
Tracing these more extreme positions assists in highlighting the 
outer reaches of these debates, while at the same time they help 
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to show how even these ostensibly opposed contributions to the 
debate nevertheless share some crucial presuppositions.  
2 A Shared Commitment: What is the Law? 
The man from the countryside in Kafka’s story never quite finds 
out what it is that is kept inside these walls, and neither do the 
readers of the story. What lies at its centre is a mystery, and 
together with Kafka’s man from the countryside we are stuck 
contemplating on the question, what is the Law? This question, 
Hunt (2002: 16) argues, arises at the historical moment that 
capitalist expansion, political strife, and the colonial encounter 
with different ‘customs’ and ‘habit’ - that is, different forms of 
making and sustaining social order - cast doubt on the natural or 
divine necessity of the Law. It is in this context, too, that appeals 
to a positive and general understandings of the Law find resonance 
among its commentators.  
Of course, this reflex has its source and mandate in the 
demarcation I have briefly touched upon in the Preamble: the 
distinction between de jure and de facto, between the two different 
‘institutions of making order’ (Jasanoff 2007: 761), that postulates 
that Law decides, and Science represents. Yet the search to 
describe the Law has quite a pedigree and, it must be emphasized, 
is not to be found in social-scientific efforts to understand the 
Law alone. Indeed, it is only a presentist tendency that allows for 
sharp distinctions to be retroactively drawn between legal and 
sociological description of the Law. The Law and the social, after 
all, posed similar ontological and epistemological puzzles to their 
18th and 19th century observers. Once severed from a necessary 
grounding in natural or divine order, or, for that matter, from the 
will of the sovereign (Hunt 2002), both the social and the Law 
confronted observers with an entity that is neither natural nor a 
product of individual acts of will or consciousness alone: a thing 
that behaves and acts seemingly ‘on its own’ even though it does 
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not ‘belong to the world of atoms and molecules, of gravity, 
electricity, or magnetism’ (Rudzinski 1976: 111). The puzzle 
presented by this thing that behaves on its own and seems to 
have a sui generis existence irreducible to God, individual 
volition, or the laws of nature should alert sociologists to the 
heritage they share with legal scholars. In a way, both ‘the social’ 
and ‘the Law’ are answers to a similar problem, that is: how to 
understand, account for, and explain the presumed fact of order. 
How is ‘order in the plenum’ (Cf. Garfinkel 2002) achieved? 
Where and how is it sustained? These are crucial questions for 
the social sciences, and different disciplines may emphasize 
different dimensions of the question and privilege different kinds 
of explananda, e.g. society, the state, culture, markets. Within 
legal thought, too, there has long been a strong current that aims 
to avoid the trappings of normative or metaphysical 
contemplation and instead aims to similarly ground its appeal in 
the realm of positive facts: legal positivism. Despite the large 
differences between self-designated legal positivists, legal 
positivism can be understood as the attempt to arrive at an 
evaluatively neutral, general description of those things which are 
necessarily true of the Law (Priel 2013): a search, if you will, for 
the laws of the Law.  
Foundational in this regard is Bentham’s (1988 [1776]) 
introduction within legal thought of two differentiated roles: that 
of the censor and that of the expositor. Drawing on Hume’s 
distinction between the realm of the is and that of the ought, 
Bentham insisted upon the necessity for legal scholars to divorce 
themselves from the normative impulse of natural law theories. 
Natural law theories, it was argued, have both descriptive and 
prescriptive intent: they must simultaneously function as 
descriptions of the laws of nature and in so doing be capable of 
guiding decision-makers. In that capacity they combine the role 
of the censor, who makes normative judgments, with that of the 
expositor, who seeks to expose the Law as it is. In combining the 
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two roles they confuse the realm of the (legal) ought with that of 
the (empirical) is. It is precisely this confusion, the utilitarian 
Bentham argued, that is corrosive to the very legal order such 
natural law theories seek to understand and protect (indeed, there 
is some sense in calling this a normative argument in favour of 
non-normative legal positivism, Cf. Waldron 1996). Hart 
summarizes Bentham’s concerns as follows: 
Bentham had in mind the anarchist who argues thus: “This ought 
not to be the law, therefore it is not and I am free not merely to 
censure but to disregard it.” On the other hand he thought of the 
reactionary who argues: “This is the law, therefore it is what it ought 
to be,” and thus stifles criticism at its birth (Hart 1958: 598). 
The disconnect between is and (moral) ought ‘haunts’ (Hart 
1958) legal thought: it appears in Austin’s dictum that ‘the 
existence of the Law is one thing; its merit or demerit another’ 
(Austin 1995 [1832]: 157); we see it reflected in Kelsen’s emphasis 
on non-normative, ‘pure’ theory of the Law (1960, 1981); and 
legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart’s concern with the ‘separation of 
Law and morals’ (see 1958, 1961), emphasizing the both ‘general’ 
and ‘descriptive’ nature of his own interventions (Hart 1994 
[1961]: 239). Legal positivism is far from uncontroversial and 
displays significant internal differences (e.g. what may be called 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ positivism). Yet in contrast to scholars who 
suggest that legal scholarship should not try to describe the Law 
at all, legal positivists continue to insist on this Benthiam, 
descriptive mandate - even though, as we will see, it is a highly 
limited mandate considering the normative character of the Law 
itself. It is that descriptive desire they share with sociologists, and 
it is on that descriptive promise I am taking them up now.  
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3 The Appearance of Law: Genetic and Documentary 
 Understandings of the Law 
A non-normative, descriptive impetus coupled with wonder 
about this strange object - the Law - may be understood as a 
shared commitment among sociologists and legal positivists, but 
upon a closer look these similarities give way to crucial 
differences. That is, while both legal scholars and sociologists 
seek the Law, what they have tended to find bears little 
resemblance. While both treat Law essentially not as linked to 
divine will or natural order, but as a ‘construction’ (Cf. Hunt 
2002: 16), who or what is doing the constructing is disputed. At its 
most extreme, the first line of response answers that what Law is 
can only be properly defined and understood by Law itself, as 
Law is crucially a legal construction. The second line of reasoning 
suggests, in contrasts, that Law is a manifestation of something 
else, particularly of political economy, power, or the social; here, 
Law is conceived of as a social, not purely legal, construction. 
The following discussion in which I unfold these approaches is 
not exhaustive, but rather concentrates on a few particularly 
extreme exemplifications of these strands of thought in order to 
fully trace the conceptual terrain upon which we find ourselves. 
Law all the Way Down: Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Law 
An obligatory passage point in this discussion is, first and 
foremost, Kelsen’s highly influential ‘pure theory’ of Law. It is 
first of all, like legal positivist theories more generally, a response 
to natural law theories which postulate that Law is and ultimately 
should be grounded in the law of nature or in divine law. Kelsen 
(1960, 1981) roundly rejects such normative, natural law, and 
insists that his own ‘pure theory’ merely aims to describe the Law. 
He further makes a distinction between the world of facts and the 
world of norms, within which the first is the site of ‘nature’ (and 
hence the object of science), while only the latter is the true 
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province of the Law. Coupling these two moves leads Kelsen to 
insist that, descriptively, Law is a system of norms that express 
‘objective oughts’: normative statements that postulate acts to be, 
or not to be, performed (Kelsen 1960; see also Spaak 2005). In so 
doing Kelsen diverges from accounts that highlight commands 
(e.g. Austin 1995 [1832], see Vinx 2012), and we will see later on 
in this chapter that this conception of the Law contrasts with 
Hart’s emphasis on rules (1994 [1961]). These objective oughts, 
crucially, form a consistent whole - a Stufenbau, a structure - as 
each of these norms is, in the end, supported and grounded in a 
basic norm: the Grundnorm. This is the norm that ensures the legal 
validity of all other legal norms: 
The basic norm represents, as it were, a blank check, while the task 
of prescribing the content of the legal norms is the province of the 
act giving rise to the constitution and of the law-positing acts that 
ensue in conformity to the constitution (Kelsen 1981: 185). 
Kelsen’s pure theory of the Law postulates, then, that the only 
arbiter on what ‘is’ Law (and what is not) is Law itself; and that it does 
so with reference to a legal ‘basic norm’ or Grundnorm. Of 
course, this conceptualization of Law is highly tautological. But 
far from a handicap, this is precisely its point. Kelsen hence 
places the tautology as the heart of the Law. Founding his ‘pure’ 
conception of Law upon Law itself, Kelsen suggests that it is for 
that reason that his theory is ‘nonmetaphysical’ (id.: 185), and 
excludes grounds upon which the basic norm itself can be 
evaluated, questioned, or understood: 
A norm of a positive legal order cannot be denied validity on the 
ground that it prescribes behaviour incompatible with a norm not 
belonging to this legal order, and in particular not on the ground that 
its content can for one reason or another be judged unjust. A legal 
norm is valid, it belongs to a valid legal order, not because it is just 
but because it was created in accordance with the procedures 
specified in the constitution (Kelsen 1981: 185). 
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This Grundnorm is not grounded in anything other than itself: it 
only and merely ‘presupposes the existence of an authority that 
could not possibly exist’ (Spaak 2005: 204). The basic norm hence 
‘contains a contradiction with itself’ (id.: 405): it evokes the 
presence of a sovereign that is, after all, only a legal fiction.2 This 
‘pure’ understanding of Law then, insists that all explanation must 
come to an end with Law’s basic norm. As such this conception 
is weary of further reduction of the Law to moral, political, or 
‘natural’ realities.  
In this lies the purity this conception of the Law promises: 
description of the Law must be ‘pure’ in that it deliberately 
disregards the things that are not properly legal. That is, in order 
to truly know the Law we must seek to describe it in the purest of 
terms; it is only in pure terms that we capture the purity of Law 
itself. In this sense, Kelsen’s purification is also an exercise in 
abstraction: it distinguishes between that which is necessarily true 
of the Law, and that which merely contingent, superfluous, and 
‘impure’. Priel (2013) likens the legal positivist in this regard with 
the botanical taxonomist, who ‘seeks to identify the central 
features of Law and this way distinguish it from other 
phenomena’ (Priel 2013: 2). In so doing, this botanist must 
assume that despite differences in appearance, members of a genus or 
species share with each other a crucial and determinative morsel 
of genetic code that makes them what they are. It is only through 
the ‘removal of all features found on comparison to vary from 
species to species’ that it becomes possible to speak of the ‘natural 
character of the genus’ (Stearn 1959: 37 cited in Priel 2013). 
Kelsen’s understanding of the Law is, in precisely this sense, 
genetic:3 Kelsen’s legal positivism promises us that beyond all 
individual manifestation lies a constitutive, if necessarily fictional, 
legal norm that ensures Law’s identity (and therefore distinction).  
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Storming the Bastille: Marx and Black 
If, for the (extreme) legal positivist, Law holds itself suspended 
above the mire of political, moral, and cultural concerns it is 
precisely these concerns that dominate a second response to the 
question raised, and never answered, in Kafka’s story-within-a-
story. The man from the countryside came to seek the Law where 
it promised it would present itself to him: behind its gates. There 
are no guarantees, however, that Law is what it promises to be. A 
second line of response, then, seeks behind the Law something 
else: a something else the Law either manifests or conceals (or indeed 
both). These kinds of arguments, it must be said, predate 
Kelsen’s positivism developed in the early 20th century: Kelsen 
was writing precisely against efforts that sought to ‘illustrate the 
primacy of the social over the legal’ (Banakar 2002: 34). Again, I 
will sketch the outlines of these argument only impressionistically; 
what concerns me is the basic mechanisms of their explanation. 
What they share is an unease with the way legal positivist 
descriptions of the Law ‘assume its [Law’s] own completeness 
and its unassailable integrity’, and their tendency to ‘close off 
inquiry because within its sphere answers are already known’ 
(Cotterrell 1996: 11).  
It is quite impossible to tell this story, first, without reference 
to Marx. While not explicitly trying to account for Law, his 
vocabulary of structural base and ideological superstructure has 
had important repercussions for contemporary understandings of 
how Law operates in society. Even though Marxist 
understandings of power have been modified and critiqued, 
Marxists’ understanding of the Law have arguably informed 
important strands of thought both within the sociology of Law, 
as well as critical legal scholarship.4 
Very broadly, Marx’s (dispersed and fragmentary) comments 
on Law suggest that ‘beneath sanctified juridical categories’ such 
as right, freedom, and liberty, lie concealed ‘real social 
antagonisms’ (Fine 2002: 102), so that his contribution lies in 
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uncovering how ‘social relations [are] expressed, mediated and 
obscured’ (id.:. 102) in and by these same legal categories. The 
Law’s deceptive trick, to Marx, consists of introducing the formal 
equality and freedom that form the legal preconditions, under 
capitalist relations of production, for labour power to be freely 
bought and sold. In doing so, however, it merely masks the 
substantive inequalities between those who are ‘doubly free’ to 
sell their labour and those who buy it: 
At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man’s 
own labour. At least, some such assumption was necessary since only 
commodity-owners with equal rights confronted each other, and the 
sole means by which a man could become possessed of the 
commodities of others, was by alienating his own commodities; and 
these could be replaced by labour alone. Now, however, property 
turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate 
the unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the 
impossibility, on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his own 
product (Marx 1887: 412). 
Of course, this line of critique pivots on the central promise of 
(liberal, modern) Law: that of individual liberty, which - according 
to Marx - quickly falls apart once it is established how formal 
liberties are leveraged in the production and reproduction of 
substantive, social inequalities.5 These arise as a result ‘not from a 
violation, but, on the contrary, from the application of these laws’ 
(id.: 413). Hence:  
The relation of exchange subsisting between capitalist and labourer 
becomes a mere semblance appertaining to the process of circulation, a 
mere form, foreign to the real nature of the transaction, and only 
mystifying it. The ever repeated purchase and sale of labour-power is 
now the mere form; what really takes place is this - the capitalist 
again and again appropriates, without equivalent, a portion of the 
previously materialised labour of others, and exchanges it for a 
greater quantity of living labour (Marx 1887: 412, emphases added).  
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The italicized words in this fragment from the first volume of 
Capital are particularly suggestive of the kind of response I am 
highlighting here: that of approaching Law as both an expression 
and concealment of the real and structural violence that comes 
with a notion of ‘right’ and ‘liberty’ to buy and sell labour power: 
‘the illusion of a free and equal relationship is dissolved once we 
explore the content of the exchange’ (Fine 2002: 104). Law’s form 
is opposed to the substance, the content, of actual reality. Its 
norms are empty form, mere mystifying gloss on the substance of 
actual fact of exploitation.  
Although it may not place absolute primacy on relations of 
production as the realest real, another mode of response that 
structurally resembles this mode of thinking is Black’s sociology 
of Law. If Kelsen promised us to purify Law and extract it from 
the contingent, normative ‘remainder of things’ (Whitehead 1953: 
73), then Black is offering us, in symmetrical fashion, a ‘pure 
sociology’ that is ‘more Durkheimian than Durkheim’6 
(Abramowitz and Black 2010: 39). Like Kelsen, Black insists that 
Law is a normative practice, and that ‘the core problems of legal 
policy-making are problems of values’ - which, he agrees with 
Kelsen, set Law apart from science: ‘such value considerations are 
as irrelevant to a sociology of Law as they are to any other 
scientific theory of the empirical world’ (Black 1972: 1087). While 
this reads, at least on the surface, as a mode to respect the Law’s 
integrity we will see that Black’s strict behaviourism does indeed 
effectuate a similar reduction as that of Marx. For upon what is 
the Law in all its normativity based? 
In The Behavior of Law, Black (1976) sets out to understand Law 
in strictly behavioural terms. Target of his criticism is in particular 
a sociology that engages itself with individual motivations and 
subjectivities; all this ‘psychology’ must be purged from sociology 
if it is to become an actual science. Enter his strict behaviourism: 
only behaviour, and in particular, amounts and intensities of behaviour 
can be the object of sociology. Behaviour, according to Black, 
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takes place within a ‘social space’, the shape of which is defined 
along several structural axes, for instance (vertical) stratification, 
(horizontal) differentiation and organization, and a realm of 
‘morphology’ or culture. One of these axes is social control. Law, 
within this framework, is defined as ‘governmental social control’ 
(Black 1976). Governmental social control displays variation in 
two ways: quantitatively and qualitatively, that is in the kind of 
sanctioning it results in. Black spends most of his time 
concentrating on this quantitative dimension of Law, showing 
how the amount of Law mobilized in specific situations depends 
on the respective social locations the two parties involved inhabit 
in the geometry of social space (e.g. a lower-class defendant 
charged with petty theft faces harsh punishment, while those 
accused of white-collar fraud can settle their way out of a criminal 
prosecution).  
Black’s promise to leave the Law in all its normativity 
untouched proves, however, an illusion. Precisely because he 
evacuates from his ‘pure sociological’ account considerations of 
meaning, of evaluation, and of subjectivity, his sociology of Law 
is unable to account for the normativity of Law it claimed to 
protect. Hunt suggests, then, that Black ‘must disallow any 
conception of “legality” or “illegality”; he can say nothing beyond 
that which governments act against or rewards is Law’ (Hunt 
1983: 26). In his interest in purifying sociology, Black seems stuck 
with a sociology without Law and its normativity at all. Again, 
Law is reduced; not, this time, to capitalist relations of 
production, but that other beast: to ‘social behavior’. In a way, 
Black takes Marx’s reduction a step further, even: Marx at least 
attributes to Law a capacity for action in that it is capable of 
concealment and mystification, while no such agency exists for 
Black at all; all is determined by the shape of social space. The 
Bastille stormed is, in actual fact, empty. 
Like Kelsen, these two contributions value purity. It is explicit 
in Black’s appeal to a ‘pure sociology’ and implicitly present in 
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Marx’ appeal to the distinction between Law’s illusory promise 
and Law’s actual reality. One question, of course, is whether it is 
possible and desirable to achieve descriptive purity at all (see in 
particular Mascini 2016) - a question I will attend to in the 
following chapter. For now, it must be emphasized that 
descriptive purity is arrived at by different means. If the legal 
positivist can be likened to the taxonomist who carefully 
distinguishes noise from a shared ‘genetic’ signal across legal 
practices, the kind of explanation offered here is rather that of 
the commentator who treats appearances as a sign of an 
underlying reality. Garfinkel understands such a reading as a 
‘documentary’ mode of interpretation: 
the method consists of treating actual appearance as “the document 
of”, as “pointing to”, as “standing on behalf of” a presupposed 
underlying pattern (Garfinkel 1967: 78). 
In more scathing terms, Nietzsche compares, rather, this 
scientific practice to that of the astrologer, who is similarly 
motivated by an almost libidinal ‘thirst, a hunger, and a taste for 
hidden and forbidden powers’ (Nietzsche 1974 [1882]: 170) of 
which actual reality is merely a surface manifestation. Latour, in 
similarly dismissive terms, locates this thirst at the heart of 
sociology more generally when he suggests that reliance on ‘the 
social’ as a final explanans constitutes a ‘magical invocation’ 
(Latour 2005: 65), that testifies, more than anything, to a ‘mythical 
belief in another world behind the real world’ (id.: 67). In any 
case, the differences with a Kelsenian understanding of Law are 
now becoming clear: while one seeks for a shared, original signal, 
the other treats the Law as a sign of something else.  
4 Jurisdictional Troubles and the Two Provinces 
My discussion so far has concentrated on the more extreme 
positions advanced in these disputes about the Law. These 
Contemplating the Law 
 39 
descriptions of the Law are both concerned with teasing out a 
general truth about the Law, yet proceed along different paths: 
the first a genetic mode of interpretation looking for a shared 
constitutive signal across legal practices (exemplified by Kelsen), 
the second a documentary mode of interpretation seeking that of 
which the Law is merely a sign (exemplified by Marx and Black). 
In so doing these contributions also imbue the Law with varying 
levels of autonomy or dependence. The suggestion that Law is 
what it says it is makes Law impenetrable to moral, political, or 
cultural concerns and portrays it as independent of the social: a 
walled fortress. The suggestion that Law is merely politics or the 
social by other means leaves it wide-open to sociological inquiry, 
even though by these accounts the Law, like the Bastille, is in 
actual fact empty … In Kafka’s story, this tension between 
accounts that posit Law’s closure and autonomy on the one hand, 
and those that treat it as ‘open’ to social determination on the 
other is captured quite precisely in Law’s status as both walled and 
open. 
Empirically and historically speaking, there can be little doubt 
that both positions are indeed reconcilable. Weber suggests as 
much when he locates the unicity and autonomy of legal practices 
in the historical rise of formal rationality (1978 [1922]). This 
formal, as opposed to substantial, rationality is the Law’s kernel, 
but this kernel itself emerges from social and historical 
contingencies. Luhmann (1972) similarly treats the legal 
subsystem’s autonomy as a product of historical processes of 
differentiation. The binary code governing legal communications 
- legal/illegal - structures the legal-subsystem’s operations in a 
way that is not unrelated to Kelsen’s Grundnorm (although 
Luhmann’s conception is not hierarchical in the way Kelsen’s is, 
within which norms derive legal validity from a Grundnorm).7 
Hunt argues, then, that: 
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these [two] views of the law are not antithetical; the rise of Law as 
autonomous system increasingly separated from the political sphere 
is consistent with a view of Law as dependent on society, in the sense 
of being a historical achievement (Hunt 2002: 17).  
And of course, the two different positions share a few things as 
well. Logically speaking, neither of the positions fully escapes 
tautology, for reducing Law to the social and then proceeding to 
explain the social with reference to the social leads the sociologist 
into yet another tautological puzzle. Bourdieu grasps the irony 
when he suggests that: 
stare decisis, the rule which decrees the authority of prior legal 
decisions for any current actions, stands in relation to juridical 
thought as Durkheim’s precept, “explain the social by the social” 
does to sociological thought (Bourdieu 1987: 823).  
Crucially, stare decisis is ‘but another way of asserting the 
autonomy and specificity of legal reasoning and legal judgments’, 
Bourdieu argues (id.: 823). Tautology burgeons at yet higher 
levels of abstraction as well. Ask a jurist what ensures social order 
and the answer is likely to be, ‘the Law’; ask a sociologist what 
shapes the Law and one is directed to ‘the social’. The social 
explains the Law and the Law, the social. At the same time, both 
approaches may have to end up drawing the similar conclusion in 
that they both, to speak with Gertrude Stein (1937), suggest that 
‘there is no there there’: for Kelsen’s genetic reading must 
presuppose a fictional signal that shapes actually existing Law, 
while Marx’s and Black’s documentary readings instead treat the 
empty formalism of ‘the Law’ as a sign of the realer social real.  
As something that requires explanation itself, the distinction 
between Law’s tautology or Law’s social determinants, between 
‘Law as autonomous’ and ‘Law as dependent on society’, 
continues to haunt commentators. The dispute is, in this sense, 
jurisdictional: it operates on the basis of an almost territorial 
understanding of the object of study: is the Law a separate 
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jurisdiction? Or is it merely an administrative province in and of 
that much larger territory of which it must obey the laws, that is, 
the territory of the social? Both positions have large 
consequences for the distribution of authority over both legal and 
non-legal commentators: who gets to authoritatively speak about 
the Law? And who gets the decisive last word?  
In a sense, we are dealing here with a territorial dispute, and 
territorial disputes tend to concentrate on the question of 
borders: borders to distinguish those inside from those outside: 
those with claims to a right to speak, and those without. 
Considering what is at stake - Law’s dignity or the possibility of 
critique and sociological explanation - commentators of the Law 
have settled precisely upon such a border. It is here that a 
vocabulary of ‘perspective’ and of ‘seeing’ makes its entrance, and 
is coupled with an almost jurisdictional and territorial 
understanding of the place and border of the Law. That is, the 
distinction between Law-as-autonomous and Law-as-social-being 
is rearticulated as a distinction between internal and external 
points of view (Hunt 2002: 17; Cf. Hart 1994 [1961]), or 
distinctions between the legal, professional ‘vision’ and that of 
laypeople. These borders help to distinguish those on the inside 
from those who shall remain stuck - like Kafka’s man from the 
countryside - before the gates of the Law. There they may 
contemplate or steal a glance, but not enter. This approach accepts 
the difference between the accounts and their portrayal of the 
Law, and seeks to understand such differences with recourse to a 
vocabulary of perspective. Law is whatever it is, and what one 
understands it to be is a function of one’s perspective.  
5 Inside/Outside Visions 
As exemplifications of this perspectivism I will use, first, 
Bourdieu’s most specific account of the Law - The Force of Law: A 
Sociology of the Juridical Field (1987), and second, the aforementioned 
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Hart’s The Concept of Law (1994 [1961]). Both authors have a 
central and authoritative position within their respective 
disciplines; both take issue with the more extreme accounts of the 
Law their disciplines have offered (exemplified here by Kelsen, 
Black, and Marx); and both try to come to a settlement 
somewhere in the middle ground between tautology and 
reduction, between conceiving of Law as an hermetically sealed 
off space and Law as mere chimera. Both do so crucially by 
nodding, in passing, to their non-disciplinary interlocutors. 
Bourdieu notes that it is important to free ‘the science of the 
Law’ from: 
the dominant jurisprudential debate considering Law, between 
formalism, which asserts the absolute autonomy of the juridical form 
in relation to the social world, and instrumentalism, which conceives 
of the law as a reflection, or a tool in the service of dominant groups’ 
(Bourdieu 1987: 814). 
Hart, meanwhile, suggests not only that his book may be read as 
‘descriptive sociology’ (1994 [1961]: v), but as we shall see, will 
open up his account of the Law to rather sociological 
understandings of rule-following behaviour. Both authors, 
furthermore, mobilize visual metaphors and draw borders in 
order to settle the dispute: Bourdieu speaks of vulgar versus 
professional vision, while Hart zooms in on the distinction 
between internal and external points of view. Their work, then, is 
an exercise in disciplinary boundary work (Gieryn 1983). But it is 
also an exercise in the drawing of borders between Law and non-
Law itself, between Law’s inside and its outside, so that accounts 
of it may be situated either internally or externally.  
As we will see, however, the distinction between inside and 
outside quickly gives way to difficulties we have encountered 
before. In trying to strike a balance between ‘formalism’ and 
‘instrumentalism’, Bourdieu himself ends up reproducing a similar 
reduction of Law to something that goes on behind it: in this 
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case, to (social) field dynamics. Hart’s conception of the ‘internal 
point of view’, meanwhile, remains hermetically sealed off for 
non-intuitive, non-legal modes of knowledge seeking (i.e. that of 
the sociologist, for instance): here, description runs into its own 
limitations.  
A Bourdieusian Settlement: Vulgar versus Professional Vision 
As is suggested by the title of Bourdieu’s piece, The Force of Law: 
A Sociology of the Juridical Field, is first and foremost an attempt to 
elaborate on Law as a social field. Noting the necessity of moving 
beyond tautological ‘formalism’ and reductive ‘instrumentalism’, 
he suggests that the juridical field is primarily a site of 
competition. In this case, competition takes place over the 
‘monopoly of the right to determine Law’ (Bourdieu 1987: 817). 
These struggles are engaged in by professionals in this field, who 
vie with each other for the right to ‘determine Law’. It is through 
such struggles that professionals dictate Law’s ‘practical content’ 
(id.: 827). The Law’s content is ‘product of a symbolic struggle 
between professionals possessing unequal technical skills and 
social influence’ (id.: 827). This implies that ‘the juridical effect of 
the rule - its real meaning - can be discovered in the specific 
power relationship between the professionals’ (id.: 827). Note, 
here, how Bourdieu locates the meaning of legal rules in their 
effect; that is, in their enactment or use as it is shaped by 
struggles over power between legal professionals. ‘Control of the 
legal text’, Bourdieu states, ‘is the prize to be won in 
interpretative struggles’ (id.: 818). Participants in these struggles, 
however, possess unequal levels of expertise and technical skills 
(id.: 827), and despite habitual acculturation to the field’s 
dynamics some may fare better than others. Competition over the 
right to determine Law, then, is predicated furthermore upon ‘the 
tacit acceptance of the field’s fundamental Law, an essential 
tautology which requires that conflicts can only be resolved 
juridically - that is according to the rules and conventions of the 
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field itself’ (id.: 831). Only then can professionals vie for mastery 
of the text, the prized right to determine Law.  
It is here that Bourdieu explicitly distinguishes the ‘vision’ that 
is produced within the juridical field from those outside of it. 
Those competing with each other for the right to determine Law 
have, he states, a ‘professional vision’ that contrasts with those 
outside, whose vision upon the Law Bourdieu calls ‘vulgar’. 
These two visions can be mapped onto two wholly different 
mental spaces: that of the person engaged in the struggle over the 
right to determine the Law and those without the juridical, 
technical skill to do so (id.: 828). The difference between these 
two modalities of vision, Bourdieu argues,  
is far from accidental. Rather, it is essential to a power relation upon 
which two systems of presuppositions, two systems of expressive 
intention - two world-views - are grounded. The difference, which is 
the basis for excluding the nonspecialist, results from the 
establishment of a system of injunctions through the structure of the 
field and of the system of principles of vision and of division which 
are written into its fundamental Law, into its constitution (Bourdieu 
1987: 828-829). 
Bourdieu hence maps different kinds of vision upon the 
distinction between member and non-member, specialist and 
non-specialist, those trained, education, and habitually cultivated 
within the juridical field and those who are not. Of course, such a 
conception helps to understand (arguably frequent) 
misunderstandings between legal professionals and lay 
participants in legal proceedings. But such an understanding also 
allows Bourdieu to characterize this professional vision as a kind 
of miscognition:  
within this field occurs a confrontation among actors possessing a 
technical competence which is inevitably social and which consists 
essentially in the socially recognized capacity to interpret a corpus of 
texts sanctifying a correct or legitimized vision of the social world. It 
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is essential to recognize this in order to take account both of the 
relative autonomy of the law and of the properly symbolic effect of 
“miscognition” that results from the illusion of the law’s absolute 
autonomy in relation to external pressures (Bourdieu 1987: 817). 
On the one hand, the juridical field is characterized by a certain 
internally produced ‘vision’, a vision furthermore that 
understands both the Law itself and the social world in highly 
specific terms. This vision contrasts with that of the lay person, 
whose vernacular vision of terms and events regularly clashes 
with that of those with professional vision. But it is also, crucially, 
a mode of ‘miscognition’, an illusion, produced by competitive 
and most importantly, social dynamics between and within fields. 
For all Bourdieu’s emphasis on dynamics internal to the juridical 
field, then, it is this internally and socially produced vision that 
does not, more generally, have epistemic value except perhaps as 
a manifestation of miscognition. Of course, this conceptualization 
of the juridical field itself and possible perspectives upon it leads 
us right back to where we started: with the sociologist who seeks 
behind the surface of the Law a deeper reality of social processes: 
a reality, moreover, concealed by the Law, something to which 
the Law or its participants are blind … 
This point assumes importance if we pay some attention to 
Bourdieu’s own vision upon the juridical field. If not 
‘professional’, nor ‘vulgar’, how is Bourdieu’s own vision upon 
the juridical field - and by extension, that of the sociological 
commentator - to be understood? It seems neither inside nor 
outside: on the one hand, it distances itself perpetually from the 
‘illusion’ and ‘miscognition’ that constitutes juridical vision. On 
the other, it desires to offer a more incisive, an altogether more 
knowledgeable vision of the Law than laypeople’s vulgar vision 
can provide. Bourdieu’s vision is not itself, then, subject to this 
regulatory distinction between outside or inside perspectives. In 
fact it is elevated beyond the distinction: a perspective upon 
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perspectives, a meta-perspective (Schinkel 2015). It is only that 
outside vision, or that vision form above, that has descriptive 
value; those on Law’s inside may have something to say, but it is 
mere miscognition.  
It is almost needless to say, then, that Bourdieu reproduces in 
many ways Marx’s understanding of the Law. But it is crucial to 
see how a Bourdieusian conception of the Law incorporates, and 
tries to account, for the tautology of Law. It does so by 
suggesting that this tautological insistence upon Law’s autonomy 
is in actual fact a perspective produced within the Law. At the 
same time, this internal perspective is fatally flawed, at least by 
Bourdieu’s standards of sociological description: it cannot truly 
transcend its own limitations and come to inhabit sociology’s 
meta-perspective (Cf. Schinkel 2015).  
Hart’s Internal Point of View: The Nadir of Description 
Much like earlier efforts in analytical jurisprudence, Hart 
considers his work to be an exercise in description, suggesting 
that his work ‘may be of use to those whose chief interests are in 
[…] sociology, rather than Law’ (Hart 1994 [1961]: v). In doing 
so he does not run counter to the positivist aspirations of earlier 
analytic jurisprudence; in fact, Hart seeks for a more empirically 
accurate portrayal of the Law, and in particular Law as it is 
experienced, used, and oriented to by those who accept the Law 
as guides for conduct. 
A first step to come to a more accurate understanding of the 
Law, Hart argues, is to rid ourselves of sanction-based accounts 
of the Law and in so doing, come to an understanding of ‘Law’s 
social being’ (Hart 1994 [1961], see also Fitzpatrick 1992: 6). The 
deficit of such sanction-based accounts, according to Hart, is that 
they narrowly associate Law’s binding force with the threat of 
sanction (Hart 1994 [1961], Shapiro 2006). Empirically, Hart 
argues, such an account does little to help us understand those 
cases in which actors do in fact exhibit rule-following behaviour 
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but are not, or not primarily, guided by the threat of force (Hart 
1994 [1961]: 40) but rather by a sense of obligation. What is 
necessary to understand Law, he argues, is a conception of the 
Law that is sensitive to its broader appeal to those acting 
according to its dictates. That is, it is necessary to think about 
what it is that makes people follow rules. Importantly, this is 
where Hart seeks guidance in the realm of social, and not strictly 
legal, rules. 
Human societies, Hart suggests, hang together by virtue of 
social rules. These may not be unambiguously accepted or at all 
times followed, but they nevertheless constitute the texture of 
social life. People follow them and accept them not simply 
because they fear sanction if they do not (although such a 
motivation may, of course, be present); they also follow them out 
of a sense of obligation. But what if there is a contradiction 
between these primary rules? How to decide, then, which rule 
should take precedence? 
Imagine a community without such second-order rules: doubts 
are surely to arise about their application, and it is at that moment 
that: 
there will be no procedure for settling this doubt, either by reference 
to an authoritative text or to an official whose declaration on this 
point are authoritative (Hart 1994 [1961]: 90). 
Second-order, legal rules, then, are rules ‘concerned with the 
primary rules themselves’ in that they specify how, when, and by 
whom these primary rules should be taken into account. Of 
course, this argument merely raises the question what further 
(third-order) rules regulate the use of these second-order rules. It 
is there, however, that Hart refuses to postulate the existence of 
further rules - diverging, of course, from Kelsen’s insistence on 
one basic norm8 - and suggests that secondary rules derive their 
validity from the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition is the 
rule that specifies how and what we should recognize as properly 
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legal, second order rules. Crucially, this rule of recognition is a 
social rule: a convention among judges to treat as authoritative the 
second order rules which they use to guide their conduct. This 
rule of recognition, then, is constitutive of all legal rules; it 
confers upon these rules their legal validity. It is with this rule of 
recognition that explanation comes to an end; it is no use 
searching for ever higher orders of rules. 
Now, there are various ways to interpret Hart’s insistence 
upon this rule of recognition. One way is to argue that it is this 
social nature of the rule of recognition that leaves the Law ‘open’, 
as it were, to a non-tautological grounding of Law, a grounding if 
not in morality, but in consensus, intersubjectively shared ideas, 
in short what (especially meaning-oriented) sociologists would 
recognize as the social. It is with this rule of recognition that we 
find ourselves miles away from a Kelsian, tautological insistence 
upon the basic norm. At the same time - and this is where I think 
Hart’s legal thought closes off Law again - he introduces the 
‘internal point of view’ that resists any description or 
understanding. To understand this it is necessary to further 
specify Hart’s answer to the question: how do people come to 
follow rules at all? What is the affective texture of these relations 
of obligation? 
To Hart, sheer habit - people follow social rules because they 
are used to doing so - is not an adequate answer to this question, 
because it mistakes regularities in behaviour for the mechanism 
through which such patterns in behaviour are established. What is 
needed instead is an account of various orientations towards rules. 
This is where Hart introduces the distinction between internal 
and external aspects of rules. In a crucial passage, Hart speaks of 
the distinction as follows: 
The following contrast […] in terms of the “internal” and “external” 
aspect of rules may serve to mark what gives this distinction its great 
importance for the understanding not only of Law but of the 
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structure of any society. […] [I]t is possible to be concerned with the 
rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept 
them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as 
guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the “external” and 
the “internal points of view” (Hart 1994 [1961]: 88-89). 
Taking an external point of view, then, is to be a non-member, 
‘merely an observer who does not himself accept them’, while the 
internal point of view is reserved to ‘a member of the group 
which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct’. Tamanaha 
(2006) points out that hence effectuated is a mapping between 
being a non-member, being an observer, and not accepting a rule, 
and between being a member and accepting a rule.9 But this 
mapping proves untenable, Hart realizes very well. On the one 
hand, external observers may be content to describe regularities 
and patternings in the members’ actions without reference at all 
to the rule (Hart 1994 [1961]: 89). On the other hand, there are 
surely instances in which participants in rule-following do not 
accept the rule but merely follow it ‘because they judge that 
unpleasant consequences are likely to follow violation’ (id.: 90). 
Describing rule-following can be done without recourse to the 
rule at all; while being a member does not guarantee any 
acceptance of the legitimacy or morality of the rule (see also 
Tamanaha 2006). 
In order for a point of view to be truly internal, then, rules 
must both be oriented to and accepted. There are ways to orient 
oneself to rules, Hart suggests, that are not ‘internal’, either 
because they neglect the rule at all and contend themselves 
merely to record regularities and patterns of behaviour (an 
‘extreme’ external point of view), or because they take a 
hermeneutic, but still ‘theoretical’, approach to the rules. In both 
of these cases, the rule is not an ingredient of actual practices; it is 
not, as an ethnomethodologist may argue, ‘oriented to’ over the 
course of ongoing, practical action. But over the course of 
practical action, rules may not be accepted; non-acceptance of the 
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rule, then, constitutes another instance of an ‘external point of 
view’. This does not mean one cannot ‘go against’ the rule: the 
rule must to some extent be internalized as obliging to allow 
people to go against it; it is only theoretical (as opposed to 
practical) non-acceptance that marks the external perspective. 
Shapiro points out that Hart’s ‘internal point of view’ is more 
adequately grasped, then, as an ‘internalized point of view’, that is 
the view of ‘a specific kind of normative attitude held by certain 
insiders, namely, those who accept the legitimacy of the rules’ 
(Shapiro 2006: 1159); it is furthermore a view that refers to ‘the 
practical attitude of rule acceptance’ (id.: 1159), emphases added. 
This practical acceptance of the rule may manifest itself 
empirically in cases where one acts in accordance with the rule, or 
when participants chastise others for not following the rule, or 
using ‘internal statements’ that point out people’s obligations 
(Hart 1994 [1961]: 102-103; Shapiro 2006). The attitude of 
practical acceptance is the difference, then, between theoretical 
and practical orientations to the rule (Shapiro 2006) and hence, 
between (various kinds of) external and internal views of the rule.  
Several features of Hart’s theory are by now clear: first, its 
divergence from sanction-based accounts of the Law as well as 
Kelsen’s insistence on the basic norm; second, its incorporation 
of ‘the social’ through Hart’s concern with the social convention 
that underlies acceptance of the rule of recognition; third, its 
emphasis on practical attitudes of rule-acceptance as constitutive 
of the ‘internal point of view’. This emphasis on the practical 
attitude of rule-acceptance as constitutive of the internal point of 
view represents an acute challenge to descriptive efforts (Shapiro 
2006). This is so because each description of the internal point of view 
will necessarily be external: the internal point of view can only be 
inhabited, not described in ‘internal’ terms. Now this 
impossibility is not necessarily a problem: just like sociologists 
seek to take seriously, as objects of empirical attention, all kinds 
of moral, religious, and aesthetic evaluations, judgments and 
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justifications without facing the need to ‘adopt the point of view’ 
of the actor (see for such exercises in particular Becker 1982; 
Bourdieu 1979; Boltanksi and Thevenot 2006), they may similarly 
continue to describe what legal rule-following looks like. Hart 
suggests as much when he states that one may still seek to 
describe this kind of internal perspective: after all description 
‘may still be description, even when what is described is an 
evaluation’ (Hart 1994 [1961]: 244). Crucially, however, what is in 
fact not permitted, according to this schema, is to mistake that 
external point of view with that of the internal rule-follower.  
And this is why Hart’s work is so eminently useful to show 
how, precisely by nodding to social rules and in advancing a 
rather sociological thesis that relies on consensus, Hart’s legal 
thought at first reads as a diplomatic exercise: it grants 
sociologists their due. Yes, legal rules depend on the social rule of 
recognition; only that confers legal validity. At the same time it 
illustrates how, in making this gesture, Hart erects an epistemic 
border that may be crossed - it is possible for instance to follow a 
legal rule oneself and in so doing assume an internal point of 
view - but behind the border is something that actively resists 
efforts at representation. Perhaps Law’s province is shown to be 
based upon ‘the social’, but it nevertheless retreats with every 
inquisitive step into the centre of its practices. Again, what is truly 
internal resists description. Again, our descriptive impulses have 
been thwarted; precisely as we attempt to move inside Law’s 
gates, we find ourselves outside, barred by yet another formidable 
obstacle: the limitations of description itself.  
6 What About the Concrete? 
Working through recurring answers to the ever-present question, 
what is the Law?, and working through several perspectival solutions 
to the contradictions and tensions between various answers to 
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ordering principle within these discussions. Taken to their logical 
extremes, neither Kelsen nor Marx nor Black allow us much 
leeway to understand concrete instances of doing, using, mobilizing, 
challenging, thwarting, resisting, or even ignoring Law. Either we 
are left with the ephemeral, fictional Grundnorm, or else 
conceive of the Law as mere form. Even sustained efforts to 
move away from either reductive or tautological understandings 
of the Law - here exemplified by Hart’s conception of legal 
behaviour as consisting in the practical attitude of rule-acceptance 
- erect a border around a kernel of ‘lawness’ that must, by logical 
necessity, resist all description. Our choice between tautology and 
reduction is now rearticulated to become a choice between trying 
to inhabit the impossible, Archimedean, all-seeing location of the 
Bourdieusian sociologist or assume the position of the practical 
rule-follower whose ‘perspective’ on the rule is itself something 
that cannot be described. Either we see much, but not much 
legally; or else we act legally, but do not ‘see’. Either we’re out, or 
we’re in. 
The priest’s story, then, evokes and simultaneously disavows 
certain habits of thought that seem to govern our thinking in the 
presence of the Law. These habits of thought find their source 
and mandate in the demarcation between fact and norm, Science 
and Law, but simultaneously find their nadir in description itself. 
It couples description with the demand for purity, which coupling 
leads to diametrically opposed conclusions with regards to the 
Law. Tellingly, both of these positions remain haunted by the 
sense that there is no substance to Law, only fiction, mere form. 
It is against this background that I wish to introduce a last 
answer to the question, what is the Law? This thinker is Bruno 
Latour.10 Concentrating on his sociology of Law (2010) and 
positioning it within his broader engagement with different 
‘modes of existence’ (2013), I show how Latour offers us a 
glimpse of a different way of approaching and answering this 
question, but ultimately falls prey, again, to the ‘purificationist’ 
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habit I highlighted in the preceding pages. That is, while he 
restores at first to both science and the Law a concrete existence 
lacking in the more abstract understandings put forward by the 
preceding authors, his sociology of law, distinguishing mode of 
existence [LAW] from that of Science, [REF] (the notations are 
Latour’s), similarly falls prey to the temptations of purification. 
Latour’s argument is rather complex, but working through it will 
provide us with a sense of the tenacity of the distinction in 
descriptions of the Law, and - importantly - the academic work of 
purification that sustains it. 
Latour: Diplomatic Purifications 
Latour casts his sociology of Law within two different 
problematics. The first is by now familiar: he seeks to account for 
Law in a way that does not fall back on sociology’s ‘magical 
invocation’ of ‘the social’ (see Latour 2005, 2010) - a position we 
have encountered in Marx and Bourdieu - while it at the same 
time does not want to uncritically adopt Law’s tautological self-
understanding - a position we can roughly attribute to Kelsen. 
The problem with the first, according to Latour, is that it treats 
the Law as ‘a sort of wrapping for power relations’ (Latour 2010: 
140) and cannot understand the specifically legal qualities of legal 
judgments; the problem with the second, for the more 
empirically-minded Latour, is that it disregards all the hesitancies, 
the practicalities, the little emergencies and legal controversies 
that make up the activity of ‘making Law’ and replaces this 
instead with ‘the true reality of the rule and its immanent logic’ 
(id.: 142). For Latour, neither reduction nor tautology, neither 
documentary nor genetic readings of the Law do the trick: ‘if we 
are led to question the notion of “power” or “society”, we will 
also call into question the notion of a “legal rule”’ (id.: 142-143). 
The crucial step he makes is to focus, in a more empirical 
manner, on the actual practices that go into the ‘winding of 
reasoning itself’ (id.: 143) that takes place within the Conseil 
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d’État. The Conseil d’État is the highest appellate and advisory 
administrative court in France, and through an ethnographic 
study of the practices of its members as well as its various clerical 
assistants and its files Latour sets out to construct an account of 
these practices that does not fall prey to either tautology or 
reduction. To Latour, these practices have the capacity to dissolve 
the hold of such abstractions upon our thought. On the one 
hand, these practices show how there is no simple translation of 
violence, power, or interests into legal decisions - for that, the 
members of the Conseil d’État are far too legalistic, far too 
detached, far too recalcitrant, even, in the face of government 
(which after all they are supposed to keep in check). On the other 
hand, these practices show the existence of hesitations, of 
interruptions, of little experiments in reasoning, of doubts and of 
debate, which ‘winding of legal reasoning’ is glossed over in legal 
self-descriptions that put centre stage the self-evidence of rules 
and their intuitive grasping.  
The focus on actual practices here operates in much the same 
way as it has in Latour’s previous work. There, scientific practices 
are similarly understood to be irreducible to academic power-play 
or bourgeois knowledge production, and as invariably more 
complex and rich than suggested by the impoverished 
epistemologies that have to serve double duty as both their 
description and legitimation (see e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Latour 1999). Ever the realist, Latour treats these descriptions as 
the purified abstractions they are and have always been. Over and 
against either conceptions of truth, Latour suggests that facts are 
neither the simple product of ‘nature’ nor an imposition of the 
human mind upon nature; instead, they are far better conceived 
as both factual - they are real - and fictitious - they are made. In 
many ways, Latour pursues this agenda, too, in the Conseil 
d’État. Bracketing both sociological and legal description of legal 
practices, Latour starts instead with the legal practices themselves. 
This emphasis on practices is highly laudable, and indeed a 
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powerful corrective to excessively abstracted and purified 
accounts of the Law. I will say more about the affordances of a 
concentration on practices in the following chapter, but for now 
it must suffice to say that large swaths of Latour’s sociology of 
Law constitute direly needed ‘therapy’ (Cf. Wittgenstein 2001 
[1958]) against the confusion that ensues once we start to 
understand the teloi of practices as their guiding, omnipresent 
logic. Indeed, this emphasis on practices is part and parcel of 
what I will introduce as a pragmatic respecification in Chapter 2. But 
here Latour and I will start to diverge quite radically. The reasons 
for this divergence are found in the second problematic Latour 
addresses in his sociology of Law, in particular in relation to his 
recently elaborated Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013). It is in 
this second problematic that the categorical distinction between 
legal and scientific practices rears its head once again. 
Emancipating Modes of Existence 
The second problematic within which Latour situates his 
sociology of Law is both more general and more specific than the 
first. It is more general, as it aims to account for not only the legal 
mode of existence but a variety of other modes of existence as 
well. In doing so Latour aims to formulate a vocabulary to talk 
not only about the Law, but also about science, art, or politics. At 
the same time the problem is highly specific to what Latour 
considers the weakness of actor network-theoretical approaches 
as they have been developed over the last few decades. Helped 
along to no insignificant degree by his own previous work on 
scientific practices, actor network-theoretical approaches have 
done important work by showing how there is no straightforward 
‘social’. Rather, the ‘social world’ (or perhaps: worlds) hangs 
together by virtue of highly specific but heterogeneous 
entanglements, practices, or networks, composed of very 
different parts (technical, scientific, economic, political, etc.) all of 
which are irreducible to ‘the social’. To Latour, this is both its 
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greatest strength and its Achilles heel. This actor network-
theoretical focus on ‘the network’ (or networks) has remained 
largely oblivious, he states, to that which passes along these networks. 
In so doing it runs the risk of becoming unable to differentiate 
between specific ‘modes of existence’ and in so doing opens up 
room for reduction: not to ‘the social’, but rather to ‘the 
network’. This possibility of reduction is dangerous both 
theoretically and politically: on the one hand, we run the 
theoretical risk of becoming unable to distinguish between very 
different kinds of ‘being’, confusing for instance a religious 
invocation with a scientific fact. Politically, we run the risk of 
glossing over the unicity of these beings and in doing so treat 
them disrespectfully and violently, for instance when we ask of 
religion to justify itself upon epistemic grounds (or to ask science 
to justify itself upon religious grounds, for that matter). These 
kinds of question constitute category mistakes: we ask questions 
within a register of ‘felicity conditions’ - for instance, true or false, 
or legally sound or unsound - which the mode of existence in 
question does not share. It is in this sense that Latour casts his 
Inquiry into Modes of Existence as an exercise in diplomacy: the 
diplomat aims to respect the highly different beings it has 
brought to one table, and to not ask them to meet demands they 
are unable to meet.  
The beings Latour speaks of are not simply different 
substances or essences (here, again, his Inquiry into Modes of 
Existence is anti-essentialist, just as Kelsen’s fictional Grundnorm, 
or Marx’s emphasis on empty form denies ‘the Law’ an 
essence).11 Modes of existence differ not because they are made 
of different substances, but differ because of the different ways 
they deal with the inevitable fact of discontinuity. Between states 
of being lie hiatuses, and it is the modality according to which 
these hiatuses are bridged that defines the specific mode of 
existence. For instance, [REF] is a mode of existence associated 
with scientific practices: there, information has to travel along 
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chains of reference tying together, say, a patch of soil in an 
Amazonian forest, through samples, through tables and 
calculations upon paper, to its publication in a peer-reviewed 
journal. The hiatuses are bridged referentially: each of the links in 
the chain of reference retain information by referring back to the 
link preceding it. [LAW], crucially, is different.  
Latour argues that the legal ‘mode of existence’ [LAW] is 
characterized by a different kind of movement or circulation than 
those characterizing scientific practices. The passage at stake in his 
portrayal of these legal practices is the movement between the 
text of the file and the text of the Law. Latour traces this passage 
as the work of the members of the Conseil d’État unfolds around 
the hefty case files accompanying the cases the Conseil d’État 
seeks to judge. This work consists of series of sequentially 
distributed note-taking operations through which the members 
will try to ‘extract, like diamonds from the ore’ (Latour 2013: 
201), the precise legal issue at stake. They have to ‘extract the 
means from the confused pile which constitutes the file’, the 
means here being his translation of the French moyen, in legal 
practice meaning both legal ground and argument or the precise 
legal issue at stake in this or that case. This moyen is the  
connection, the coming-and-going between two types of writing: on the 
one hand, the ad hoc documents of both parties which are produced 
for and through the occasion, such as statements and various 
productions, and, on the other hand, the printed, authorized, voted 
upon and connected texts which are carefully arranged on the shelves 
of the library [written law] (Latour 2010: 86).  
The moyen is a particular bridge that has to span a hiatus, a gap, 
between two kinds of texts; and this movement is what Latour 
calls the ‘passage of Law’ (2010) which characterizes mode of 
existence [LAW]. In so distinguishing between [REF] and [LAW], 
the mode of existence that organizes reference to the world and 
the mode of existence that emerges in the bridging of the text of 
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the file with the text of the Law, Latour bifurcates between legal 
and scientific practices. Of course, Latour recognizes that judges, 
like scientists, are sometimes concerned with the question of 
reference, that is ‘superimposing layer upon layer of documents 
and tracings, which are very different in terms of their materiality 
(photographs, graphs, documents and plans)’ (Latour 2010: 226). 
Yet this activity, according to Latour, is nothing legal:  
to be sure, it is possible to retrieve numerous traces of this very 
particular kind of activity that one finds in laboratories in judicial 
files, but far from defining the nature of judicial activity, it merely 
organizes a few of its segments, the remainder being characterized by activities 
that are more properly legal (Latour 2010: 226). 
This is the movement - circulation - of reference, i.e. [REF], and is 
as such radically distinct from the legal passage. While 
recognizing, then, that the Law does need ‘facts’ to do its work, 
Latour nevertheless delegates these to the mode of existence 
[REF] and expulses them from [LAW]. ‘The making of Law’ is 
fundamentally unlike - and independent of - the production of 
facts and (referential) truths.  
In its interest in the legal moyen and in its delegation of factual 
questions to mode of existence [REF], Latour’s sociology of Law 
reproduces, then, the same Leitunterscheidung that structures 
Law’s self-understandings. While he warns against hasty 
purification, his account nevertheless again purifies the Law in a 
way that is by now familiar. On the one hand, faced with the 
‘hesitations, the winding paths, the meanders of reflexivity’, in the 
deliberative practices of the members of the Conseil d’État, he 
suggests that ‘we should not be too hasty to purify this movement’ 
(Latour 2010: 151, emphasis added). Proceeding, Latour argues 
that:  
[l]et us not profit until the end from the opportunity of not being a 
legalist ourselves and hence of not understanding too hastily what in 
those movements is purely legal and what is not (Latour 2010: 151).  
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At the same time his demarcation between [LAW] and [REF] is 
an exercise in purification itself. Hesitation before purification: this is a 
movement that characterizes, for Latour, both legal practices 
itself, but it is precisely this movement towards purification that 
characterizes his own argument.  
Only in recognizing the difference between [LAW] and [REF] 
can we, according to Latour, remain diplomatic in our dealing 
with these different modes of existence. But what, I wonder, is 
diplomatic about an effacing of large swaths of judicial work, i.e. 
the neglect of fact- and truth-making in legal settings? And, on a 
more empirical level: while it may be helpful to keep the 
differences between [LAW] and [REF] in clear sight, I do wonder 
- again - what we are to do, conceptually and empirically, with 
concrete practices of truth-telling in legal settings and with the 
performativities of social-scientific accounts of the world. 
7 Simple Stories Losing their Shape: Returning to Kafka 
What started quite innocently as a search for the Law has now 
become a self-perpetuating circle of thought: with our expository 
mandate we run into the limitations of description itself. Kelsen, 
Marx, Black, Bourdieu, Hart, and finally, Latour: we have traced 
the work that the distinction between norm and fact, Law and 
Science, judgment and knowledge is doing in the fraught debates 
about the character of the Law, and, for that matter, the character 
of description itself. While Latour is the ‘odd duck’ in that we 
find ourselves, with him, in the middle of concrete practices, we 
run into a similar tendency towards purification. There, too, the 
distinction between Law and Science is reinstated: each are 
governed by a wholly different felicity conditions, wholly 
different ‘tonalities’ (Latour 2013). It is at that point that Law’s 
expositors have to admit that whatever they say will not quite 
approach the tonality of the Law itself. Running the risk of 
striking such a disharmonious chord, it is better, perhaps, to 
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remain silent. But how, then, to proceed? Perhaps more 
unforgivably, we have purified and abstracted both Law and 
Science in such a way as to divorce their presupposed purity - a 
purity that is not even an essence, for its substance is mere fiction 
or form - from their practical, particular, and concrete existence. 
Tracing this conceptual looping has led us not, then, to the 
capacity to inquisitively ‘hop, skip and jump’ (James 1909: 109) 
through the many concrete practices we encounter, but to 
confusion, contradiction, and in the end: silence, the tools for our 
thinking lying quite uselessly at our feet.  
A similar weariness with interpretation, with description, and 
even understanding itself descends on Joseph K., who becomes 
‘too tired to think about all the ramifications of the story’. The 
story, related to him by the priest, has led him into all sorts of 
thoughts, thoughts ‘not familiar to him, unrealistic things’ (Kafka 
1924: 263). ‘The simple story’, Kafka (id.: 263) writes, ‘had lost its 
shape, he wanted to shake it off, […]’.  
So do I. The next chapter represents an attempt at doing so. It 
starts not with a man who waits before the gates of the Law, but 
with a character already enveloped by it, a character who has no 
choice but to keep on moving and searching, but a character, too, 
who has little time to contemplate and must act in the here-and-
now. I think there is much to learn from this character. For 
instance, in contrast with abstracted and purified accounts of the 
Law, we may begin to ask not what the Law, in general, 
everywhere and always, is, but rather how the Law is done and 
enacted as a matter of practical work. Instead of relying on inside 
and outside visions, we can inquire into how ‘vision’ takes place 
at all - how it is mediated, where it is done - and how the 
distinction between inside and outside the Law empirically takes 
place in many different ways and instances. Instead of keeping our 
accounts harmoniously in tune with legal and scientific felicity 
conditions, we can attempt to stay with the troubles in concrete 
practices: the categorical troubles represented by sociological 
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modes of enacting worlds, and the troubles represented by legal 
modes of organizing knowledge and ‘vision’ upon the world it 
seeks to judge. That, to me, sounds like an alternative. But it is an 
alternative that must start not with stasis but with movement, not 
with detached observation but with envelopment. We find this 
story of envelopment in the story that envelops the ‘opening 
paragraphs of the Law’, that is Kafka’s The Trial itself.  
Enter Joseph K. 
NOTES
 
1 Deleuze and Guattari (1986) are dismissive of allegorical readings of Kafka’s 
work, and for good reason. Yet here is a crucial difference between 
dominant allegorical readings of Kafka’s work and my own: if these 
allegorical readings of ‘Before the Law’ have focused on unearthing just 
what the story says about the Law, I am far more interested in what this 
story tells us about those who come and seek what they think is ‘the Law’. As an 
allegory of ‘the Law’ the story fails, precisely for the reason that it attributed 
to Law an almost transcendent existence that itself must be explained, not 
assumed. As an allegory for the kinds of assumptions made, among 
commentators, about the Law, and about the kind of ‘access’ to it, Before the 
Law succeeds remarkably well - particularly when it is placed, as I will do in 
Chapter 2, in a conversation with the story that envelops it: Kafka’s The Trial 
itself.  
2 Kelsen’s treatment of the state (or the sovereign) as an effect, not source, of 
the Grundnorm diverges sharply from utilitarian, ‘command theories’ within 
legal positivism. Associated in particular with legal scholar Austin, command 
theories of the Law generally suggest that the sovereign acts as a guarantee 
and enforcer of the Law. While both Kelsen and Austin seek to from legal 
thought both moral concerns and social concerns - Austin famously insists 
that ‘the existence of the law is one thing; its merit or demerit another’ 
(Austin 1995 [1832]: 157) - a crucial difference between the two consists in 
their treatment of the nature of Law’s force, and by association, the role of 
the sovereign. For Austin, Law is to be understood as a collection of 
commands, i.e. ‘threats backed by sanctions and statements of legal 
obligation as predictions that the threatened sanctions will be carried out’ 
(Shapiro 2006: 1157). Kelsen however diverges from this account as his 
treats norms as primary. After all, it is norms that specify how and what  
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behaviour is to be sanctioned and who is legitimized to sanction: ‘legal 
norms are to be recast as imperatives directing legal officials to impose 
sanctions on citizens under certain conditions’ (Shapiro 2000: 204). In 
Kelsen’s words: ‘if the state is a community, it is a legal community’ (Kelsen 
1948: 381). 
3 A note to those familiar with genes and theories with regards to their 
operation: I am referring here to an understanding of phenomena as 
determined by a constitutive code (DNA), which is arguably a rather vulgar 
theory of evolution (exemplified best, perhaps, by (popular readings of) 
Dawkins’ theory of the selfish gene (1976). This is not, I must say, 
necessarily a position shared by actually existing geneticists. Indeed, 
advances in the study of processes of epigenetics - within which genes do 
not determine outcomes, but are rather selectively activated or even 
reconstituted in response to processes taking place in the gene’s 
‘environment’ - underscore the limits of genetic reductionism in explaining 
the behaviour of individuals and makes problematic the nature-culture 
binary upon which such genetic reductionism tends to rest more generally.  
4 Obligatory references include, here, Chambliss’ work on vagrancy laws 
(1964); Althusser’s understanding of Law and its relation to the ideological 
state apparatus (1970) one could also think of Wacquant’s account of the 
‘deadly symbiosis’ between the ghetto and the prison, and Law’s 
instrumentality in projects of ‘punishing the poor’ (2009).  
5 Of course, this tension between substance and form is crucial to Weber’s 
sociology of Law as well; however, if Weber suggests that there is a tension 
between the prioritization of means through formal rationality and the 
question of substantive ends and points to the crucial role of legitimacy, 
Marx’s account is much more cynical about the very possibility that Law may 
do anything else than cover up substantive inequalities by legal rational 
means. In other words: for Weber, Law may indeed fall short of its promised 
substantive justice, but to Marx, this is precisely the point of Law, as these 
claims are built upon a conception of freedom and right that is in and of 
itself a mere form (Hunt 2002).  
6 In an interview conducted for the International Journal for Law, Crime and 
Justice, Black describes his stance vis-à-vis Durkheim as follows:  
as a graduate student I was […] somewhat disappointed to discover that 
Durkheim never really delivered what he claimed or promised. And 
because my own work contains no psychology at all, I sometimes saw 
that I am more Durkheimian than Durkheim, and that even Durkheim 
was not really Durkheimian (Ambramowitz and Black 2010: 39). 
7 In doing so, these accounts enact a small but crucial distinction between the 
character and the origin of Law. This distinction, while crucial, plays a minor  
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role in this book and will return to the fore only in my last chapter, where I 
will briefly discuss Benjamin’s (1978 [1921]) account of Law-positing 
violence in relation to social-scientific efforts at description. For now, it 
suffices to say that historicizing accounts notwithstanding, the distinction 
between tautology and reduction, between Law’s factual as well as legal 
‘source’, has not been surpassed in contemporary theorizing. 
8 The difference between a Kelsenian, more hierarchical understanding of the 
relationship between legal norms and their derivative relationship with the 
basic norm and a Hartian conception of the Law that refuses to seek ever 
higher norms of legal validity that culminate in one central basic norm 
roughly maps onto differences between continental jurisdictions 
characterized by a Constitution, and (Anglo-Saxon) common law traditions 
within which the precedent plays a larger role.  
9 As I show, this is in fact a rather superficial reading of Hart’s account of the 
internal and external point of view. However, it is worth noticing that this 
kind of misreading of Hart’s point - the unproblematic mapping of the 
internal view onto members and the external view onto observers, 
sociologists included - surfaces again and again in legal and sociological 
scholarship. See e.g. Tuori’s characterization: ‘the legal scholar is supposed 
to adopt an internal, participant’s point of view, whereas the sociologist is 
said to approach Law from an external observer’s perspective’ (Tuori 2006: 
28), or Cotterrel’s admonition: ‘in order to understand Law, the legal 
sociologist has to understand it as a participant, or as a participant does, or 
rather as many different kinds of participants do - lawyers and citizens, for 
example, living in the world of Law’, so that the sociological study of the 
Law ‘samples, inhabits, imagines, explores, compares, questions and 
confronts different participant perspectives’ (Cotterrel 1996: 369-370). 
10 Latour does not fit neatly the category of sociologist nor that of legal-
positivist. However, as he regularly converses with (or polemicizes against) 
certain strands in sociology (2005) and engages himself specifically with both 
sociology of Law and legal positivism in his recent work on Law, he certainly 
has a place in this discussion. More importantly, however, his empirical 
attention to the particularities of legal work practices is a helpful pointer into 
the right direction and in that capacity a bridge to the next chapter, which 
develops tools to understand both ‘Law’ and ‘Scientific description’ as 
concrete practices.  
11 Indeed, the problem with Kelsen or Marx (or Latour) is crucially not that 
they are essentialists - attributing to the Law a fixed essence - but rather that 
they, in teasing out Law at its purest, fall prey to abstractionism that 
irrevocably ends up with a dematerialized understanding of ‘Law’ as form or 
fiction. The difference is one between an essentialist position that posits that  
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Law is an immutable, fixed ‘there’ (a position not shared by any of the 
authors discussed here, and arguably quite rare) and a position that, as a 
result of its own tendency towards purification, must conclude that there is 
effectively no there there. In other words: the axis around which this 
dissertation turns is not the one of essentialism versus constructivism - a bad 
opposition, as both run the risks of abstractionism - but purified 
abstractionism versus an emphasis on the concrete and bringing that 
concrete into relation with practices of abstraction (e.g. concrete instances of 
‘seeing’ and description, concrete instances of enacting ‘the Law’).  
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2 A Guide for the Perplexed 
1 Shaking it off: Lessons from Joseph K. 
If Before the Law is suggestive of several habits of thought 
surrounding the description of the enigma of the Law, the book 
from which it is taken - The Trial - offers a bewildering sense of 
what it is not to contemplate the Law or to try to steal a glance 
inside, but to find oneself already enveloped by it.  
At first glance, this interpretation is not immediately obvious. 
Think of the tragedy of Joseph K. frantic searching: does he not, 
in the end, fail to find the elusive magistrate judge capable of 
finding him innocent? While Joseph K. may find himself ‘inside’ 
various rooms and offices where the Law is done, he never finds 
what he presumes to be Law itself. In this, he is at least 
superficially quite like the man from the countryside, who fails to 
find what he was searching all along. The suspicion running 
through both stories is at first sight quite similar: it is the 
suspicion that there is no magistrate, that there is no centre to 
this power … Indeed, both stories raise the suspicion that there is 
no there there. ‘Seeking a being, an essence offered to [their] 
mediations, something meaningful to command [their] respect’ 
(Hegel cited in Derrida 1992: 208), both the man from the 
countryside and Joseph K. seem to find nothing at all: Law itself 
remains ‘ungesehen und ungefühlt’ (id.).  
However, this interpretation relies on the assumption that 
Before the Law is supposed to function as a metaphor for the Law 
itself. Only then do the parallels between the two stories become 
so obvious. However, there is also the possibility that Before the 
Law captures not the Law, but one of our ‘delusions’ in the face 
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of the Law. That is the delusion, or the mistaken expectation, that 
there is something there that hides itself, and that we may move 
inside of it and see for ourselves. Indeed, prior to the priest’s 
recounting of the story, the priest warns Joseph K. that he is 
‘deluding himself about the court’, and that ‘that delusion is 
described thus’ - after which the priest relates to him the 
infamous Before the Law. Now, in the last chapter we have seen 
what kind of theoretical cognitive dissonance is required of us if 
we follow this route: yes, we can describe the Law - but we really 
cannot. Yes, we can ‘see inside it’ - but there is nothing to see … 
Envelopment and Journeying 
Let’s zoom in, then, on the differences between Before the Law and 
The Trial. Take this striking passage in The Trial. Before Joseph K. 
is to meet the priest-cum-prison chaplain, Joseph K. finds himself 
at one of the entrances to a large, officious building. There, he 
had been informed, a first hearing with regards to his case would 
be held: a chance for him to plead his innocence. The building is 
large, but, like many of Kafka’s buildings, not spacious. Searching 
various hallways for the room in which he is expected to make 
his appearance, Joseph K. makes some inquiries. Ashamed for his 
legal troubles, he invents for himself an alibi. Going around 
knocking on doors and asking for Lanz, the joiner, he is surprised 
to be pointed in the direction of one room in particular. Entering 
it,  
K. thought he had stepped into a meeting. A medium sized, two-
windowed room was filled with the most diverse crowd of people - 
nobody paid any attention to the person who had just entered. Close 
under its ceiling it was surrounded by a gallery which was also fully 
occupied and where the people could only stand bent down with 
their heads and their backs touching the ceiling. K., who found the 
air too stuffy, stepped out again and said to the young woman, who 
had probably misunderstood what he had said, “I asked for a joiner, 
someone by the name of Lanz.” “Yes,” said the woman, “please go 
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on in.” K. would probably not have followed her if the woman had 
not gone up to him, taken hold of the door handle and said, “I’ll 
have to close the door after you, no-one else will be allowed in.” 
“Very sensible,” said K., “but it’s too full already” (Kafka 1924: 46).  
The resemblance between the woman’s words - ‘I’ll have to close 
the door after you, no-one else will be allowed in’ - and that of 
the Tartar-bearded guard in Before the Law - ‘here no one else can 
gain entry, since this entry was assigned only to you. I’m going 
now to close it’ - is uncanny. Both guard and woman are 
mysterious representatives of the Law; but where the guard locks 
the man from the countryside out of the Law, the Law now 
envelops Joseph K. Even if he does not find that final Judge, that 
final office, he is nevertheless caught in its machinations, forced 
to move about. ‘The Law’ behaves differently in the two stories: in 
Before the Law, it rests and only asks for waiting; in The Trial, its 
tentacles force Joseph K. from room to room. 
Indeed, that movement is a second salient difference between the 
man from the countryside and The Trial’s Joseph K. While both 
man from the countryside and Joseph K. may share the same 
delusion - the delusion that there is a there there - the first remains 
stuck in static contemplation, the second is continually wandering 
from room to room, from office to office, negotiating and 
pleading. Deleuze and Guattari highlight the contrast when they 
suggest that Joseph K., more than anything, is a figure in movement:  
he [Josepk K.] will find justice only by moving, by going from room 
to room, […] He will take control of the machine of expression: he 
will take over the investigation, he will write without stop, he will 
demand a leave of absence so that he can totally devote himself to 
this ‘virtually interminable’ work’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 50-51).  
Envelopment and journeying: these are the two dimensions upon 
which the crucial difference rests. In The Trial, the Law is not 
some mysteriously gated, bounded entity but rather a concrete, 
even networked, many-faced thing. It makes itself known, to 
Ways of Case-Making 
 68 
Joseph K., not in the guise of a solitary guard but is made present 
in many different place-holders (‘lieu-tenants’): from mysterious 
men who show up in Joseph K.’s apartment, to voices on the 
telephone, and from lowliest chambermaid, to artist, to 
investigating judge and his notebook. All, to Joseph K., appear to 
have something to do with the Law, but neither are its pure 
embodiment. Of course Joseph K. keeps searching, but the final 
and decisive magistrate judge is never seen or felt. Meanwhile his 
journey is shaped by concrete conversations and collaborations 
that always lead him into yet another room, yet another office.  
This, then, is The Trial’s comedy: it consists in Joseph K.’s 
delusions coupled with his unwillingness to trust his own eyes. 
Deluded by abstracted metaphors for the Law, escaping him is 
the possibility that his own searching, pleading, and wandering, 
his own journeying from room to room, representative to 
representative, might just provide for a more productive 
understanding of the Law than the priest’s story. That he might 
be helped in his journeying not by revealing parable nor 
‘intellectualist philosophies’, but that he is helped along by the 
‘surprises and cruelties’, the ‘wildness’ (James 1995 [1907]: 9) of 
these experiences. The Trial suggests that the facts of 
encountering, of cajoling, of collaborating, of finding yet another 
passage or room that are themselves the space of ‘Law’.  
This is why Joseph K.’s fraught attempts to find the Law are 
far more interesting than that of the man from the countryside: 
while the latter assumes knowledge of the Law to come to him 
through waiting, Joseph K.’s seeks concrete ways to deal, to 
collaborate, to convince, to mobilize. That he does not find what 
he expected to find - capitalized Law - is an indictment of his 
presumptions, not of his methods of inquiry. After all, it is 
precisely through these concrete, if fraught, practices of 
collaboration that the reader comes to appreciate the viscose and 
the opaque, as well as the smooth and the seamless, of the world 
in which Joseph K. is thrown. Indeed, what is the Law? might have 
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been the wrong question to ask. With Joseph K., we wonder 
instead where it takes place, whom and what it envelops, how it is 
done, and how we might move about it.  
In the following chapter, I will make a turn similar to the one 
effectuated by my juxtaposition of the man from the countryside 
and Joseph K. This is a turn that emphasizes concrete legal 
practices and concrete practices of description and ‘vision’; it is 
also a movement towards an appreciation of the concrete beings - 
methods of inquiry, instruments of measurement, case files - that 
populate these practices. Last, it is also a movement that puts 
centre stage movement itself, especially where it pertains to my own 
inquiries and investigations. The following is an elaboration.  
2 Abstraction and the Remainder of Things 
Description fails in the face of the Law - it must, at some point, 
throw up its hands and accept the fact it has merely 
circumvented, rather than penetrated, the Law. Far from a 
theoretical problem only, this defeatism is a challenge, too, for 
the practices I seek to understand. Relying on a purified 
conception of both Law and scientific description, these tools do 
not enable me to do justice to sociological modes of enacting 
worlds and legal modes of finding out ‘what really happened’. In 
so doing, both the abstraction ‘Law’ and the abstractions of 
‘description’ or ‘seeing’ fail to operate as good abstractions 
should: as tools to think with, and think through, the specificity 
and concreteness of practices (Stengers 2005). Hence the 
necessity to scrutinize both what we mean to refer to when we 
speak of ‘the Law’, and what we do when we seek to describe it 
and to see it at all.  
The answer to these questions lies in the relationship between 
the abstract and the concrete. That is, it lies in understanding the 
descriptions proffered by commentators in the preceding chapter 
as the outcome of exercises in abstraction. Abstraction proceeds 
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by way of flight away from the concrete. Only some things 
survive the process of abstraction while other things become ‘the 
remainder of things’ (Whitehead 1953: 73). In working through 
several answers to the question of the Law, we have seen 
descriptions of a particular kind. Not just any description will do, 
it has been suggested; description must be separated from 
normative evaluation, the ‘ought’, so that description and 
description alone must do the trick. Descriptions, secondly, must 
not only themselves be purely descriptive, but must also index 
and isolate an essential or necessary feature of the phenomenon 
described. This is the function of appeals to descriptive ‘purity’: 
proper descriptions of the phenomenon Law do not include the 
inessential, the accidental, or the contingent. Description of the 
kind offered in the preceding chapter, then, relies upon 
abstraction: on the teasing out of something general, something 
determinative, about the phenomenon in question. By 
distinguishing figure from ground, signal or sign from noise, 
abstraction itself produces the remainder of things.  
Of course, that things are excluded from description after the 
process of abstraction is not in and of itself a problem but 
something that simply accompanies any such effort. Indeed, 
abstractions are eminently useful in the same way good theories 
are: conceived as ‘tools for thinking’ (Stengers 2005), they help 
focus attention, draw distinctions between figure and ground, are 
the precondition for agreement and shape the possibilities for 
dissensus. They are operationally valuable, too, when they 
mediate between different observations, ideas, prior knowledges 
and programs of action in fruitful ways: when, as ideas, they ‘help 
us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience’ 
(James 1995 [1907]: 21).1 But abstractions may also be mobilized 
to sever the link between themselves and ‘the remainder of things’. 
It is at that point a return towards the concrete may come to 
present acute problems. In the conceptions of ‘the Law’ 
presented in the preceding chapter this is evident in their drive 
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towards purification. In asking what is ‘necessarily true of the 
Law’ concrete legal practices are either understood as constituted 
by a determinative signal or sign of the underlying, substantive 
‘social’. In doing so these accounts risk prioritize abstraction itself 
over the concrete practices to which they aim to refer.  
Dupretet al. (2015) speak of this process when they coin the 
kinds of accounts I have highlighted in the preceding chapter 
‘hyper-explanation’. Wanting to account for the operation of 
Law, commentators put forth accounts that ‘deploy abstract 
concepts that have (arguable) relevance to any and all social 
situations and social actions’ (Dupret et al. 2015: 4). Their own 
examples of such hyper-explanations include the notion of 
bureaucracy, modernization theory, and general theories of power 
and domination. While not in and of themselves words that 
necessarily lead to practices of hyper-explanation, these concepts 
tend however to be used in ways that gloss over concrete, 
ongoing practices, for instance when we argue that this or that 
institution responds to ‘modernization’ or this or that practice is 
determined by underlying power relations. It is instructive, here, 
to add to this brief and non-exhaustive list of examples of hyper-
explanations the kind of descriptions proffered by Kelsen or by 
Marx. In their own ways, these descriptions reduce the many 
varieties of legal practices to zoom in on the code they share or 
on the societal interests, purposes, or structures they serve. Aside 
from obvious differences in opinion and foreseeable breakdowns 
in communication between (the admittedly rare) pure Kelsian 
jurists and Marxist sociologists of Law, such hyper-explanations 
suggests that legal practices can adequately be explained with 
reference to their preferred abstraction.  
However, the irony here is that we may look for concrete 
occurrences of capitalized ‘Law’ only to find nothing at all. 
Precisely this chasm between abstract and the concrete is written 
into Kafka’s The Trial. ‘This is where the Law is done’, proclaims 
the Court. Yet instead of that elusive Law, embodied in the 
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absent magistrate judge, Judge Joseph K. finds offices, rooms, 
lawyers, examining judges, notebooks, pleadings and proceedings. 
Compare this with my own experiences: instead of hidden 
interests or the logic of the Grundnorm, I was, upon entry to the 
court under study, confronted with documentary practices, with 
emails, faxes and telephone calls, with episodes of quiet work 
punctualized by the occasional court session or shared lunch. I 
saw offices, computers, files and filing cabinets; hurried judges 
whose ritualistic dress failed to conceal the fact they are only 
humans. I found, in other words, what Whitehead calls ‘the 
remainder of things’ (1953: 73): the things we have not included 
in our abstractions but that nevertheless stubbornly persist in 
experience. Here, our attempts at abstraction runs into troubles 
accompanying their own ‘craving for generality’ (Lynch 1997; Cf. 
Wittgenstein 1958 [2001]: 18) when we are faced with the 
concreteness and specificity of legal practices. 
Of course, we can choose to stay at the level of abstraction 
and disregard practices altogether, yet we have seen this does not 
necessarily lead to clarity, nor does it help us to say something 
about these specific cases, these being: social scientific 
performativities as well as concrete legal practices of truth-
making. Another option is to retain abstraction and to approach 
legal practices as a manifestations of their preferred, hyper-
explanans. Of course, one might say, I don’t ‘see’ the Grundnorm: 
it is after all a fiction! And of course I don’t ‘see’ powerful 
interests at work; Law precisely conceals their operation, so that 
the fact that I do not notice them is a sign of their efficacy (Cf. 
Valverde 2008). Notice, however, how this objection proceeds: it 
saves these specific abstractions, yes, but it can only do so by 
downgrading the concrete facts of experience. Both  
focus on another reality, one that is invisible to the actors themselves 
but which is supposed to explain their behaviour: either the true 
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reality of society and social violence or the true reality of the rule [or 
norm] and its immanent logic (Latour 2010: 142).  
This gesture is one of saving abstract concepts by treating them 
as more real than the stubborn facts of experience. Whitehead 
calls this the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: of attributing to 
abstractions a realer, more concrete existence than experience 
itself (1953: 73). In doing so, it looks suspiciously like ‘throwing 
out the baby and leaving the bathwater for analysis’ (Wilkens 
cited in Dupret et al. 2015: 4). Of course, there is nothing wrong 
with a study of bathwater per se - except, of course, when you 
were interested in the baby. 
How are Abstractions Done? 
One way out of these both conceptual and practical conundrums 
is by asking where and how our abstractions are concretely done. 
Within sociology, this gesture can be traced most directly to 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological studies (1967, 2002). Think, by 
way of an example, of the problem of social order - a 
quintessentially sociological conundrum. How can we explain 
social order? How does it arise? What are its consequences? 
Garfinkel suggests that precisely this question has suffered 
from sociological tendencies towards abstracted hyper-
explanation. Not disputing the ‘objective reality’ of social order, 
Garfinkel draws a contrast between two orientations to the 
question of social order. The first, he suggests, implicitly assumes 
that sociologists derive their mandate from the way they distill 
and isolate ‘order in the plenum’. Often, they are assisted by what 
Garfinkel calls a ‘technology of formal analysis’ (2002), within 
which the concreteness of life is reconfigured. Faced with the 
‘concreteness of social facts of ordinary activities’, they have 
sought to respecify these activities so that they may be ‘displayed 
in details of orderliness in formal analytic and generic 
representational theories’ (Garfinkel 2002: 65). The implicit 
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assumption made, Garfinkel argues, is that there is ‘no order in 
the plenum’ and that sociologists are privileged in their access to 
the objective reality of social facts in a way the actors themselves 
are not. Yet theoretical problems begin to burgeon as soon as 
these sociological abstractions are imbued with a concrete 
existence out there: how precisely do these objective social orders 
steer social action ‘on the ground’? Lost in this process of 
abstraction, Garfinkel suggests, are two important things: first, an 
appreciation of the ways social order is concretely done and enacted as a 
matter of ongoing, practical action; second, an understanding of 
sociological hyper-explanation as just that: a practice of abstraction 
assisted by a specific technology.  
While we may not agree with this portrayal of contemporary 
sociology (of course it is partial!), it is nevertheless worthwhile to 
stay with Garfinkel’s programmatic remarks here. Note how 
Garfinkel does not deny the objective reality of social facts and of 
social order, but that he suggests these must be respecified: that is, 
brought into touch with concrete practices of doing social order 
and, where necessary, modified. The focus is not on the social 
fact as a principle of inquiry but on its status as a phenomenon - in 
other words, something that is concretely achieved. Garfinkel’s 
novelty lies in translating this more general problematic of 
abstractions and their relationship with the concrete into a 
program for investigative action. With Garfinkel, we find ways to 
stay with the concrete for a while and to inquire into how ‘our’ 
abstractions are locally enacted. Latour’s sociology of Law is 
precisely in this sense important: it refuses to treat legal practices 
in the Conseil d’État as exemplars or manifestations of an 
invisible governing norm or social logic; instead, he is interested 
in ‘the winding path of practice’ (Latour 2010: 142).  
It is with this respecification in mind that I will turn to the two 
abstractions that, in the preceding chapter, were continually 
played out against each other. On the one hand, I want to replace 
overtly abstract speech of ‘the Law’ with an appreciation of, even 
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care for, concrete legal practices. On the other hand, I want to 
move away from conceiving of representation in the abstract 
towards an understanding of how ‘representation’ is done. 
Together, these gestures constitute a pragmatic respecification of the 
Law-Science conundrum. Emphasizing concrete practices of 
description and ‘vision’ as well as concrete legal practices, this 
pragmatic respecification opens up room to stay with the 
conceptual troubles within the practices that we call ‘the Law’ or 
‘Science’. In the following, I concentrate on a series of salient 
dimensions - the courtroom, the legal rule, the file, methods of 
scientific inquiry - of concrete legal and scientific practices to give 
flesh and bone to this pragmatic respecification.  
3 Legal Practices: The Courtroom and the Archive 
A pragmatic respecification of the enigma of Law returns to the 
concrete practices in and through which ‘the Law’ is done and 
enacted. It does not seek for pure Law embodied but locates it in 
its concrete operations, most notably those taking place in self-
designated legal practices. Of course, legal practices are never tied 
only to a specific site nor tied to a specific professional group; 
lay-people may orient their actions towards legal standards 
(Garfinkel 1967), and the Law is done at borders, in policy-
making, in trade and commerce, in the fabrication and legal 
qualification of ‘people and things’ (Mundy and Pottage 2004). 
Yet courts, precisely by promising the unity of place, time, and 
act - ‘this is where the Law is done’ - offer themselves up as the 
legal setting par excellence. What better way to situate our 
abstractions than to start with the concrete practices that make us 
this promise? 
The Courtroom 
Joseph K. is partially right to go on searching for ‘the Law’ in 
courtrooms: they are the site of interrogation, of narrative strife, 
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and of interaction between co-present participants (Atkinson and 
Drew 1979; Conley and O’Barr 1990, 1997; Matoesian 1993; 
Dingwall 2000). In the specifically Dutch context studied here - 
the practices of magistrate judges, or politierechters - they are also 
sites of judicial inquiry and decision. In a sense, courtrooms 
dramatize precisely the (abstract) encounter of Subject and Law 
deferred in both The Trial and Before the Law: that of the subject 
thrown before the punishing gaze of the judge. Yet treating 
judgment as a practical, ongoing achievement, the pragmatic task 
is to inquire into how judgment is achieved over the course of the 
interaction between defendant and judge. Pointed to as sites of 
‘degradation ceremonies’ (Goffman 1956), courtrooms are 
pregnant with both legal and moral possibility. Not only the 
defendants’ legal culpability, but also her morality is in question: 
courtrooms are among the sites where the ‘soul’ of the defendant 
(Cf. Foucault 1977) and particularly his/her remorsefulness 
(Weisman 2004, 2014) is an empirical question for decision-makers. 
While studies of the role of remorse in these decision-making 
practices have generally demonstrated its importance, precisely 
how, on a local level, remorse is communicated, negotiated, and 
challenged remains a question ill-attended to (Bandes 2015). This 
lacuna in studies of the role of remorse in legal settings raises 
questions about the ‘practical grammar’ (Dupret 2011) of 
remorse; in other words, how ‘remorse’ is interactively and 
narratively established. How, then, do judges make sense of the 
defendants’ remorsefulness in court? How is such sense-making 
mediated by the stories told by the defendant him/herself? How 
do judges weigh, prioritize, and evaluate these narratives?  
Courtrooms are ‘rich’ settings: they dramatize, in their 
infrastructural layout and procedural demands, the encounter 
between the subject and ‘the Law’ that is often elevated to the 
level of general truth. Yet settings like these are far from the only 
venue where the Law is enacted in the broader sense. That is: 
although they may be the site of face-to-face interaction, as well 
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as the performative utterance par excellence - the ‘you are guilty’ 
(Austin 1955: 59) - these Courtroom dramas depend on 
protracted episodes of quiet ‘face-to-file interaction’ (Scheffer 
2005: 75) taking place in the court’s ‘backstage’ (Goffman 1959), 
as well as professional familiarity with legal rules and statutes. It is 
to these dimensions of legal practices I now turn.  
The Archive 
If the aforementioned face-to-face interactions are fruitfully 
studied as practices of ‘doing Law’ and ‘doing remorse’, a crucial 
difference between social and legal orders starts to emerge when 
we take into account two further specificities of legal practices. 
The first difference pivots on the distinction between ‘social 
rules’ and legal rules; the second emphasizes the specificities of 
bureaucratic action in its concern with the legal case file. Both 
concerns - the rule and the file - have to do with the materiality 
and the temporality of the legal archive. That is the way legal 
practices mobilize, produce, and process materials explicitly 
aimed to outlast their moments of mobilization, production, or 
processing. More concretely, first I am referring to the body of 
legal rules stored and transmitted in black-letter Law; second, I 
am pointing to the information storage, transmission, and 
retrieval technique of the case file.2 Both are two sides of the 
archival coin: the first pertains to commandment - to rules, to 
obligations, to ‘the place from which order is given’ - while the 
second pertains to commencement, the site ‘where things 
commence’ (Derrida 1995: 9) with the original filing of a 
document. Both are salient dimensions of legal practices. Indeed, 
with Latour (2010) we might understand these legal practices as 
engaged in the making of a connection between these two 
dimensions of legal practices: from file to law-book. Of course, 
the empirical, pragmatic question is how, precisely, this 
connection is made.  
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A Body of Laws 
Think, first, of legal rules: the written constitution and the stored 
and transmitted decisions that make up legal precedent. In legal 
practices, we are not solely dealing with a purely sociological 
abstraction - ‘social order’ - which then must be treated as an 
ongoing and practical accomplishment, but rather with a kind of 
practice ingredients of which clearly exist prior to the work of 
enactment. That is, legal practices can emphatically not invent 
standards of legality each time anew in a way similar to the 
ongoing, practical accomplishment of social order with each and 
every interaction. Specific to legal practices is precisely their 
stability over time: with the exception of a constitution, typical 
legal practices do not invent Law anew each time but are oriented 
to a body of rules and statutes. In short: legal practices are 
enacted with reference to an archive of rules and precedent that 
envelops the locality and temporality of specific work practices. 
But that does not mean that legal rules can be understood to 
unproblematically guide and steer legal activities. Hawkins (1992) 
suggests that there is significant fact-finding and fact-defining 
discretion involved in the choice for a certain legal rule over 
another. In this sense legal rules are not a fixed ‘legal context’ to 
legal practice, but part and parcel of these practices. Within a 
pragmatic understanding of practices, legal and procedural 
‘context becomes a moving horizon’ (Scheffer 2010: 45) made 
relevant to the here-and-now by implication: that is, when these 
rules are oriented to, included and enfolded in the here-and-now 
of practical activity. The normative ‘theory’ or ‘model’ of 
decision-making, written down in black-letter Law, does not 
stand apart from the practice to guide it; the ‘theory’ is part and 
parcel of the practice itself. In asking the question how actors 
come to orient their actions and decisions to a body of legal rules 
at all I zoom in on precisely the ‘missing what’ (Garfinkel 2002: 
99; Dupret et al. 2015: 4-6; Dupret 2011; Travers 1997) in much 
socio-legal scholarship. A pragmatic respecification of the ‘Law’, 
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asking where and how Law is done, must remain sensitive to this 
difference between legal rules and the ‘social rules’ sociologists 
speak of.  
‘Fallen Writing’: The Case File 
This understanding of the interrelationship of legal rules and legal 
action - that is, the point that they constitute legal practices 
together - also offers a way into the specificity of these concrete 
practices, that is those taking place within a Dutch, inquisitorial, 
lower criminal court. The specificities of this setting lead me to a 
second permutation of the legal archive: that is, the legal case file. 
This object has received rather little attention in sociological 
accounts of the Law’s workings (Scheffer 2005, 2007; a problem 
these share moreover with historical studies, see Vismann 2008). 
Perhaps this has to do with our tendency to treat documents as 
mirrors onto the world instead of objects of interest in and of 
themselves (see Prior 2008), or with a more Anglo-Saxon focus in 
the study of legal practices, which jurisdictions tend to rely to a 
far smaller extent on the ‘administrative technology’ of the legal 
case file (Vismann 2008). While Anglo-Saxon courtrooms are in 
general more ‘phonocentric’ (Derrida 1967) in that they privilege 
oral testimony and may dismiss written evidence as hearsay, 
Dutch criminal law in contrast makes far more procedural 
allowances for (formal) written materials: not ‘voice’ but the 
‘fallen writing’ (Cf. Messick 1989) of administrative forms, 
process-verbals [processen-verbaal], expert reports and witness 
statements found in the legal case file play an important role in 
Dutch criminal law. In contrast with black-letter Law, these legal 
case files are more humble, ‘pragmatic writings’ (Luhmann 2004: 
237) may not be made to last forever but must nevertheless allow 
for decisions in the here-and-now about the there-and-then. 
Legal practices are also archival practices, then, in the informational 
sense of the word: they draw on case files to collect, store, and 
transport materials that allow a decision in the here-and-now of 
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the courtroom about the there-and-then of the offense in 
question. After all, judges say, ‘we were not there when [the 
offense] actually happened’. Legal practices may hence fruitfully 
be studied as practical, archival work concerned with the bringing 
into a mutual relation ‘deposits, traces, signs or clues’ (Osborne 
1999: 58). Again, the empirical question is hence how, over the 
course of practical work, case files come to be implicated in the 
unfolding of everyday judicial activities, and how they allow the 
production of a spatio-temporal bridge between the here-and-now of 
the decision, and the there-and-then of the (alleged) offense in 
question.  
Time-Space Matterings 
In this sense this pragmatic respecification builds upon Latour’s 
sociology of Law (2010, 2013) in that it takes seriously the 
practices that go into making a connection between the text of the 
file and the text of the Law. Both rule and information, or more 
concretely: law book and case file, are implicated in legal practices. 
Both legal rule and case file are things we need to contend with if 
we seek a pragmatic respecification of the thin and ephemeral 
abstractions that have proven unproductive as tools for thinking. 
Yet the conception I am seeking diverges from Latour’s 
conceptualization in that it directs more attention to both the 
materiality and the temporality of the archive. One, Latour has a 
tendency to treat case files solely as containers of texts of which 
the decision-makers try to make sense (see also van Oorschot 
2014a, van Oorschot and Schinkel 2015). In portraying juridical 
practices in this light it is tempting to forget that the case file has 
a material existence: that it is made of heavy carton folders 
collecting written and photographic evidence, or of digital files 
that can be accessed using personal computers. A second 
difference pertains to its temporalities: the fact that the ‘bridge’ 
between case file and law book in question requires a temporal 
folding as well: the making of a relation between the here-and-now 
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of the decision and the there-and-then of the offense in question. 
Just how the legal case files mediates this temporal folding is 
another question that assumes importance in my efforts to 
restore to legal practices their practical robustness (see Chapters 5 
and 6 respectively for my empirical discussion of these issues).  
4 Knowing the Law: How Vision Happens  
Part of our task is now respecified: it consists not of seeking 
abstract Law above or behind the concrete, but starts with the 
concrete itself and devises abstractions that may do productive 
work in organizing experience satisfactorily. However, with a 
pragmatic understanding of abstractions comes not only the 
question of the concrete practices they wish to help navigate, but 
also the question about the making of abstractions itself. In other 
words, how are these activities situated? In the preceding chapter, 
we see that such exercises in abstraction have either adopted a 
language of representational description - speaking in the realm 
of the ‘is’, within which a word comes to stand for a world - or, 
when meeting the challenge of incommensurable understandings 
of the Law, have shifted in focus to adopt a language of 
perspective. Yet this perspectivism similarly runs into the 
limitations of description of the Law: either we are returned, via 
Bourdieu, to the unmasking expositor already embodied in Marx; 
or, via Hart, to the viewpoint-that-is-no-viewpoint of the internal 
rule-follower. The problem with these understandings of 
description and of perspective, I argue here, lies in its disregard 
for the concrete, situated activities of knowing that precede and 
inform both vision and description. In this sense, both 
representational description and vision may be convenient catch-
all ways of speaking about (knowing) practices, yet both miss out 
on the concrete ‘in-between’ (James 1995 [1907]): that which lies 
between the knowing subject and the known object.  
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The Mediated In-Between 
The implicit model of knowing that informs both mandate to 
representational description and the emphasis on vision and 
perspective can be understood as the ‘spectator theory of 
knowledge’ (Dewey 1929). It postulates a crucial distinction 
between, on the one hand, the perceiving mind (the metaphorical 
‘eye’) and on the other, the world which extends before it. Within 
this model, knowledge can be arrived in either of two ways: it 
passes from the world into the perceiving mind; or else the eye 
surveys the world. The postulated direction of the arrow - from 
world to mind, from mind to world - is suggestive of ‘empiricist’ 
or ‘rationalist’ understandings of knowledge respectively; yet what 
they share is the distinction between eye and world.  
For Dewey such a conception of knowledge must, from the 
start, exclude an appreciation of knowing as a matter of practical 
activity (Dewey 1929: 22). We do not simply ‘know’ the world 
because we survey it or because it impresses itself mercilessly 
upon our passive senses. Instead knowledge is the outcome of 
various ways to experiment, collaborate, and grapple with the 
world’s recalcitrances and affordances (Gibson 1979). Think, for 
instance, of trying to find out where the light switch is in a 
strange and darkened hotel room. Our eyes may not help us, but 
our sense of touch, coupled with our guesses as to typical 
locations for light switches, do. Our body and our expectations 
mediate the encounter. It is only in retrospect that these activities 
become the ‘in-between’, or rather, the ‘before’ of metaphorical 
(and in this case, literal) illumination. In contrast with approaches 
that treat knowledge or vision as unproblematic and radically 
separate the observer from the observed, a more pragmatist 
understanding emphasizes, instead, this neglected in-between. 
The empirical question facing us, then, is how this ‘in-between’ 
takes place concretely. Or, formulated differently, it raises 
questions about the situatedness of knowledge: how, in other 
words, our capacities for ‘sight’ and ‘vision’ are mediated and 
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distributed. In order to tease out these concerns I turn to Donna 
Haraway (1988). 
Situated Visions 
Like Dewey, Haraway (1988) draws out the metaphorical 
connection between knowledge and ‘vision’ when she suggests 
that visual metaphors - vision, E/enlightenment, insight - have 
proven productive in glossing over the active work that 
constitutes knowing. Yet she seeks to retain the metaphor of 
vision by mutating our conception of the ‘eye’. She does so by 
translating it from either an all-seeing force or a passive recipient 
of data into an active and situated perceptual system. The metaphorical 
eye is assisted by ‘prosthetic devices’: instruments that amplify 
and mutate our ‘seeing’ capacities: 
the “eyes” made available in modern technological sciences shatter 
any idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices show us that all 
eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, 
building on translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of 
life (Haraway 1988: 583). 
With its emphasis on prosthesis - literally, that which is ‘put 
before’ but better conceived of as that which is ‘plugged in’ - this 
conception of vision understands knowledge to be mediated. 
That is, the ‘in-between’ that constitutes subject and object is 
made out of many parts that help us ‘see’: e.g. experimental set-
ups that help us stabilize and isolate a phenomenon of interest; 
measurement techniques such as the survey, eliciting responses 
on pre-coded categories; data analysis techniques that help us 
order and reorder into patterns suggestive of correlations. Our 
‘ways of seeing’ depend on this mediated in-between and are 
shaped by it; after all, there is only so much one can ‘see’ with a 
particle accelerator, an experiment, a survey, or for that matter an 
interview. This mediated in-between is a material-semiotic 
assemblage populated by things of many kinds: cultural codes and 
Ways of Case-Making 
 84 
categories play their part, sure, but the in-between is also 
populated by things - pragmata. This conception of knowing calls 
for attention to the material-semiotic mediations and distributions 
of knowing practices: 
there is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in 
scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly 
specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, 
partial ways of organizing worlds (Haraway 1988: 583). 
Now, such an understanding of knowing clearly disallows any 
appeal to absolute, capital-t Truth. There is no ‘view from 
nowhere’: no all-seeing eye that, unmediated and detached, 
observes the world as it is.3 Claiming this Archimedean position 
constitutes, for Haraway, a ‘God trick’ (1988): it glosses over or 
positively ignores the many mediations that allowed vision to 
occur at all. In a way, Bourdieu’s sociology of Law falls prey to 
this specific ‘God trick’. Note how Bourdieu (1987) situated both 
laypeople’s and legal professionals’ specific ‘visions’. But what 
about his own ‘perspective’ on these issues? Where is that 
perspective located, and how is it mediated? We have seen that 
his ‘perspective’ leads us back to the role of the unmasking 
expositor who sees things as they really are behind the legal 
façade. Here, Bourdieu aims to ‘represent while escaping 
representation’ (Haraway 1988: 581). Of course, such a move is 
impossible - there is no Archimedean point of view. Nor does 
this emphasis on situated knowledges amount to relativism4 in 
which every perspective is as valid as any other: truth does not 
‘vary with the subject’ but rather speaks to the ‘condition in 
which an eventual subject apprehends a variation’ (Deleuze 1993: 
21). Condition, situation: both speak to the constitutive 
implication of the observer in ‘detailed, active, partial ways of 
organizing worlds’ (Haraway 1988: 583).  
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Visions and Worlds: On Enactment 
Haraway’s insistence on the ‘organization of worlds’ is crucial 
here. If the subject only emerges as a result of observation, then 
the object to which the perspective refers is similarly an effect of 
observation. The relation is one between ways of seeing and ways of 
world-making (the formulations here are, respectively, Berger’s 
(1972) and Goodman’s (1978: 7)). Within the study of knowledge 
practices, this dimension of knowing activity is often referred to 
as performativity (Butler 1990), or enactment (Mol 2002).5 Mol’s 
(2002) study of the concrete ways through which the disease 
atheroslerosis is done and enacted is especially helpful in this 
regard. Much like Butler (1990), she is not content to understand 
(in this case biological) matter as a passive substratum of knowing 
activities. The distinctions between biological sex and social 
gender, between physical disease and socially constructed illness, 
is one that continues to uphold a sense of a world from which we 
are quite radically cut off. This world is conceived to be unitary 
and prior to, and independent of our actions. Yet precisely 
because knowing is always an activity not just ‘about’ the world, 
but in and with specific worlds, the distinction necessarily 
collapses. Within the hospital practices she studies, Mol (2002) 
notes that the disease atherosclerosis is not ‘constructed’ or 
‘thought of’ in different ways, but rather that its reality is enacted 
in different ways. We do not simply ‘know’ objects; we ‘enact 
reality in practice’ (Mol 2002: 50). In that sense, there is a real and 
non-trivial sense in which there is not one world at all; only 
multiple worlds that may, or may not, be unified under the 
banner of the one.6 Precisely this recognition - that we make 
different worlds as soon as we start any kind of collaboration 
with specific worlds, and that these worlds are not necessarily 
compatible with each other - opens up room for us to become 
able to assume responsibilities for the worlds we make. For 
Haraway, this kind of responsibility is the ability to give an account: 
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an account-ability that consists in the willingness to ‘become 
answerable for what we learn how to see’ (Haraway 1988: 583).  
5 Making Room: Three Ways of Case-Making 
Slowly but surely we are arriving at the possibility to make room 
for the troubles I highlighted in the introductory chapter of this 
book. The Law has been de-purified and restored to its practical 
and concrete robustness; description and vision have similarly 
been shown to be situated in concrete and highly variable, highly 
specific ways of knowing and enacting the world. It is with this 
vocabulary that we can start to do justice to both sociological and 
judicial ‘ways of case-making’.  
Enacting Worlds: Social-Scientific Case-Making 
First, if abstraction always generates a ‘remainder of things’, and 
making knowledge is rooted in specific engagements and 
collaborations with reality, room is opened up to start inquiry into 
the reality effects of sociological accounts of legal practices.  
Raising this question allows me to inquire into the specific 
reality effects produced by sociologists who, much like me, have 
sought to study legal practices. For instance, it allows me to ask 
just what it was about the Leiden study that rendered legal 
practices so alien to judges. With a conception of knowing as a 
situated and mediated practice comes the possibility to unpack 
the mediations crucial to the production of the Leiden study’s 
account. On the one hand, it is worth inquiring how the Leiden 
study has enacted its object - judicial decision-making - but we 
may also ask what other realities, perhaps ‘collateral’ (Cf. Law 
2009) to that central object, are being made. In so doing this 
approach also moves away from understanding legal 
professional’s self-understandings as ‘miscognition’ (Cf. Bourdieu 
1978) and instead aims to treat their perceptions as at least 
partially correct in that the ‘view’ granted by the Leiden study is 
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but one, and far from the only, mode of enacting legal practices. 
Inquiring just how this reality is made allows us to take seriously 
the rather significant levels of discomfort judges expressed in 
relation to the Leiden study, and inquire into how ‘their practice’ 
was made and remade in the researchers’ attempts to know it.  
But this recognition of the relationship between knowledge-
making and world-making also raises questions with regards to 
the situatedness of other kinds of accounts of legal practices. For 
instance, we find more interpretatively oriented sociologists 
criticizing statistical accounts of legal (sentencing) practices 
because these would tend to neglect actual, unfolding instances of 
legal decision-making. Often, a concentration on narrative and 
spoken language is perceived as capable of counterbalancing this 
emphasis on offender and offense ‘factors’ (Mears 1998). E.g. we 
find Tata suggesting that these ‘factors’ only emerge over the 
course of narrative typification practices on the part of decision-
makers: 
Far from being discrete, immutable and irreducible elements, in the 
routine decision process “factors” are inextricable and inseparable 
from the meaning of the constructed and reconstructed typified 
whole-case narrative (Tata 2007: 435). 
Often, the courtroom is pointed to as a particularly salient site of 
story-telling and of narrative strife (Jackson 1988, 1996). This 
emphasis on narrative typification and its situatedness in 
courtrooms is important to follow up on, yet the question - again 
- is how and where such a mode of enacting legal realities is 
situated, and whether accounts like these do not themselves neglect 
other important facets of legal practices. As we will see, these 
narrative-centred accounts have the tendency to enact legal 
practices as a kind of dematerialized struggle over the meaning of 
words and the sense of stories, hence neglecting a crucial, if 
recalcitrant object in and of legal practices. I am referring here of 
course to that transporter of evidence, clerks’ and judges’ access 
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to ‘what really happened’, object of struggle in and of itself: the 
legal case file.  
Truth as a Legal Epistopic: Judicial Case-Making 
The legal case file assumes particular importance in relation to 
local ways of finding out ‘what really happened’. As I have 
bracketed the constitutive distinction between norm and fact, 
Law and Science, the presence of truth-making practices within 
legal practices represents not a conceptual problem but an object 
of study in and of itself. Opened up is the question how various 
‘epistopics’ (Lynch 1993) - topics of epistemological concern like 
truth, method, and observation - are done as a matter of 
unfolding activity in the sites we study. How, in other words, 
does observation take place? How are facts7 made? How is truth 
established? This is not to suggest that the truths made in legal 
settings will pass scientific tests of accuracy, but merely to insist 
on local ways of ‘seeing’ and enacting specific realities. In other 
words, there where legal practices promise some kind of access to 
‘what really happened’, these instances are helpfully addressed 
using a distributed, mediated, and practical conception of 
observation. Particularly the case file, allowing the transportation 
of evidentiary materials and the translation of an event into a 
punishable offense, is a salient ingredient of these epistemic 
practices: without it, there is no ‘case’ to be made.  
This interest in local, epistemic practices is to be distinguished 
from exercises that treat ‘the Law’ as a more or less homogenous 
‘epistemic subject’ (Teubner 1989) that orders and constructs 
reality in its own terms. While this Luhmannian vocabulary allows 
us to decentre the seeing subject - just like Haraway’s insistence 
on perceptual systems does (1988) - it is important to stay with 
the practical robustness, as well as the specificity of concrete 
practices. Here, the contrast I make is between, on the one hand, 
a vocabulary that ties the capacity for systemic observation onto 
societal subsystems, and on the other a more pragmatic 
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understanding of truth-making allows for multiplicity within and 
between ‘subsystems’. By tying observation so tightly to the 
various societal subsystems, this Luhmannian approach after all 
leaves little room to appreciate the aforementioned instances of 
multiplicity, both within and between various subsystems: the 
fact, for instance, that atherosclerosis is something multiple, even 
within what we might call the medical-scientific subsystem (Mol 
2002); or the fact that there is, empirically speaking, no one ‘legal 
perspective’ or no one ‘sociological perspective’ to begin with. A 
second difference to be kept in mind, here, is the one between a 
Luhmannian concentration on communication - in other words, 
on semiosis - and Haraway’s (1988) material-semiotics, which 
includes both meaning and things (see, for Luhmann’s treatment 
of materiality (or lack thereof), Philoppopoulos-Mihalopulos 
2014; van Oorschot and Schinkel 2015). In so doing we may 
come to appreciate the case file not only as the surface of 
semiotic signs, but as a material entity shaping judicial case-
making practices.  
An insistence on the specificity and materiality of mediation 
(Haraway 1988), coupled with a concern with enactment (Mol 
2002), all in all allows for a more fine-grained understanding of 
knowing practices - wherever they practically occur. It proceeds 
on the basis of the suggestions that ‘observation’ of the world is 
never a disembodied, dematerialized practice of detached 
surveying but a situated and mediated practice (Haraway 1988). 
Indeed, treating the question as to ‘what really happened’ as a 
mediated practice also means opening up room to study its 
distribution over a variety of actors. Among these actors are human 
actors, particularly court clerks, or defendants, but also non-
human ones, specifically of course the transporters and 
transformers of written evidence: the legal case files. But this 
activity is also distributed over various sites: on the one hand, the 
veridictional site of the courtroom; on the other, the relatively 
more quiet backstage offices and file-rooms. This approach, then, 
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brackets juristic understandings of the judge as the all-
determining actor within such local ‘epistemic practices’ (Lynch 
1993) and instead distributes knowing activity over both human 
and non-human actors. If we wish to cast this discussion in 
perspectivist terms at all, the question is not who ‘has’ the 
internal point of view, but rather one that wonders how, where, and 
when perspectives upon the case happen.  
Situated Ambulations: This Case 
The emphasis on activities of seeing, description, and abstraction 
raise question as to the ‘case’ I will be making throughout this 
book. In other words, what does the ‘in-between’ of my own 
collaborations with realities look like? How is this case situated? 
Of course, the first thing to emphasize here is how this case is 
the product of speaking with and working alongside a total of 14 
‘police judges’ in a Dutch court, of acquainting myself with the 
many other actors populating ‘their’ ecology of practice - 
especially clerks and case files! - and of following cases from file 
room, to judicial desk, to the courtroom. Taking place over a 
period between March 2013 and November 2015, this fieldwork 
consisted of both trying to understand the goings-on within the 
court’s administrative offices, its dealings with files, and judges’ 
pre- and post-trial appraisals of the individual cases. Drawing on 
a technique of ‘shadowing’, my observations of judges’ work 
practices mostly took place right at their desk and right in the 
courtroom, where after some months I was allowed to take place, 
properly attired in robe and bib, at the judicial desk. I ‘shadowed’ 
14 judges this way. I studied ‘their’ files prior to their preparatory 
work practices as well, so that I became familiar with about 250 
individual cases (this number excludes the case files studied 
during my own preparatory study of files), the vast majority of 
which were decided on by the judges I shadowed (some cases 
were suspended). Informal talk and conversations with judges 
and clerks over lunch and throughout the ethnographically 
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infamous hallways further helped me along, as well as the 
opportunity I was granted to participate, in the Fall of 2013, in a 
three-day educational course for beginning police judges. 
Throughout this book, or rather case, I will refer to the 14 crucial 
judges using a pseudonym, while other judges I spoke with on a 
more informal basis will be referred to simply as ‘a judge’ (a 
distinction that will help you situate their words). Similarly, 
defendants whose individual case I have observed (and about 
which I have spoken with judges) are referred to by a (fictional) 
name, while more generalizing statements - either mine or those 
made by judges - will simply refer to ‘defendants’.  
Now, the preceding notes are only a bare outline of the 
activities of which my collaborations with this practice consisted. 
However, it is only a beginning of an answer to the question of 
how this case is situated. Indeed, this question is difficult to 
answer in such broad strokes, as each of the following chapters 
are rooted in different kinds of collaborations. One is based on a 
close reading of the Leiden study and aims to reconstruct, from 
the text as well as from correspondence with one of its authors, a 
sense of the specific choices made and methods used. Another 
chapter focuses on verbal interactions in court and is rooted in 
informal conversations with judges and observations of court 
proceedings. Yet another takes as its object clerks’ and judges’ 
file-based preparation practices, and is largely rooted in 
observations of their face-to-file interaction (Scheffer 2005). The 
last empirical chapter, in turn, combines various sources of data - 
conversation as well as observation of court proceedings. Taken 
together, these modes of collaboration combine a critical8 
approach to social-scientific approaches surrounding ‘my’ object 
of study - judicial decision-making practices - with a praxiographic 
concern (Mol 2002) with the practical work that constitutes 
‘judging’.  
This praxiographic concern is itself less a well-defined method 
than a sensitivity to the vagaries of actual practices. Indeed, what 
Ways of Case-Making 
 92 
exactly constitutes praxiography is in and of itself difficult to say; 
it all depends on the way it is exercised in relation to specific 
problems, specific settings, and specific objects. In lieu of a neatly 
packaged definition of the ‘tool’ of praxiography, then, I prefer to 
think of it as an active mode of paying attention to actual 
practices, and, with James (1995 [1907]: 9) especially to their 
‘surprises and wildness’. Given my emphasis, too, on the case file 
as a salient ingredient of these practices, this praxiographic 
sensibility contrasts productively, for my purposes, with 
ethnography as it is commonly understood: that is, with 
ethnography as a mode of researching and writing that takes as its 
object human actors and their culture. Praxiography’s objects of 
concern are not any predetermined human collectives (the 
‘ethnoi’) or their culture, but practices. Last, and much like 
ethnography, it places emphasis on writing and rewriting (graphein) 
over the extraction, from practices, their guiding logos (as in: 
praxe-ology, see also Schatzki, Cetina and Savigny 2001).  
To me, praxiography’s definitional openness is immensely 
productive, precisely because there are no pre-existing habits that 
can dictate how one should go about ‘doing’ or ‘using’ 
praxiography. Indeed, the very notion forces us to think about 
how we conceive of practices and how we might write about 
them. Praxiography is precisely therefore a ‘tool for thinking’ 
(Stengers 2005), that is an attempt give ‘to the situation [itself] the 
power to make us think’ (Stengers 2005: 185). It also raises direct 
questions with regards to its own ‘toolness’, that is, its own non-
innocence in mediating our own inquiries. It is not immediately 
ready-to-hand to us, but mere contemplation upon its capacities 
and limitations will not do either. It must be taken up in so that 
we can work through its affordances, and there is no guarantee such 
efforts will yield the desired results. In other words: it produces 
itself the risk the researcher will have to be willing to take (Cf. 
Stengers 2005). Taking it up is each and every time a new and 
particular gesture (id.: 185). Its ‘application’, or rather its exercise, is 
A Guide for the Perplexed 
 93 
intimately connected with the specificities of the ‘object’ of study, 
whether this is a peer-reviewed article, narratives in court, or 
various ‘doings with documents’ (Harper 1998) in legal practices. 
It is for that reason that I will not isolate these concerns in a 
separate methodological chapter, but comment on the way this 
praxiographic sensibility takes shape in relation to specific sites 
and objects of study throughout the separate chapters in more 
detail than I can provide here. 
‘Knowing as One Goes’ 
Together the following chapters demonstrate not only an 
attentiveness to the situatedness of knowledge, but also to the 
value of movement between various perspectives. Each of the 
following chapters takes up a hiatus produced, a reality unmade, 
in the preceding chapter by moving from one standpoint to the 
next. From a study of the ‘factorial approach’ to legal practices 
evident in the Leiden study, I move to the unfolding of decision-
making in relation to narrative typification practices taking place 
in court (Tata 2007), specifically as they pertain to the mutual 
elaboration of questions of guilt and remorse. From the court, I 
move ‘backstage’ (Goffman 1959), where clerks, judges and files 
are all implicated in extracting from the paper or digital file a 
condensed ‘image of the case’ (van Oorschot 2014a). From an 
understanding of the file as a materially recalcitrant object, I 
move to an appreciation of its temporalities, so that I find myself 
always in relation to the file, but also - depending on the ‘quality’ of 
the file - both ‘here’, in court, and ‘there’, at the time and place of 
the offense in question.  
This ambulatory and praxiographic mode of paying attention, 
then, is not necessarily rooted in one place in particular, although 
it is always situated. It takes seriously the pragmatic dictum that in 
order to arrive at truth, we’ll have to set ourselves in motion: after 
all, methodology - meta-hodoi - is always a matter of travelling 
roads. The roads travelled between these epistemic situations are 
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written into this book as part and parcel of the ‘case’ I am 
making. In a sense, I practice a metaphorical praxiography ‘on 
foot’ (Ingold and Vergunst 2008), as my position is not tied down 
to one static perspective but instead seeks to travel between 
situations. This kind of travelling cannot forget or gloss over the 
fact that the sailing is not always smooth, that the roads travelled 
may be bumpy and the terrain treacherous. In contrast to a 
conception of knowing that forgets this rocky in-between - a 
floating eye that ‘barely skims the surface of the world, leaving no 
trace […] or even any recollection of the journey’ (Ingold 2006: 
25) - I will attempt to retrace my steps and reconstruct the 
building of a perspective as well as my lines of escape towards 
differently situated perspectives. These trajectories are shaped in 
relation to the physical, digital, even legal environment; they are 
also shaped in relation to disciplinary problematizations, 
theoretical blind alleys and conceptual lines of flight. Both the 
‘mechanics of movement’ and ‘formation of knowledge’ (Ingold 
2007: 50) are always implicated in each other; my task is to show 
you how, where, and with what effects. With Joseph K., I will 
stay on the move - without hope of finding that elusive 
magistrate judge, perhaps, but in anticipation of encounters with 
the unexpected. 
NOTES
 
1 I highlight in this chapter the epistemic uses of abstractions, hence 
narrowing the question of ‘experience’ down to experiences we would call 
‘empirical’. Of course, this is a rather limited understanding of ‘experience’, 
not including, for instance, metaphysical experience (the question is whether 
one can separate the metaphysical and the physical, of course). I will touch 
upon these issues in the last chapter of this book, when I introduce a more 
fruitful abstraction - the notion of the hyper-object - with which the think 
and study ‘the Law’. There, I will pay attention to possibilities for action and 
intervention afforded by a more pragmatic, as opposed to contemplative,  
A Guide for the Perplexed 
 95 
 
orientation to beings that always tend to escape both our capacity to know 
and our scales of (political, ethical) action.  
2 I use the term archive, and not ‘written Law’ or ‘Law-on-the-books’, here 
because I seek to divorce this issue from accounts of the Law that place its 
historical emergence within an oral/literacy framework (e.g. Goody 1986). 
This kind of account generally suggests that Law emerges once societies or 
cultures move from largely oral modes of communication to written modes 
of communication. After all, writing - according to this kind of account - is 
crucial in organizing not only the present but, in Levi-Strauss’ words, ‘the 
present and the future’: 
Once men know how to write, they are enormously more able to keep in 
being a large body of knowledge. Writing might, that is to say, be 
regarded as a form of artificial memory, whose development should be 
accompanied by a deeper knowledge of the past and, therefore, by a 
greater ability to organize the present and the future. Of all the criteria by 
which people habitually distinguish civilization from barbarism, this 
should be the one most worth retaining: that certain peoples write and 
others do not (Levi-Strauss 1961: 292). 
 In contrast with this rather narrow concentration on writing I emphasize the 
archive itself, as the notion of the archive is (at least conceptually, if not 
empirically) not tied up with a specific medium of communication. While 
writing surely may introduce efficient ways to retrieve, from the past, 
decisions in a search for precedent, I am not convinced that this archival 
‘memory work’ is adequately captured by mapping it narrowly on to the 
medium of writing. Oral modes oftransmission may ensure both the Law’s 
memory and archive function - see e.g. the Quran, which literally translates 
as ‘recitation’ (see Messick 1993). The archive, conceived broadly as a 
technology of memory, storage, and order conveniently escapes the narrow 
confines of the orality/literacy framework. Moreover, it also carries with it 
the suggestion that the archive itself is always the product of archival work, 
subject to ordering and interpretation, and as an object related to the 
technologies of Law and/or State (see e.g. Osborne 1999).  
3 This is the objection that asks: if absolute truth is dead, is everything 
permitted? Are all statements quite as true, or rather quite as false, as any 
other? Is everything a ‘matter of perspective’? It is a tempting question, but 
rests, in my view, upon a flawed opposition, i.e. the suggestion that the 
opposite of the ‘view from nowhere’ must be a ‘view from everywhere’. The 
answer to this question is a resounding no. Haraway’s conception of seeing 
is precisely a cure against such relativism. Relativism conceived as an attempt 
to ‘see from everywhere’ is as neglectful of mediations as its obverse, i.e. the 
view from nowhere. By taking into account how, where and when  
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knowledge is situated is to retain a sense of its objectivity (Haraway 1988). 
This objectivity is limited, as it does not seek transcendence or detachment; 
it is also partial, as it does not seek absolutes but remains committed to the 
production of operative, workable truths. Such truths do not need the 
metaphysical scaffolding of the Absolute: what is wrong with provisional, 
situated, humble truths rooted in specific modes of grappling with the world 
in and of itself? Valverde (2008: 9) warns, too, that the opposite of capital-T 
truth is not ‘lies’; its opposite is rather a multiplicity of truths, each valid to 
the extent that they are operative and accountable for their situated and 
mediated character. The notion of accountability is crucial here: required of 
us is the ability to give an account of the various mediations that went into 
producing this truth here or that fact there.  
4 Also, consider how the location of Bourdieu’s metaperspective is also the 
epistemic location of that secularized God: the State (Schinkel 2015). A God 
trick, indeed. 
5 Mol (2002) draws distinctions between the notions of performance, 
performativity, and that of enactment. Notions of performance needlessly 
assume the existence of an actor ‘backstage’, or a ‘doer behind the deed’ (Cf. 
Butler 1990). The notion of performativity, however, is also problematic to 
Mol (2002), and for two additional reasons. First, the word remains too 
much burdened by its implication in debates regarding (social) identities, 
while she wants to be able to speak not (only) of the constitution of subjects 
(e.g. women, observers) but of objects (disease). Second, the notion of 
performativity remains too much tied to the doing and making of the social, 
while her proposed notion of enactment would be able to justice to both 
material and semiotic practices of world-making. For that reason, she prefers 
the term enactment (see Mol 2002: 32-41). In this book, I tend to use both 
notions interchangeably.  
6 Mol’s point on multiplicity (2002), here, is eminently pragmatic (in the 
philosophical sense of the term), but not obviously so. For on the one hand, 
one may wonder why we need such trading in ontology at all: is it not 
enough that there are different constructions of what we assume to be a singular 
world? What, to raise the pragmatic question, difference does this difference 
make? Yet the difference between the relativist ‘social construction of 
realities’ and the more radically ontological insistence on ‘multiple 
enactments of realities’ is crucial, precisely because it suggests that there is 
pragmatically no need for an underlying world to encompass or unify our 
accounts. Why such encompassment or totalization takes place, how it does 
so and where, are then viable questions in and of themselves. How is the 
fact of multiple objects juggled in, for instance, hospital settings? How are 
realities ordered, compared, hierarchized, made compatible?   
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7 A note on the word legal fact: I am not referring, here, to notoriously 
fictitious legal facts such as the ‘reasonable man’ but to local ways of 
establishing something factually happened.  
8 I am using the term ‘critical’ not to suggest I am interested in treating these 
accounts as ‘lies’ covering up a realer truth. Precisely the opposite, I would 
argue: a critical stance, invested in finding out what social-scientific accounts 
may do (and what they might not do) is one that takes its object very 
seriously. The kind of critical stance taken here is one that aims to situate 
social-scientific accounts of judicial practices. Unless one understands 
criticism and care to be mutually exclusive (I do not, see also Haraway 1988, 
Latour 2004), this effort strikes me as one more respectful to the intricacies 
and ‘wildness’ of social-scientific research practices than either a simplistic 
belief in its truth-telling mandate or an equally simplistic rejection of social-
scientific expertise as mere power-struggle by epistemological means. For 
these debates, see also Latour (2004).  
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3 Dealing with Difference: Doing 
 Criminal Law and Social Order 
1 Guilt and Denial? 
Intellectual work takes patience, practice, and, of course sheer 
serendipity. Serendipity would have it that the start of this 
research project was marked by a controversy that went directly 
to the heart of the issues I am discussing here: the relation 
between legal practices on the one hand and their social-scientific 
description on the other. I am referring here to the study of 
sentencing disparities in Dutch criminal law titled Differences in 
Sentencing in Similar Cases: A Quantitative Study into the Role of Specific 
Defendant Characteristics, authored by Wermink et al. (2012a), and 
published in the Dutch Jurists’ Magazine [Nederlands Juristenblad]. 
The study concluded that defendants with foreign looks, 
particularly when they did not speak Dutch, were more likely to 
receive a prison term than defendants who both look and speak 
Dutch.  
As I have shown in the introduction to this book, judges were 
not pleased with this study. They raised questions about the 
‘partiality’ of the research and about the qualifications of the 
researchers themselves - do they have ‘any idea how a judge 
arrives at a sentencing decision?’ (Bade and van der Nat 2012: 
973). Judges who I was to meet later during my fieldwork had not 
forgotten about the study, and would assert in no uncertain terms 
that they were not happy with the study’s implication. The 
implication being, of course, that they would disadvantage people 
with certain legally irrelevant characteristics - specifically those 
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with foreign looks and those unable to speak Dutch. Of course, 
there is a (very much disputed) word for making such illegitimate 
differences: racism.  
Given this implication - i.e. judges wittingly or not reproduce 
discrimination against minorities - it is particularly tempting, 
perhaps, to understand judges’ responses to the study as 
variations on the psychological mechanism of denial: ‘I know 
very well I am guilty, but I will pretend not to be (even to myself 
if need be)’. Or, it is possible to understand, with Bourdieu (1987) 
perhaps, these reactions as rooted in a blind spot that would 
accompany judges’ professional pride: surely discriminating 
people on the basis of their looks would go against the very thing 
in whose service they are working, that is the Law and its promise 
of equal treatment. Or, yet more generally, it is also possible to 
explain these reactions as a broadly Dutch kind of racism in and 
of itself: a racism that, more collectively than individually, thrives 
upon its own denial of guilt in a claim to either ‘Dutch’ or ‘white’ 
innocence (Cf. Wekker 2016). All such readings fundamentally 
find the root of judges’ reactions to the study in pride and self-
deception. Crucially, all such readings also attribute to the 
sociological observer epistemic privilege: the social-scientific 
researcher simply knows best. Now, I am the last to dispute the 
political import of diagnosing and addressing racism, especially 
when it takes on complex and opaque psychological, social, and 
cultural forms. Yet in this specific instance I think these 
interpretations of the judges’ reactions to the Leiden study are 
both theoretically reductive and actively harmful in their appeal to 
the epistemic privilege of the social-scientific observer. Let’s 
zoom in on three problematic consequences in particular.  
Situating Expert Knowledges, Establishing Rapport 
For one, such readings are reductive in that they gloss over the 
ways judges may have been on to something when they spoke of 
‘partiality’. In attributing judges’ responses to a psychological or 
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cultural mechanism of denial, in other words, we miss out on the 
opportunity to take their concerns seriously and to inquire into 
the differences between this specific account of their practices 
and local ways of making cases and doing justice. That is, even if 
we agree that illegitimate forms of making differences can and 
should be studied using social-scientific methods and standards of 
inquiry (which I do), we may still want to understand just how 
specific combinations of subject matter, methodological 
apparatuses, research questions and implicit assumptions shape 
and enact realities that may, or may not, be commensurable with 
local ways of judging. After all, social-scientific interventions do 
‘category work’ as well (Krebbeckx, Spronk and M’charek 2016; 
Yanow 2003). Differences, to speak with Krebbeckx et al. (2016: 
3), are always ‘in the making’ (see also M’charek 2010). Lumping 
and splitting individuals or ‘cases’, they may just categorize and 
classify in ways that do not necessarily resonate with local ways of 
‘seeing’ and making differences between cases or individuals.  
This emphasis on the realities enacted in and through this 
study is all the more important, secondly, considering the politics 
of undisputed claims to social-scientific privilege and the singular 
reality these claims tend to presume. Indeed, if there are valid 
indications that the all-knowing subject of knowledge or science 
has historically hidden its own situatedness at the centre of 
Western, imperial, and male power (e.g. Chakrabarty 2000; 
Haraway 1988; Spivak 1988) is it not crucial to political struggle 
itself to question the self-evidence of the ‘view from nowhere’ 
(Haraway 1988) of the social-scientific expert? Does such a 
project not require us to put into doubt the possibility or the 
desirability of absolute, unmarked, unmediated vision and the 
mighty subject it presumes? Against an understanding of politics 
as driven by facts about a singular world, I would point out that 
the precondition of political struggle - including those of anti-racism 
activists - is precisely multiplicity in perception (of realities) and 
conception (of alternatives). 
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Last, I doubt that relegating judicial responses to a variation on 
the psychoanalytic mechanism of denial has the capacity to 
establish rapport between social-scientific observers and practising 
jurists, that is, the possibility of first, understanding, and second, 
independently valuing, the specificity of both social-scientific 
research practices and legal practices. For that kind of rapport 
seemed very much missing throughout this controversy. Like 
Bade and van der Nat (2012) in their written reply to the Leiden 
study, many of the judges I met felt that the Leiden study 
suffered from a similar ailment: the researchers did not seem to 
know ‘what judging looks like’.1 Doubtlessly making this 
epistemic controversy particularly tenacious is the charge of 
discrimination, which is in essence a discussion about what 
differences - between cases, between individual defendants - 
should, and should not, be allowed to make a difference to 
judicial decisions. With commentators ‘talking past each other’ 
this way, it is my aim not to adjudicate between these two 
positions at epistemic war, but rather to trace what realities the 
Leiden study enacts. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate just 
where and how it hurts for judges: not in order to heal, but 
simply to understand just enough to establish the beginnings of 
rapport. 
2 Journeying and Points of Passage 
In tracing the specific performativities of the Leiden study, this 
chapter is an account of the kinds of methods social scientists 
have employed in the study of judicial practices and the kinds of 
realities enacted in doing so. It is a reflection on a set of 
common-sensical assumptions made about the objects of 
sociological attention, and a commentary on the frictions that 
emerge when such assumptions are coupled with an 
unproblematic appeal to social-scientific jurisdiction. At that 
moment, not only is there little room to establish ‘rapport’ with 
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the practices and people hence judged, but also conceptually 
difficult to find ways to do justice to local, practical, and 
unfolding ways of ‘doing justice’.  
Yet this chapter is also an effort to incorporate the fact of 
journeying into this narrative, and to retain a sense of the roads 
travelled in my account. That is, journeying is not only a question 
of navigating physical boundaries (although it is that, too), but 
also of encountering densely packed and entangled knowledges, 
claims, and truths surrounding one’s object of study. Often, we 
encounter these at the stages of exploratory literature review, and 
incorporate the insights these offer about the object of study into 
our own questions, methods, and choices for topics of inquiry. In 
doing so we use these accounts as a lens, sharpening (or perhaps 
dulling) our preliminary insight into the object of study. We look 
through these accounts, directly to the reality - presumably singular 
- to which they refer, trying to combine and contrast insights just 
to know more about the object of study. Yet the Leiden study 
and the brief controversy it sparked precisely seem to disallow 
such exercise in ‘looking through’ accounts of ‘our’ object of 
study: it is a moment where the people studied spoke back and 
(re)claimed jurisdiction. As an entanglement of professional, 
epistemic, and methodological claims, then, it proffers itself as an 
object to be looked at in its own right. 
This is all the more so as the Leiden study places itself within 
an established tradition of statistical research into sentencing 
disparities (see e.g. Zatz 1987; Spohn 2000). This tradition 
proffers itself as crucial to not just (epistemic) understanding of 
legal practices but also aims to mobilize interest by pointing out 
the difference between ‘Law on the books’ and ‘Law in action’ 
(see Pound 1910), the promise of equal treatment on the one 
hand, and differential outcomes on the other. As part and parcel 
of the various modes of research into judicial practices, this kind 
of research approach is in many respects an ‘obligatory passage 
point’ (Callon 1986) for those seeking to understand judicial 
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practices. All the more reason, then, to look at, rather than look 
through, this kind of approach to sentencing practices. What 
happens when we journey using this obligatory passage point? 
How is criminal law constituted?  
As such, this attention to the ‘obligatory passage point’ of the 
Leiden study contrasts, too, with more classically ethnographic 
modes of writing that emphasize arrival in the ‘field’ and 
departure from it. Captured most famously in Malinowski’s Brief 
Outline of the Ethnographer’s Tribulations, the arrival trope is 
mobilized when he asks the reader to imagine 
yourself suddenly set down surrounded by your own gear, alone on a 
tropical beach close to a native village while the launch or dinghy 
which has brought you sails away out of sight (Malinowski 1922: 4). 
Of course, this ethnographic arrival scene is a narrative artefact 
(Pratt 1986) and tends to write away the fact that arrival was 
made possible by capitalist and colonialist expansion to begin 
with - something Malinowski laments and later, Levi-Strauss 
comments on with significant tristesse (1961). This narrative 
gesture is present not only in such more classically ethnographic 
writings, however; in the social study of knowledge practices, it is 
perhaps most interestingly drawn on by Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), whose Laboratory Life’s first chapter similarly starts with a 
plunge into the deep end: the laboratory under study. While there 
are excellent reasons to start, pragmatically, ‘in the middle of 
things’ (after all, that is where we always already are), this does 
not always mean we must start our narratives as if we are 
suddenly set down ‘in the field’. Writing as if we were ‘suddenly 
set down’ in the middle of things glosses over our explorations, 
our detours, our stumbling about in the face of objects of study 
both familiar and strange. Arrival scenes also isolate both ‘the 
field’ and ‘the researcher’: ‘the field’ from many specific (research) 
practices and networks within which it is taken up, even if only as 
an ‘object of study’; the researcher from a community of scholars 
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and from the conceptual pull of disciplinary borders, 
problematizations, and obligatory passage points. Yet these all 
shape one’s travels, and should be accounted for. Starting, then, 
not with arriving in the ‘field’ but with the beginning to 
journeying, this chapter is both study of the Leiden study’s 
performativities and part account of passages I sought.  
In the following, I will first briefly introduce the Leiden study 
in more detail, taking care to introduce its theoretical concerns, 
the methodology it employed, and the conclusions it draws. After 
this brief discussion, I turn to a discussion of its performativities, 
distinguishing between its enactment of decision-making, of 
(criminal) law, of the individual defendant and, in relation to the 
individual defendant, the naturally occurring population its 
enacts.  
3 The Specifics of the Leiden Study 
The three researchers of the study published in the peer-reviewed 
section of the Dutch Jurists’ Magazine, studied, in brief, what 
defendant characteristics exert influence on judges’ decisions to 
unconditionally imprison defendants or opt for another 
(conditional or unconditional) sentence type, e.g. a community 
service or fine. That is, it is interested in finding out what factors 
play a role in judges’ decision between sentence types. 
Theoretically, the researchers draw on what in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature is called the ‘focal concerns theory’ (see e.g. 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1998). Originally ‘focal 
concerns theory’ was constructed to account for the cultural 
dimensions of lower-class gang life (see Millers 1958), yet later 
generations of sociologists have come to apply it to members of 
the judiciary to account for the concerns they incorporate into 
their sentencing decision. Focal concern theory suggests that 
judicial decision-makers incorporate three focal concerns into 
their sentencing decisions:  
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1. the offender’s culpability,  
2. the offender’s (perceived) dangerousness to society, and  
3. the practical consequences of the decision for the offender, 
as well as the organization itself (see Millers 1958; Wermink 
et al. 2012a: 727).  
Each of these three focal concerns are expected to have some 
explanatory power; yet as concepts, they are in dire need of 
operationalizations. That is, they have to be translated into a set 
of concrete variables. Here, socio-demographic factors make an 
entrance in their operationalization.  
The authors identify the first focal concern - the offender’s 
culpability - as plausibly connected with an offender’s criminal 
past, as ‘that kind of past would suggest greater culpability for the 
current offense’ (Wermink et al. 2012a: 727). In addition, the 
authors state that a criminal past is also plausible to increase 
perceptions of offenders’ ‘dangerousness’ - the second focal 
concern. But offenders’ criminal past, they note, together with 
the legally relevant factors of offense type and severity, does not 
appear to explain all variation in sentence types. Previous 
research also suggests that ‘socio-demographic characteristics, like 
the offender’s ethnicity and gender’ (id.: 727) similarly seem to 
play a role. Here, too, focal concerns theory - and in particular 
focal concern number two, the perceived dangerousness of the 
offender - helps the authors to justify their hypothesis with regard 
to these socio-demographic factors: 
allochthons or defendants with a foreign appearance could be 
deemed more dangerous through stereotyping by judges, for example 
because of [allochthons’ and foreign-looking defendants’] 
disproportionate participation in criminal activities and 
overrepresentation in the prison population in comparison with the 
Dutch [population] (Wermink et al. 2012a: 728). 
Both the offender’s criminal history and various socio-
demographic factors, particularly whether he or she is allochthon 
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or has a foreign appearance, are hence included with reference to 
focal concern 1 (the offender’s culpability) and focal concern 2 
(the offender’s perceived dangerousness to society).  
Positing, furthermore, a slightly different causal mechanism, as 
well as a causal mechanism exacerbating the influence of 
stereotyping, the researchers also suggest that the language the 
offender uses in court will matter: first, miscommunication 
between judge and offender is more likely, and second, because 
those who do not speak Dutch and appear foreign are likely to 
have an ever higher chance of being stereotyped than those who 
look foreign, but speak Dutch. The authors also touch upon the 
last of the three focal concerns - the practical consequences of a 
sentence for the offender or the organization itself - when they 
suggest that practical considerations make those who do not 
speak Dutch even more likely to receive a prison term, as their 
incapacity to speak Dutch will likely pose problems when a 
community service must be executed. 
The researchers also incorporate a set of control variables such 
as the location of the court, the type of offense, the defendant’s 
age category, and a series of binary variables detailing whether or 
not the defendant has spent time in pre-trial custody, whether or 
not the defendant has a criminal record, and whether or not the 
defendant perpetrated the offense alone or in association. 
Importantly, the dependent variable details whether or not the 
defendant receives an unconditional prison sentence and is hence 
dichotomous. A distinction is made between unconditional 
prison sentences on the one hand, and on the other, all other 
sentence types, such as a fine, an unconditional community 
service, or conditional prison sentence (all of varying gravity). 
Crucially, as this dependent variable is dichotomous, the authors 
cannot use measures of correlation but instead turn to a binomial 
logistic regression analysis. Without detailing much about this 
particular kind of analysis - which contrasts with more traditional 
forms of regression analyses of variation on (presumed to be) 
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continuous variables - the authors go on to present their 
descriptive statistics (id.: 730) and then their analysis (id.: 731).  
Going on to review their findings, the authors state that their 
expectations with regards to the role of ‘foreign appearance’ and 
‘speaking Dutch’ have been confirmed: controlling for all relevant 
variables, they find that defendants who look and speak Dutch 
have the smallest chance of being sent to prison, while those who 
do speak Dutch but have a foreign appearance are five times 
more likely to be sent to prison than not being sent to prison in 
comparison with that group. Those who do not speak or look 
Dutch are twenty times more likely to be sent to prison than 
being not sent to prison in comparison with the Dutch-looking 
and Dutch-speaking reference category, so that this category of 
defendants qualifies as the ‘most severely punished’ (id.: 732).2 
Now, I have alluded to the fact that this study, upon 
publication, sparked a brief controversy in the media. Following 
the publication of the study, the NRC Handelsblad paid attention 
to its findings in a brief newspaper article, summarizing the 
researchers as having found that judges 
punish defendants with a ‘foreign appearance’ more severely than 
they do the Dutch, in particular when the defendants do not speak 
Dutch. […] The researchers have judged by the defendant’s 
appearance whether he or she is possibly from abroad. Whether the 
defendant is in actual fact a foreigner was checked with help of the 
defendant’s country of birth, which is always mentioned in court’ 
(NRC 2012, March 14). 
In the next day’s editorial, the NRC concluded that the ‘intuitive 
judge has been caught out’ (NRC 2012, March 15) and that lady 
Justice’s blindfold ‘seems an illusion, not a self-evident 
professional characteristic’. Emphasizing that ‘judges are not 
immune to stereotypes’, it suggested that further large-scale 
studies should be conducted. Indeed, while it emphasizes that 
‘solid conclusions about the possible lack of sentencing parity 
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between allochthons and autochthons cannot be drawn from one 
study’, it nevertheless raised the following questions: 
Are criminal law judges sufficiently aware of the influence of 
negative stereotypes? Is there attention paid to such issues 
throughout their education and in collegial ‘intervision’ [intervisie]? Do 
people correct each other there or is this study a bolt from the blue? 
Are there, moreover, enough criminal law judges with a non-Dutch 
cultural background? (NRC 2012, March 15). 
Other actors similarly extracted, from the article, the suggestion 
that the Dutch judiciary is facing significant problems in dealing 
with difference. For instance, not only did the National Minority 
Counsel (LOM) express their shock with the study’s conclusions, 
they also requested of Minister of Security and Justice Opstelten 
to formally distance himself from these discriminatory practices, 
to take ‘appropriate measures’, and to enter into dialogue with the 
partnerships making up the Counsel as soon as possible (LOM 
2012). Members of Parliament, Recourt (PvdA, centrist Labour 
Party), Dibi (the Green left) and van der Steur (VVD, the largest 
Liberal party), for their part, each submitted sets of formal 
questions to the same Opstelten. These questions roughly 
concentrated on whether the Minister shares the researcher’s 
conclusions ‘that negative stereotyping with regards to defendants 
with a foreign appearance play a role in their greater likelihood of 
receiving a harsher sentence’, and the actions the Minister would 
undertake to make sure that ‘judges do not weigh the defendant’s 
appearance in their sentencing decisions anymore’3 
(Kamerstukken II 2011/12). In response, the Minister asked the 
Scientific Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) to 
critically appraise the study and used this to inform his own reply 
to the request of the members of Parliament (Ministerie van 
Veiligheid en Justitie 2012). A more detailed reply, written by two 
WODC researchers was later published in the same Dutch 
Jurists’ Magazine (Weijters and Leeuw 2012), together with a 
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reply of the three authors of the study (Wermink, de Keijser and 
Schuyt 2012b) and a reply by two judges (Bade and van der Nat 
2012). These assorted documents, together with personal 
correspondence with one of the study’s authors, make up the 
core materials upon which this analysis is based.  
4 Seeing Decision-Making, Making Differences 
Let’s turn, now, to the central questions addressed in this piece. 
How is the Leiden study’s ‘perspective’ upon judicial practices 
made? And what realities are enacted in the building of this 
perspective?  
Oligopticism-in-Action and the Black-Boxing of Decision-Making 
While Hartian socio-legal scholars may be quick to understand 
the Leiden study to embody an ‘extreme point of view’ (Hart 
1994 [1961]), it is nevertheless instructive to be a bit more 
specific about how this perspective is built and how it is situated. 
First of all, what strikes any reader is the rather large N of the 
study. While a sample size of 333 cases may not seem much in 
comparison with other, larger databases, this number of cases 
nevertheless effectuates itself what Latour (2005: 181) calls a kind 
of oligopticism. This sociological oligopticism allows the 
researchers to ‘see’ many cases at once. However, this is a 
qualified kind of oligopticism: it is far from an effort to see 
‘everything’, but rather to ‘see’ cross-sectionally in order to gauge 
differences between groups of individuals. In so doing its 
ambition is revelatory: it tries to see many cases at once and to 
reveal consistencies and patterns one might not see ‘up close’.  
It must do so, crucially, by cutting up cases into dependent and 
independent variables (in this case, it only works with one 
dependent variable, that is the binary variable detailing whether or 
not the defendant received an unconditional prison sentence). 
The making of these variables is inevitably a practice of lumping 
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and splitting: of making differences, as well as grouping together, 
phenomena of a certain kind. This is, incidentally, where the 
study attracted most criticism. For instance, the objection to this 
study that the researchers, in their measure of the defendant’s 
criminal history, had opted for a binary variable detailing only 
whether the defendant did or did not have a criminal record, is 
one such an objection. The question is not whether a defendant 
does or does not have a criminal record, it was argued, but also 
precisely how ‘long’ it is, and whether it details ‘relevant’ 
recidivism (that is, whether the current offense is of a similar type 
as the one the defendant was previously convicted with). Neither 
did the study adequately control for the severity of cases lumped 
together: dealing in large quantities of heroine is arguably a 
wholly different offense than the possession of a small amount of 
party drugs, for instance (see also Ministerie van Veiligheid en 
Justitie 2012; Weijters and Leeuw 2012). In the social study of 
legal practices, much has been said about the particular reduction 
such a ‘perspective’ effectuates. Case-specific characteristics of 
relevance to decision-makers may not be measured at all (if only 
to function as control variables in the final analysis), or, 
distinctions of local relevance may be glossed over and grouped 
together as constituting a single variable. Lumping and splitting, 
then, are never neutral operations. And as we will see later on, the 
‘category work’ the study did in lumping and splitting defendants’ 
in their social characteristics will prove somewhat controversial as 
well.  
However, let’s first look at its object of study: the outcomes of 
judicial decision-making. The charge that statistical research 
inevitably runs into difficulties accounting for the causal 
mechanisms at the heart of its analyses applies here to some 
extent as well. Analysing the effect of ‘input’ on the decision’s 
‘output’, judicial decision-making itself is ‘black-boxed’4 (Latour 
1999). That is, enacting judicial decision-making as an input and 
output system - values on the independent variables go in, values 
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on the dependent variable come out - the statistical analysis has 
the tendency to seal off the complexities of such decision-making 
itself. This, of course, is not necessarily a problem: black-boxing 
decision-making in favour of a more cross-sectional perspective is 
instructive. Yet the theoretical addition that the observed 
differences in output are plausibly explained with reference to 
focal concern theory adds, in turn, another black-box at the heart 
of the postulated causal mechanism, that is: the ‘head of the 
actor’ (Garfinkel 1967) him/herself. The suggestion is hence that 
the observed differences are due to cognitive processes - ‘focal 
concerns’. And there, too, yet another black box makes its 
appearance, as the authors distinguish between a transparent part 
of that ‘head of the actor’ - the conscious - and the opacity of the 
unconscious, where bias resides. 
For sociologists, these remarks on the performativity of the 
Leiden study are doubtlessly exemplary of a broader criticism of 
statistical methods. They have a history: for instance, Becker 
suggests that statistical analysis, although having some use, is of 
limited value precisely because it reduces the richness of life-as-
lived: ‘it’s only your analysis that produces the abstract and 
discrete variables which then have to be put back together’ 
(Becker 1996: 56, emphasis added). What the fieldworker in 
contrast ‘sees is not variables or factors that need to be “related” 
but people doing things in ways that are manifestly connected’ 
(id.: 56). In so doing this specific argument has the tendency to 
separate the vagaries of everyday life from the ‘premature 
quantification’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 567) associated with 
statistical methods. The appeal is more or less explicitly naturalist, 
so that a distinction between the richness of everyday social life 
and the cold formalisms of statistical analysis is erected. This 
methodological romanticism, if I may call it that, does little justice to 
the fact that statistical analysis is itself a productive and concrete 
practice - that, I repeat, can and should be studied in its own 
right. As soon as statistical analysis is contrasted with the ‘actually 
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occurring’, lost from view is the fact that statistical analysis is itself 
‘actually occurring’. Indeed, while such objections are cast in a 
register of lack and failure (to measure, to adequately grasp), they 
do productive work as well. As a consequence of lumping and 
splitting and black-boxing, several ‘collateral realities’ (Law 2009) 
are made. These ‘collateral realities’ are best conceived of as 
realities that may not be the delineated object of study - the 
outcomes of judicial decision-making in this case - but realities 
that are made as a side-effect of investigative work. That is, they 
are a kind of ontological fall-out to the ways knowledge is made. 
So what does the study’s emphasis on aggregates do in the 
production of a specific conception of criminal law? And who or 
what, secondly, are its subjects? 
Distributing Justice, Sorting Population Groups 
The Leiden study approaches criminal law as a distribution and 
sorting machine. It distributes justice in the form of punishment, 
and it sorts people by attributing them differential statuses. 
Indeed, the conception of criminal law enacted here has affinities 
in Hasenfeld’s conception of organizations more generally as 
‘people-processing organizations’ which are defined as 
organizations 
attempting to achieve changes in their clients not by altering basic 
personal attributes, but by conferring on them a public status and 
relocating them in a new set of social circumstances (Hasenfeld 1972: 
256). 
Importantly, it is precisely this approach that renders criminal 
law, at least conceptually, comparable to other ‘people processing 
organizations’ - e.g. to medical practices or to educational 
practices. This is a significant advantage: for instance, it then 
becomes possible to look for differences in the performance both 
within these machines - between, for instance, individuals courts - 
and between them, for instance when one is interested what role 
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is played by different institutions or organizations in the 
reproduction, exacerbation, or mitigation of social inequalities. 
Yet this same advantage translates into what Hart would call the 
‘extreme point of view’ (1994 [1961]) that has little to say about 
what distinguishes criminal law from other distributing and 
sorting machines. What, in other words, sets criminal law apart 
from other institutions that similarly operate to distribute a 
collective good and similarly sort people? This is a specific 
performative effect that happens whether or not fact actual 
differences (discriminatory effects) are found to result from the 
machine’s operations. The very problematization of criminal 
justice as a ‘sorting machine’ ensures that little legal is said about 
the exercise of Law. There is, to be precise, one place where ‘the 
legal’ can be said to play a role: in the distinction between case 
characteristics deemed legally relevant and those deemed legally 
irrelevant. Crucially, however, those factors deemed legally 
relevant - in particular the kind and severity of the individual case 
- are precisely delegated the status of a control variable, so that the 
‘legal’ is enacted as a context to the actual substance of ‘social’ 
distributing and sorting processes.  
Social Order: Factors, Populations Groups, Nature and Nationality 
Now, if this study enacts the criminal justice process as a 
distribution and sorting machine, then who are the object of such 
sorting and distributing work? The short answer is: naturally 
occurring, always already there, groups within society, or: 
population groups [bevolkingsgroepen] of which individual 
defendants are understood to be a member. This operation is 
evident in the way the study disaggregates, and assembles anew, 
individual court cases. Enacted in the Leiden study is the case as a 
collection of factors, some of which pertain to the offense in 
question, some of which pertain to the offender in question. In 
this distinction, it echoes the judicial distinction characteristic of 
offender-focused jurisdictions like the Dutch5 between the 
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offense and the ‘personal circumstances’ (or ‘person of the 
defendant’), but it is also typical of studies in the sociology of 
sentencing more generally (Mears 1998; Tata 2007).  
At the same time, the ‘person of the defendant’ figures not as a 
judicial category but incarnates sociologically. That is, the ‘person 
of the defendant’ is the location of a set of imputed, arguably 
‘social’ qualities. Gender is one of these presumed qualities in the 
Leiden study, but perhaps more interesting is the strange and 
slippery way it enacts differences tied to defendants’ degree of 
‘Dutchness’.  
That ‘Dutchness’ is of prime importance to the authors’ 
analysis goes without saying: drawing on a binomial logistic 
regression analysis, the authors need a reference category against 
which to measure the relative likelihood of other categories of 
people. Of course, the choice for what category constitutes the 
reference category is statistically arbitrary, and the authors - as is 
often the case, see Boersma and Schinkel (2015) - have elected to 
use ‘Dutch-looking and Dutch-speaking’ as the reference 
category against which variation is measured. The interesting 
question here is how precisely this category is made; that is, how 
presumed differences in the population are made consequential 
to their measurement of ‘social factors’. While the authors 
variously refer to ‘ethnicity’ (e.g. Boersma and Schinkel 2015: 
727) or the distinction between ‘allochthons’ and ‘autochthons’ 
(e.g. id.: 728), something a little more complex is happening in 
the Leiden study. Remember that the study does not draw on 
officially registered data on the ethnicity or allochthon status of 
defendants appearing in court (indeed, that information is, in the 
Netherlands, not registered at all either by courts or other actors, 
even though there are efforts to categorize those registered as 
suspects using several databases, see e.g. Blom et al. 2005).6 Instead 
the Leiden study relies on student assistants’ observations in 
court. However, the article itself is curiously silent about how 
these observers make differences between defendants according 
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to their ‘foreignness’ or ‘Dutchness’, and does not elaborate on 
how such foreignness and Dutchness is to be operationalized. So 
what do these student assistants observe, precisely? 
According to the official publication in the Dutch Jurists’ 
Magazine, the students have observed whether or not the 
defendant 1. Speaks Dutch and 2. Has a ‘foreign’ or ‘Dutch 
appearance’. The second measure of ‘Dutchness’ is particularly 
interesting: it seems to enact Dutchness and foreigness as 
something completely and common-sensically evident, visible at 
first glance to the untrained eye of student observers. In that 
sense, it enacts Dutchness and foreignness as a ‘superficial’, 
immediately legible difference of the body and the face. Indeed, 
in a ‘fact-checking’ blog of April 17, Schuyt tells us that with 
regards to this measure of difference, ‘one could think of having a 
moustache, black hair and brown eyes’ (FHJ Factcheck, 2012, 
April 17).  
This collection of differences awkwardly combines the cultural 
- a preference for moustaches most commonly associated with 
foreign men - and the biological, congealing into phenotypical mode 
of doing difference. The individual’s body, there, is a collection of 
biological and cultural signs. Interestingly, Schuyt here makes no 
mention of that marker most commonly associated with 
difference, that is, skin colour. This hesitancy speaks perhaps to 
the ‘absent-presentness’ of biological race in contemporary, 
Western-European speech about difference (M’charek, Schramm 
and Skinner 2014; M’charek and Skinner 2014). At the same time, 
difference remains something legible on and of the body: 
mobilized are moustaches, hair and eye colours as markers of 
difference.  
However, complexities continue to multiply. Whether or not a 
defendant had a ‘foreign’ or ‘Dutch’ look, the authors tell the 
NRC,  
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was checked in the context of the hearing with reference to the 
defendant’s birth country and the defendant’s [migration] history 
(NRC 2012, March 14). 
Here, the plot thickens: birth country and ‘the defendant’s history’ 
have also played a role in the categorization of defendants. Does 
this mean that the in-court observers have ‘checked’ their own 
observation of the defendant against what is now presumed to be 
his or her actual foreignness, a foreignness which is here tied to 
defendants’ birth place and migration history? Now, the article or 
other sources do not detail how such ‘checking’ took place and 
how observers have prioritized different ‘measures’ of 
foreignness: for instance, what if their observation was wrong and 
the person was, indeed, born in the Netherlands? Which 
‘measurement’ of foreignness would they have prioritized?  
Replying to precisely this question raised by Weijters and 
Leeuw (2012), the authors explain that the distinction between 
allochthon and autochthon was based particularly on the 
defendants’ birth country (which is always mentioned in court) 
(Wermink et al. 2012b). However, as one of the study’s authors 
further explained, this measure of ‘foreign-ness’ was 
complemented by a second:  
The students received instructions for that variable to code people 
born abroad as foreign, and to code people who were born in the 
Netherlands but look foreign as also ‘foreign’ (Wermink 2016, 27 June).  
The study’s author suggests that this procedure ensured that ‘2nd 
and 3rd generation allochthons could also fall into the category 
“foreign”’. Here a third mode of doing difference enters the 
picture: the distinction between allochthons and autochthons. 
This is a distinction quite particular to the Dutch context (but see 
Geschiere 2009 for its use in African settings). The category 
allochthon, introduced as a way of speaking about immigrants in 
1971 by Verwey-Jonker and formalized, in part, by the Central 
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Bureau for Statistics (CBS), refers to people with either one or 
two parents of a foreign nationality.  
Thus we encounter a third mode of doing category work: the 
distinction between autochthons and allochthons, a recurring one 
in the Dutch context. In this one measure of difference, in other 
words, three different ways of making population groups are at 
work: first, there is reference to nationality; second, there is 
reference to phenotypical looks, self-evidently present on the 
surface of the body; third, both are drawn on to categorize people 
into the categories of allochthony and autochthony. These are 
registers of difference that pivot on different markers: the first, 
birth place; the second on phenotype, while the third, allo- and 
autochthony, combines a logic of soil - where one is born - with 
descent - where one’s parents come from (see Geschiere and 
Jackson 2006).7  
And indeed, the form the students were required to use during 
their in-court observations speaks not of looks, nor of birth 
country, but directly aims to register the defendants’ ‘background’ 
[afkomst]. It provides the following three categories (see Figure 1 
for the materials in Dutch. I have only translated the relevant 
answers of question 4, here): 
 1. Autochthon  
 2. Allochthon, namely: European / Non-European / Unknown 
 3. Don’t know 
First the nation, then the body; first nationality, then phenotype: 
this is how the Leiden study enacts differences between 
individual defendants, who are from now on either slotted as 
allochthons or autochthons. This enactment of difference, then, 
is spectral, drawing on phenotype, soil, and blood simultaneously. 
If Law is enacted as a sorting machine, the operation of sorting 
assumes and enacts a self-evident difference within the 
population; a difference, furthermore, at once administrative and 
phenotypical. At play is a very particular enactment of difference, 
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and it must be said it is one not entirely disconnected from racial 
imaginaries of biological difference that happen to map onto 
geography and territory. ‘Face’ and ‘place’ are here tied up with 
each other, and if they are not aligned - in case someone is born 
in the Netherlands but ‘has’ a foreign look - it is ‘face’ that is the 
deciding factor in this politics of belonging (Cf. Geschiere 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Selected questions on the observation form used in the Leiden 
Study; courtesy of H. Wermink 
Now, it is well-known that variations and differences within 
populations have historically emerged as prime objects for both 
knowledge-production and government (Foucault 2004); it is also 
well known that the history of statistical analysis and its concern 
with the population is deeply intertwined with the advent of 19th 
century evolutionary biology and, of course, eugenics 
(Desrosières 1998). Yet it is equally important to note that 
explicitly racial modes of enacting difference within the 
populations have, for obvious eugenic reasons, not fared well in 
Western Europe post-World War II (even though, it must be 
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said, that the explicit absence of ‘race’ makes racism by no means 
an impossibility (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991)). Yet it is 
important to not simply draw the conclusion that ‘race’ is 
therefore a thing of the past, or else mere fictitious, only a social 
construction. M’charek (2013; or see M’charek et al. 2014; 
M’charek and Skinner 2014) in particular points to the continuing 
relevance, but absent-presentness, of ‘race’ in contemporary 
knowledge practices, for instance in genetics and forensics. ‘Race’ 
is relationally enacted within highly specific sites and practices, 
‘gaining in reality’ when geneticists draw distinctions between 
populations, or when forensic scientists try to ‘give face’ to an 
individual suspect using genetic materials (M’charek 2015). There, 
too, specific relationships between ‘race’ and ‘population’ are 
forged, and there, too, are differences enacted between 
populations. With the Leiden study, we encounter the phenotype 
once again coupled with the notion of the national population - 
this time in the knowledge practices not of forensic scientists or 
geneticists, but that of social scientific inquirers.  
5 Returning to the Charge of Racism 
This chapter has demonstrated a mode of analysis that 
concentrates on the reality effects of social-scientific 
interventions. In so doing it has paid attention not to the politics 
of its stated effects - discrimination - but rather the politics that 
inhere in its enactment of judicial decision-making, criminal law 
itself, and the population over which it distributes punishment. 
These enactments of the Law as a distribution machine, decision-
making as a matter of information inputs and outputs, and the 
objects of the Law as an internally stratified population, I argue, 
are political through and through: they pertain to the question as 
to how we order, sort, and make worlds. With Mol (1999: 75) I 
would point out that this reality, after all, does not precede ‘the 
mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather 
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shaped within these practices’. In that capacity, the term politics 
is apt, precisely because ‘it underline[s] this active mode, this 
process of shaping, and the fact that its character is both open 
and contested’ (id.: 75).  
This question assumes importance in a specifically Dutch 
context, within which we can discern several modes of dealing 
and non-dealing with difference more generally. Addressing 
practices of presumably illegitimate modes of difference-making, 
my emphasis on the study’s performativities is one way to engage 
with the question as to whether ‘we are equipped to recognize 
our racism’ (van Reekum 2014: 92). This question contrasts 
sharply with arguably more dominant social-scientific approaches 
to difference that posit difference as the source of social problems 
and the medium (Mitchell 2012) through which these should be 
measured and governed (Essed and Nimako 2006). Indeed, van 
Reekum (2014) insists that it is precisely this political and 
epistemic question - are we equipped to recognize our racism? - 
that was overshadowed, in the Netherlands in the late 1980s and 
beyond, by the attempts of social scientists, decision-makers, and 
intellectuals to create a realist consensus about a ‘multicultural 
society’, within which it was most notably ‘them’ - ‘ethnic 
minorities’ or ‘allochthons’ - and their difference from an 
autochthonous ‘us’ that was the target of knowledge production 
and governance. This proliferation of research about ‘them’ 
throughout what has been called the ‘Dutch minority research 
industry’ (Essed and Nimako 2006) has entailed a symmetric 
move away from ‘critical explorations of the historical and 
ideological underpinnings and ramifications of Dutch 
constructions of “race” and “ethnicity”’ (id.: 284). It is in this 
context that the Leiden study’s authors’ attempts may be 
welcomed as an opportunity to not speak only about ‘them’, but 
precisely as a way of engaging with racism on the part of the 
Dutch self. There are some indications that the Leiden study is 
cited as evidence of racism in Dutch society, e.g. in Amnesty 
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International reports on ethnic profiling (2013), or in articles by 
those seeking to criticize the Dutch denial of slavery and racism 
(e.g. Özdil 2014). However, my treatment of this study has 
suggested we be a little more cautious, specifically in our choice 
of ‘equipment’. That is, how do our concept and methods render 
racism intelligible and visible? And, what do they not do? 
Due Diligence 
First, some caution is warranted because of its reliance on a 
vocabulary of unconscious bias. On the one hand, the 
researcher’s operationalization of meaningful difference as, first 
and foremost, a question of nationality and second, of 
phenotypical difference, seems a plausible mode to construct an 
object of ‘unconscious bias’. Their reliance on this notion of 
unconscious bias is, of course, not directly supported by their 
own data. After all, the discriminatory effects witnessed may, for 
instance, be the consequence of conscious discriminatory attitudes. 
Indeed, the imputation that certain differences in outcomes are 
due to unconscious bias presents a palatable, but ultimately quite 
unsatisfying, modality of shaping the conversation about racism. 
Moreover, while it is doubtlessly important to make people aware 
of largely implicit but biased notions they may share, the terms of 
the discussion leave little room for an appreciation of racism as a 
structural effect, rather than a mental preference - a well-known 
problem in the study of racism (see e.g. Fanon's warning that 
racism cannot adequately be grasped as a merely mental quirk or 
flaw (Fanon 1956)). In a context where racism seems to become 
‘debateable’ yet again, it is important, then, to note the work an 
emphasis on unconscious bias is doing in narrowing down the 
notion of racism itself.  
Furthermore, in relation to issues of structural racism, it is 
important to note also that an emphasis on the ‘hidden variable’ 
that would explain away discriminatory practices in judges’ 
sentencing decisions might inadvertently bar questions as to the 
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operations of criminal justice more generally. For instance, were 
we to find, through sophisticated measurement and statistical 
manoeuvring, that ethnic or racial bias in the outcomes of 
sentencing decisions can be explained with reference to other, 
heretofore unmeasured variables - for instance, these ethnic 
minorities’ lower educational attainments, lower labour market 
participation rates, lower ‘integration’ in society or weaker ‘social 
bonds’ - we might be happy to show that racial or ethnic bias 
does not exist as such. Note that this is precisely the suggestion 
made by researchers affiliated with Scientific Research and 
Documentation Centre (WODC). When the then Minister of 
Security and Justice Opstelten asked them for a critical appraisal 
of the study, their reply suggested that surely the researchers have 
overlooked an underlying variable that explains these differences 
and outcomes (Weijters and Leeuw 2012). In any case, following 
this procedure we would have lost the opportunity to ask the 
question how it is that criminal law seems to target in particular 
already deprived social groups at all; and by extension, how 
racism does not have to be present in the heads of individual 
actors for a system to work out in racist ways.  
Further caution is warranted because there is something quite 
specific in the study’s enactment of difference. If critical race 
scholars treat ‘race’ as an effect of racism, the study instead draws 
unproblematically on the state’s categorization practices - the 
distinction between nationals and foreign-borns - and 
complements it, in case nationality is suspected to be a flawed 
measure of presumed to be ‘actual’ difference, with an emphasis 
on phenotype. As such, difference is partially naturalized, 
understood to reside unproblematically on the surface of 
individual bodies. It is for that reason quite problematic once we 
assume the interrogation of racism to have to start with an 
understanding of its performative and naturalizing effects. Then, 
the problem is one of explaining the self-evidence of both the 
phenotype and administrative categorization practices, of 
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indexing where ‘kind and kin’ are made, and understanding where 
they are attached to further qualifiers and differences. Such a 
mode of addressing racism would point out that one of the most 
salient effects of racism is race itself, and that a modality of 
response to racism would need to denaturalize precisely racism’s 
presumed to be stable referent, e.g. race. 
6 Onwards: From Factors to Narrative Typification 
Practices 
Having analysed the study and drawn out its performative effects, 
it is now time to return to the issue of rapport. In other words: 
how can we understand the controversial status of the study 
among the members of the judiciary in light of this analysis? How 
might we establish rapport between judges and these sociologists? 
For a start, I would now point out that the research was in 
actual fact partial, precisely in the sense elaborated on by 
Haraway (1988): even though it promises political and epistemic 
detachment, it is both committed to the truth, and engaged in 
making available of specific accounts situated in specific 
perceptual systems. This is not simply a variation on the charge 
that the researchers’ model reduces complexity - of course it 
does. With Borges (1972) we know that the only map capable of 
perfectly representing the territory is a map as large as the 
territory itself, and we can only imagine how unwieldy, how 
impractical, such a map would prove to be. Even though the 
study reduces complexity, my analysis has concentrated on the 
way it adds complexity: that is, how it enacts worlds that are never 
quite as self-evident as social scientists may believe them to be. 
For instance, ‘Law’s promise’ of equal treatment may not 
necessarily be adequately translated into a conception of criminal 
law as a blind distribution machine taking as its object internally 
differentiated populations. Moreover, the legal category of the 
‘person of the defendant’, part and parcel of judges’ sentencing 
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decisions and the locus of the imputed discriminatory sentencing 
outcomes, is precisely established to move away from an arguably 
undifferentiated and precisely therefore unjust treatment of individual 
cases. Yes, criminal law does promise to ‘sort people out’, but not 
necessarily by sorting people ‘sociologically’. I have suggested that 
Law’s promise of equality should not be misunderstood to imply 
sociological equivalence between population groups, and that the 
fact-fiction of the ‘population group’ is doing both productive 
and perhaps less productive work in the way we conceive of legal 
practices, of racism, and of ‘race’ itself. While the assumption that 
reality is in actual fact singular - that both the researchers and 
judges are actually talking about the same reality - is dominant in 
the controversies around the Leiden study, my intervention has 
drawn attention to the fact that we need not make this 
assumption. It is precisely by deferring this assumption that 
rapport becomes an option. Not because it suggests that there are 
different perspectives on ‘the same’ underlying reality, but 
precisely because social-scientific efforts make realities - often in 
their own terms, using their own equipment.  
It is now time to move on and to follow up on the provocative 
question, posed by the two judges replying to the study, whether 
the researchers have ‘any idea how a judge arrives at a sentencing 
decision?’ (Bade and van der Nat 2012: 973). I aim to read this 
provocation as an invitation, and in the following I will address 
precisely how judges go about their adjudicating and sentencing 
business. If judges do not necessarily ‘see’ individual defendants 
as exemplars of sociological ‘population groups’, how else do 
they see these defendants? If they do not ‘see’ cases as bundles of 
factors, how else do they make sense of cases?  
These are questions that run through the remainder of this 
book. The legal case file, conceived as a material-semiotic ‘optical 
device’ (Haraway 1988) for ‘seeing cases’ is touched upon in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The following chapter, however, stays 
somewhat closer to judicial self-conceptions and emphasizes the 
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role played by in-court interactions between judge and defendant, 
the centrality of narrative, and evaluations of the defendants’ 
‘remorsefulness’. This chapter shows that while members of the 
judiciary may be quick to contrast the social-scientific, cross-
sectional perspective with their own ‘casuistic’ approach - within 
which each case is considered unique and irreducible - we will see 
that a concentration on the production and evaluation of 
‘remorse’ in the interaction with the defendant illustrates the 
existence of vernacular, informal typification practices. That is, 
even though the social-scientific triad race-class-gender is not 
explicitly oriented to over the course of their decision-making, 
judges nevertheless make use of informal, narrative typifications 
that centre on the type of defendant and the type of offense in 
question. Distinguishing between three ‘typified whole-case 
narratives’ - the typical ‘drug-addict’, the typical ‘angry young 
man’, and the typical ‘explosive couple’ - I show how defendants’ 
demonstrations of remorse are weighed and prioritized differently 
and tend to have repercussions for the sentence decided on. In so 
doing I zoom in on the legal category of the ‘person of the 
defendant’, but without treating this person as a collection of 
(sociological) ‘factors’. In this I am following up on Tata’s 
admonition (2007) that the practice of judging is not to be 
conceived mechanically but instead as a matter of ‘judgcraft’ - an 
admonition in line with judges’ own conceptions of their work 
practices.  
NOTES
 
1 For judges, experiencing this lack of rapport is nothing new. Throughout my 
conversations with judges I learned that many of them have very little faith 
in the broader public’s interest in, or understanding of, their practices. There 
are roughly two ways of misunderstanding their practice, it soon became 
clear: the first judges associate with right-wing accusations that the judiciary, 
as a professional group, is far too left-wing, far too rehabilitationist, far too 
cuddly-feely. The Leiden study represented, in this constellation, a largely  
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unexpected Charybdis to the Scylla of popular sentiments: in effect it 
suggested that judges punish at least some groups of people too harshly. This 
perception that neither the wider public nor sociologists knew enough about 
their practices had consequences for my own research practices, as some of 
the judges I encountered actively took my research as an opportunity to 
‘correct the record’. I am not sure these judges have fully mobilized me to 
their cause, yet the analysis presented in this chapter hopefully testifies to the 
care I took to not side-line their discontent as mere ignorance or denial.  
2 I am aware that my formulations in the preceding paragraph are likely to 
inspire some confusion in the reader. Interestingly, part of the controversy 
surrounding this study had to do with its reliance on odds ratios as measures 
of likelihood. Where the initial NRC article reported that foreign-looking 
and non-Dutch speaking defendants were twenty times more likely than 
Dutch-looking and Dutch-speaking defendants to receive an unconditional 
prison term, commentators of the NRC newspaper were quick to point out 
that the original study relied upon a logistic regression analysis, which 
produces not measures of relative chances, but odds ratios (in Dutch: 
wedsverhoudingen). But the NRC editors should have spotted the difference 
between measures of relative chances and odds ratios; indeed, if foreign-
looking and non-Dutch speaking defendants indeed are 20 times more likely 
than the Dutch to receive a prison term, a quick glance at the original 
publication in the Dutch Jurists’ Magazine would have suggested that this 
group has the impossible probability of going to prison of 2.2 (or 220 per 
cent). After all, the Dutch go to prison in 11 per cent of the cases and as 
such have a 0.11 probability of receiving an unconditional prison term 
(Table 1 in Wermink et al. 2012a: 730). A more accurate way of stating the 
researchers’ results is to say that the probability of going to prison as 
compared to the probability of not going to prison is 5 times larger for the 
group of foreign looking defendants than the probability of going to prison 
as compared to the probability of not going to prison is to the Dutch 
defendants. The actual relative probabilities - not the odds ratios reported in 
the study - are, according to some commentators, more likely to be 
somewhere around 2.5 (or 0.25 per cent), but this is a conclusion based on a 
table in the original study that does not yet control for other important 
variables (see te Grotenhuis cited in NRC 2012, 31 March).  
3 Both quotes are from Minister Opstelten’s answers to Recourt’s set of 
questions; Opstelten referred the other members of Parliament to his 
answers to Recourt’s questions, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 
2012: 1-6). 
4 Latour (1999) speaks of ‘black-boxing’ in the context of scientific work in a 
slightly different way than I am using it here. For Latour, black-boxing is a  
Ways of Case-Making 
 128 
 
way of speaking about the way scientific or technical work is rendered 
invisible precisely because of their success (1999: 304). In that sense, it is a 
notion akin to that of infrastructure, sunken into the background of 
expectations (see e.g. Bowker and Star 1999). I however am using it to speak 
about the effect of statistical analyses such as the one discussed here. Black-
boxing, in that sense, is an artefact of an analysis that renders the ‘internal 
complexity’ of judicial decision-making only intelligible in terms of its input 
and output. 
5 ‘Offender-focused’ is my translation of the Dutch term ‘daderstrafrecht’, 
which is often contrasted with ‘daadstrafrecht’, offense-focused criminal law 
jurisdictions. The difference pivots on whether judicial decision-maker are 
allowed, even required, to take into account the personal circumstances of 
the defendant or whether only the type and severity of the offense can be 
weighed in deciding on a verdict.  
6 It should be noted that there is, of course, quite a difference between a 
defendant whose case is appearing in court (who, furthermore, may be 
found not guilty) and a suspect registered by the police: of those suspects, 
some may never be charged at all, and when they are charged, cases may be 
deposed.  
7 Throughout the text, reference is also made to ethnicity, although this 
specific mode of enacting difference is not part of the researcher’s 
measurements or operationalizations - for which reason I am not discussing 
it here. However, the ostensibly smooth slippage between these three 
registers of difference - allochthony/autochthony, phenotype, and ethnicity - 
should alert readers to the unique challenges attending to any measurement 
of population difference, and their tendency to become linked or mapped 
onto each other (both in social-scientific accounts and in public 
understandings of Dutchness and citizenship).  
  129 
4 Situating Remorse 
1 Following up on the Leiden Study 
The preceding chapter demonstrated the ‘reality effects’ of some 
social-scientific, statistically-oriented approaches to criminal 
justice practices. With Law (2009), I have argued that these kinds 
of approaches are not to be understood as reductive (only) but as 
productive: they enact the object of study - judicial decision-
making - in a specific way, and simultaneously mobilize and enact 
multiple collateral realities, most notably a population that falls 
apart into distinct population groups and judgment as a question 
of informational inputs and outputs.  
Having spent time on the ‘reality effects’ of the Leiden study, I 
turn now to effects of a different kind, that is the way the study 
affected judges and my own collaborations with them. In this 
chapter1 I suggest that the Leiden study’s mode of doing legal 
practices contrasts with the emphasis judges place on their own 
intuitions, their craft, the specificity of individual cases and, 
especially so, the uniqueness of the ‘person of the defendant’. 
Aiming to follow up on judges’ emphasis on ‘their own way of 
dealing with cases’, I trace here the kind of judgments judges 
make about this ‘person of the defendant’, and pay specific 
attention to defendants’ ‘remorsefulness’. Far from an 
unproblematic, binary given as something either present or 
absent (Tombs and Jagger 2006), I show how judges’ appraisals 
of defendants’ remorsefulness are a doubly-situated 
accomplishment. It is situated, first, within the legal and moral 
space of the courtroom, where legal requirements and moral 
demands may clash and place interactional burdens on the 
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defendant in his or her demonstrations of remorse. Second, the 
accomplishment of remorse is situated not only in the space of 
the courtroom but also narratively: that is, within not just the 
specifics of the case but within vernacular, informal ‘typified 
whole-case narratives’ (Tata 2007) which judges draw on in their 
sense-making. For instance, facing either drug-addicted 
defendants or domestic abuse charges, judges tend to weigh and 
prioritize defendants’ demonstrations of remorse differently. 
While judges may not work with stereotypes concentrated on 
population groups, then, their practices nevertheless show some 
measure of typification, particularly when it concerns their 
appraisals of the value and importance of defendants’ 
remorsefulness. In other words, I will show how judges do 
difference (between defendants, between cases) differently than the 
authors of the Leiden study.  
Based upon observations in court as well as case-specific 
conversations with judges, this chapter emphasizes (much like 
judges themselves) specific cases chosen for their strategic and 
demonstrative value. In doing so this chapter offers both a 
discussion of a specific topic of theoretical concern - the 
‘practical grammar’ (Dupret and Ferrie 2015) of remorse, 
particularly as a both legally and narratively mediated 
accomplishment - as well as a discussion of my travails in relation 
to the often-postulated opposition between sociology’s cross-
sectional approaches to legal practices as well as judicial, casuistic 
self-conceptions. I will conclude this chapter commenting on the 
situatedness of my own collaborations with these practices as 
these took place within the largely oral proceedings in court. 
2 Contrasts and Questions 
Let’s go back again to that spring of 2012. My first encounters 
with judges around that time were very much shaped by the 
publication of the aforementioned Leiden study. In a series of 
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exploratory conversations with retired or practising judges, the 
study had a habit of popping up in our conversation. The 
aforementioned Judge Beech (see the preamble) was perhaps 
most vocal about her disagreement with the study’s findings: 
This does not do justice to the way we tailor sentences. […] It’s all a 
matter of taking various steps. You start with the offense in question 
- is it punishable, is it proven -, then you move onto the 
circumstances surrounding the offense and then you move onto to 
the defendant and his or her circumstances. […] We might have our 
weaknesses and our little frustrations [with individual defendants], 
but we learn to reflect on them to take them into account. But the 
suggestion that we punish some defendants more harshly than others 
is just insulting. We have our rules, our procedures, and we look at 
cases individually. The defendant is part of that. Every case is 
different, every defendant is different, but we follow the same rules. 
I have no doubt that some of the discomfort, evidenced here in 
Judge Beech’s words, was in fact partially due to its (implicit) 
accusation of discrimination, even racism. Yet this discomfort is 
suggestive, too, of the sometimes fraught relationship between 
sociological-statistical enactments of judicial work and judges’ 
own conceptions of these practices. This chapter is a way to 
engage with these discomforts. Sensitized by Judge Beech’s rather 
vehement disagreement, I took her admonition to take seriously 
judges ‘own ways of dealing with cases’ to heart. That is: if they 
are not satisfied with the Leiden study’s results, how would they 
say they usually deal with cases? 
I would learn that this question is both the right and the wrong 
question: right, because judges’ modes of response to it cast light on 
both judges’ self-perceptions and their modes of justifying their 
practice; wrong, because it was asked in a register their answer 
tended to disavow. That is, while the question is cast in a general 
and descriptive mode, judges’ answers emphasized intuition over 
‘science’ or ‘legalism’, the specific over the general, and the 
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‘whole case’ and the ‘whole person’ over the fragmentation 
introduced by statistical modelling.  
Craft, Intuition, and the Unique Case 
Telling in particular were the moments I would introduce my 
research to individual judges. Casting my research as an 
intervention aimed to do justice to ‘their ways of dealing with 
cases’, I often faced a sympathetic but slightly weary audience. 
‘But so much of it has to do with intuition’, one of the judges 
objected. How would I be able to describe these intuitions, 
especially when part of these intuitions is obscure to judges 
themselves? For instance, Judge Dempsey suggested that ‘much 
of it is unconscious’, suggesting that his thinking surprises even 
himself at times. Conscious or unconscious: with judicial 
practices, judges asserted, comes a trained, juridical intuition, a 
cultivated prudence that is not easy to make explicit even to 
oneself. In evoking the centrality of intuition, these judges tended 
to agree with Scholten’s appraisal of judicial practices as 
involving, ultimately, an unexplainable ‘jump’ [sprong] ‘that is 
always courage’ (‘die altijd durf is’, see Scholten 2010; see also 
Hartendorp and Wagenaar 2004). This also means that judicial 
practices are ‘not exactly science’, to speak with Judge Jamison, 
and especially so in the relatively minor cases appearing in the 
Police Judge Court. Neither agreeing with the dictates of rigorous 
‘science’, nor with the demands of pure legalism, Judge Jamison 
thinks of their role as comparable to ‘village elders’: ‘we arbitrate 
conflicts, and that’s it’. The contrast between cultivated prudence 
and the more rigorous character of ‘science’ was a recurring one 
in judges’ accounts of their practices. Helpfully pitting judicial 
practices against formalism of another kind is Judge Emerald’s 
assertion that ‘none of this is higher mathematics’. Although 
judges ‘have an ugly power, the way we can shape people’s lives’, 
some of it, Judge Emerald asserted, is ‘very simple’ - that is, as 
long as judges are trained in the exercise of their prudential 
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sensibilities. ‘Of course that intuition can be a pitfall as well’, 
Judge Jamison commented, ‘the risk is that you’re working on 
auto-pilot, as it were. But it is a craft nevertheless.’  
Other judges refrained from drawing explicit contrast between 
this emphasis on the specificity of the individual case and the 
aggregate level analysed in the Leiden study, yet their discomfort 
with the generalization inherent in my questions would become 
evident in their mode of response. For one, some judges perceived 
the question ‘how do you deal with cases’ to be an inquiry into 
different legal principles with regards to punishment, including a 
concern with the proper relationship between the state, the 
individual, and community. In such cases conversation would 
swiftly move to more abstract ideals of justice and legal-
philosophical questions - should judges aim for retribution or 
rehabilitation? Whose interests must a criminal judge serve, and 
how can these be balanced and weighed against each other? - as 
well as matters of court organization and bureaucracy. When 
drawn back to their everyday ‘doings with cases’, hesitations and 
qualifying statements characterized their answers. ‘It all depends’, 
or a variation thereupon would usually preface their response, 
and the following answer would usually concentrate on a specific 
example: a case yesterday, a case last week, a difficult case some 
months ago … In any case, ‘it’s difficult to say anything general 
about it’ (Judge Curtis). My general questions were either met 
with equally general concerns with the ideals of justice and the 
purpose of punishment; or else, once I returned them to their 
work practices, these generalizing questions were answered only 
with help of hesitant qualifications and with specific examples.  
The Person of the Defendant  
These exploratory conversations were helpful, then, precisely 
because they pointed out the limitations of generalizing questions 
themselves.2 However, these conversations also pointed me in 
the direction of the ‘person of the defendant’ as both a matter of 
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concern and a locus of the specificity and uniqueness of the case. 
Some judges made the connection between the unicity of the case 
and the ‘person of the defendant’ explicitly, arguing that their 
practice is first and foremost one of tailoring the decision to the 
specific person of the defendant. Judge Beech, of course, 
suggested as much when she said that ‘every case is different’ and 
that ‘every defendant is different’ and that their practices is one of 
‘tailoring’: ‘everything must be tailored to fit’ [alles moet op maat]. 
Mobilizing conceptions of ‘individualized sentencing’ (Hutton 
2013; Tata et al. 2008), judges suggested that prudential judgment 
does not only take into account the consequences of the criminal 
offense for the victim or society at large, but must be ‘tailored’ to 
the specific defendant. In order to make a correct and proper 
sentencing decision, judges asserted, it is absolutely vital to arrive 
at a comprehensive ‘picture’ [beeld] of the personal circumstances 
of the defendant in question. For instance, does a defendant have 
debt that would cause a fine to be more punitive than called for? 
Is he or she physically and mentally capable of doing a 
community service, should that be a sentencing option? Does the 
defendant risk losing his or her job when sent to prison?  
Importantly, however, judges’ concerns also incorporate an 
appreciation of the defendant’s character and outlook on life: do 
they take responsibility? Are they sorry? Do they have specific 
and concrete plans to combat that which made them end up in 
these dire straits in the first place? In a conversation over lunch, 
several judges comment on the importance of demonstrations of 
regret and remorse (again with reference, now a familiar gesture, 
to a specific case): 
The question is, are they really sorry? Are they really shocked with 
what they did? I had a really nasty case some time ago, with a couple 
of young guys charged with the armed robbery of a store. In court 
they were trying their best to appear as laconic as possible, making 
themselves out to be such cool guys. Look, if they tell me they saw 
the videotapes of their robbery and would say something like, 
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“Gosh, is that really me? I didn’t know I was capable of doing such a 
thing!” But they were indifferent, they didn’t see the gravity of what 
they had done. Needless to say I sentenced them accordingly …  
Apologies and sincere ‘shock’ is what this judge was looking for; 
finding it lacking, she saw no reason to opt for a mitigated 
sentence. The ‘person of the defendant’, then, is both a legal and 
a moral being: not only someone possibly legally culpable, but 
also ideally morally responsible.  
The Court Session 
Now, where are such judgments routinely made? Judges often 
pointed me to the court session as a salient site to such appraisals. 
‘It all depends on what is said in court’, Judge Clarens 
commented on a specific case: 
If he shows up and if he has a clear story and tells me he wants to try 
and better himself, maybe I’ll give him a second chance. There are 
always extenuating circumstances. 
Not only do Judge Clarens’ comments underscore the 
importance, for defendants, of showing up in court (after all, they 
are not legally obligated to do so), they also hint at the storied 
texture of courtroom practices. In a later lunch conversation, her 
emphasis on ‘the story’ found resonance among other judges. ‘It 
helps to talk’, their consensus was: one judge asserted that ‘when 
there is a lot of evidence it helps to talk to the police, it comes 
across a lot more cooperative.’ Laughing, she added, ‘Unless the 
evidence is bad, then you’re better off remaining silent!’ Judges 
often assert the value of a ‘good story’ - suggesting that remorse 
is not only expressed in words of apologies and shock but also 
expressed in defendants’ willingness to talk at all. These 
evaluative judgments are, again, subject to that same, prudential 
intuition: ‘you work with your image [of the defendant], I have 
developed an intuition for that sort of thing’ (Judge Peters).  
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3 Studying Craftwork and Remorse 
All in all, then, judges’ emphasis on trained capacity for 
prudential judgment sensitive to the specificities of individual 
cases contrasts sharply with the Leiden study’s enactment of 
these practices. First, judges emphasize the specific and the 
unique rather than general regularities. Second, their conception 
of the ‘person of the defendant’ as a both legal and moral being is 
at odds with the disaggregation of the ‘person of the defendant’ 
into presumably ‘social characteristics’ such as class, gender, age 
or ‘race’/ethnicity effectuated in the Leiden study. Third, to them, 
a decision is not the function of informational ‘input’, but rather a 
practice of prudential, sometimes intuitive judgment tailored to 
the specifics of the case and the specifics of the ‘person of the 
defendant’.  
It is for this reason that Tata warns against the use of statistical 
analysis reliant on ‘factors’ in understanding legal decision-making 
practices: 
Cognitive-analytical work has tended to equate “factors” with case 
“facts”. So not only does factorial explanation ignore how “facts” are 
identified or not, it also ignores their contingent, fluid, synergistic, 
and constructed nature. Yet […] the meaning of facts is contingent 
on the ever-evolving nature of the case (Tata 2007: 435). 
Like the judges mentioned here, Tata (2007) prefers to conceive 
of judicial practices as a kind of ‘craftwork’: a mode of work that 
relies upon interpretation of ‘the ever-evolving nature of the case’ 
rather than isolation and the measurement of ‘case factors’. 
Retaining its contrast with the often-evoked counterpoint of 
‘science’, ‘craftwork’ is a productive notion as it is suggestive of 
training and practice rather than detached ‘know-what’ or ‘know-
why’. It evokes situated evaluations of specific cases, and in a 
fashion similar to the notion of bricolage, and prioritizes local 
modes of problem-solving over the seamless and unproblematic 
Situating Remorse 
 137 
application of rules or plans, introducing a sense of practicality 
into our conceptions of judging. It is for that reason I wish to 
mobilize this notion in my effort to follow up on the aporia 
produced in the Leiden study. If its mode of enacting legal 
practices fails to address legal practices in terms judges’ recognize 
and identify with, the notion of craftwork promises to apprehend 
these practices in more acceptable terms. Drawing on this notion, 
I will follow up on judges’ emphasis on intuition, on the ‘whole 
case’, and on their concern with the ‘person of the defendant’. 
Specifically, I zoom in on judges’ concern with defendants’ 
‘remorsefulness’ in order to give flesh and bone to their practices 
of decision-making; after all, it is the moral quality of the 
defendant judges tend to point to as an important topic of 
evaluative concern. In that capacity, it is a local matter of concern 
capable of casting light on judicial concerns with the unique case.  
Remorse as a Local Matter of Concern 
Now, remorse has a particular history in criminal law. Its 
importance to judicial decision-makers is contingent upon a 
rather Western and modern conception of the criminal subject. 
Where Roman Law, for instance, did not treat (criminal) acts as a 
manifestation of individual intentions, modern Law instead 
‘assumes a subject that is answerable for its acts in the world’ 
(Pottage 2014: 153; see Thomas 1977), as it considers deviant acts 
‘expressions of some complex authorial psychology’ (Pottage 
2014: 153). It is only with such a more modern conception of 
criminal subjects that remorse can enter the picture, as being 
bound by one’s action one now can and has to relate oneself to 
them. This, of course, is what Foucault points out when he 
sketches the rise of a modern, juridical concern with the ‘soul’ of 
the deviant subject (Foucault 1977). This ‘soul’ features both as a 
locus of threat and a site of intervention. And indeed, there are 
strong indications that judicial decision-makers incorporate in 
their judgments a concern with the defendant’s remorsefulness 
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(see e.g. Bandes 2015; Duncan 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1997; 
Everett and Nienstedt 1999; Martell 2010; Proeve and Tudor 
2010; Sundby 1998; Wood and MacMartin 2007).  
Although the importance of remorse to judicial work practices 
is well-established in social-scientific literature on the topic, 
remorse tends to be isolated from the on-going practicalities of 
judicial work practices. For instance, although the Leiden study 
includes a measure of the defendant’s remorsefulness, it is largely 
unclear upon what specific behaviours or accounts the 
researchers based their measurement of defendants’ 
remorsefulness. In so doing it fails to address the ways judges 
themselves attribute, weigh, and evaluate defendants’ 
remorsefulness. Moreover, it treats remorse in a binary fashion as 
something unproblematically present or absent (Wermink et al. 
2012a). A similar emphasis on the supposedly binary character of 
‘signs of remorse’ is evident in Tombs and Jagger’s (2006) study 
of sentencers’ accounts of their decision-making practices. While 
‘signs of remorse’, coupled with ‘signs of hope’ may sway 
sentencers to mitigate their sentences, it is yet unclear how 
sentencers in specific cases attribute remorse to individual 
defendants, and how these attributions are weighed and 
evaluated. Reifying and dichotomizing ‘remorse’ this way in these 
kinds of approaches allows little room to inquire into the way 
remorse, as a practical and situated matter of concern, is 
established or challenged: that is, how it is ‘marked by 
negotiation, contestation, surrender and opposition, claims and 
counterclaims’ (Weisman 2014: 8). It also fails to address the 
salience of what judges call ‘the good story’ in relation to 
remorse: that is, the role of narrative and story-telling in court. 
Narrative is commonly understood to denote a way of connecting 
events and people into a temporal and causal arch (Ewick and 
Silbey 1995) through the device of ‘emplotment’ (Ricoeur 1992). 
Here, I put centre stage the moral uses of such emplotment: that 
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is, the way defendants’ remorsefulness is both narratively 
accomplished and narratively understood by judges.  
‘We’ll have to see what he has to say in court’: judges’ concern 
with the interaction with the defendant points to the courtroom 
as a site pregnant with moral possibility. Their emphasis on the 
‘story’ suggests this concern with remorse to be played out 
narratively and interactively. That in-court communication 
matters more generally has indeed been the lesson of studies 
concerned with narrative, story-telling, and interaction in court 
(see e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979; Bennett and Feldman 1981; 
Conley and O’Barr 1997; Jackson 1988, 1996; Komter 2000; 
Matoesian 1993; Travers and Manzo 1997; for an overview of the 
field, see Dingwall 2000). Curiously, however, studies of ‘doing 
and telling’ of remorse have not as of yet situated remorse within 
such courtrooms. While there have been important efforts to 
understand the role of remorse historically and conceptually, and 
while empirical efforts have concentrated on materials as wide-
ranging as narratives in media, in highly publicized court cases, 
and in written verdicts, there has been little focus as of yet on its 
narrative production within courtroom dynamics (see Bandes 
2015: 5). This neglect is all the more striking, as the courtroom 
can be a rather fraught space for defendants. They may be 
unfamiliar with legal standards and formats, and - as Dutch 
criminal law combines, in one setting, both adjudication (fact-
finding and judgment) and sentencing - defendants have to 
navigate both the court’s legal and moral demands (Komter 
1994).  
In an effort, then, to dereify remorse I emphasize both its 
‘practical grammar’ (Cf. Dupret and Ferrie 2015) and its situated, 
interactional character. Questions central in this chapter are: what 
do judges understand to constitute ‘remorse’? How does the 
interaction with the defendant in court inform judges’ 
attributions of remorse? How do judges weigh and evaluate, 
moreover, the presence or absence of what they understand to 
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constitute remorse in specific cases? With judges’ emphasis on 
the ‘good story’, I am first and foremost interested in the storied 
texture of remorse: how, in other words, the interaction with the 
defendant in court allows attributions of remorsefulness, and 
how judges draw on narratives themselves to make sense of 
individual cases, including defendants’ demonstrations of 
remorsefulness.  
Shadowing Judges, Tracing Cases: A Case-Specific Approach 
Aiming for general answers to general questions does not, I had 
learned by now, assist inquiry into judges’ craftwork. An 
emphasis on specificity - ‘it all depends’, ‘we’ll have to see what 
happens in court’, ‘maybe he has a good story’ - thwarted the 
ambition to arrive at some general sense of judges’ ‘ways of 
dealing with cases’, particularly in relation to the presumed 
uniqueness of each and every defendant. Having learned, then, 
that the ‘general question’ is not the most productive question, I 
opted instead for a more case-specific approach to judicial work. 
Concretely, this meant that instead of relying on more or less 
structured interviews, I started to ask individual judges if I could 
‘shadow’ them in their work practices (see also Halliday et al. 
2008) so that I was in a better position to ask them questions 
about specific cases. Often, I would ask these questions either 
throughout judges’ pre-trial file-work (about which I have more 
to say in Chapter 5) or before and after specific cases in court, 
where I was permitted to observe and transcribe the interactions 
between the various parties to the trial. As the setting within 
which judge and defendant come face-to-face, where apologies 
are offered or elicited, and remorse is demonstrated, the 
courtroom is the primary location of this chapter. While I at first 
sat in on the court’s public benches, in a later phase of the 
research I was permitted to seat myself - properly attired in robe 
and bib - at the judges’ table next to his or her assisting clerk. 
There I was able to transcribe the proceedings and conversations 
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on the PC’s located on these tables, and there I was in a unique 
position to ask the judge brief questions in breaks between cases. 
It is there that I observed the interaction between defendant and 
judge; and it is there that I would elicit reflection and evaluation 
from judges on the cases they had just decided on. My efforts to 
‘situate’ the question of remorse in judges’ work practices, was 
then itself situated largely in the space of the courtroom - a 
situatedness upon which I will comment in the concluding notes 
to this chapter.  
4 Showing and Telling Remorse: Judge Mason and Jenny 
Carpenter 
By way of an entry into the relationship between judges’ concern 
with the person of the defendant, their evaluations and 
interpretations of defendants’ remorsefulness, and story telling in 
court, let’s consider the following case involving Judge Mason 
and Ms. Carpenter:  
On a dreary morning in October 2013, I find myself in a well-lit and 
unadorned courtroom. Judge Mason is judging 10 cases today, of 
which Ms. Carpenter is the 6th defendant scheduled to appear in 
court. Ms. Carpenter, or Jenny, I have learned, is accused of 
throwing a glass of beer at one of her friends. The glass had broken 
and the victim had sustained rather severe injuries to her face. Judge 
Mason told me prior to the court session that she expected to see a 
pliant defendant in court today. It seemed to her that Jenny ‘is not 
trying to lie, and she hadn’t immediately requested a lawyer but was 
just telling the police her story.’ She also pointed out that Jenny had 
attempted to get in touch with the victim after the offense, and 
approvingly noted that ‘girls like this are all in the same group of 
friends, it is so important for them that they can continue to get 
along’. These meetings also mean, to Judge Mason, ‘that she never 
really meant to hurt anyone that badly. This really shows something 
about her as a person, it tells me something about her willingness to 
talk.’  
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Enter, then, Jenny Carpenter.  
Jenny is short, quite thin, and strikes me as visibly intimidated by the 
court setting. She has arranged no legal counsel, nor is she 
accompanied by family members or friends. Judge Mason 
commences the inquiry in court by asking her a series of questions 
about the event in question. ‘Yes, it happened’, Jenny immediately 
confesses, and goes on: ‘But I just think it’s weird that she [referring 
to the prosecutor’s summary of the legal charges] is using the words, 
“purposefully”. I never meant to do this! I had to spend a night in 
jail, then sought contact with the victim and we talked a lot, and I’ve 
felt bad about it a long time. I even offered to pay her health 
insurance costs! It was such a difficult period for me back then …’ 
I remember looking at both the public prosecutor and Judge 
Mason, a little afraid for Jenny’s fate: I had seen defendants 
chastised before for their supposed lack of ‘remorse’, and it 
seemed to me this was about to happen to Jenny as well.  
Judge Mason is growing slightly irritated. While she goes on to ask 
further factual questions - what had you been drinking? Why did you 
do it? - Jenny seems to have a way of reorienting Judge Mason’s 
factual questions back to the hardships she herself had faced during 
and after the offense. While unequivocally emphasizing that she is 
sorry and has done all she can to make up with the victim - 
volunteering to pay her insurance costs, for instance - Jenny seems to 
continue to rub Judge Mason the wrong way. After a few of these 
back-and-forths, Judge Mason intervenes, and tells Jenny sternly, ‘I 
see. But I must say, you seem to lack an appreciation of the severity 
of what you have done here, Miss Carpenter’. The prosecutor, seeing 
her chance, chimes in: ‘Because this really is about something 
terrible, isn’t it? [Turns to the judge] I don’t think Ms. Carpenter is 
showing a lot of understanding of what she has done, and the 
consequences of what she has done for the victim, to be honest’. 
Jenny, shocked with the stern tone of both judge and prosecutor, has 
now started to cry silently: ‘But, I never expected this …’ 
Judge Mason, unmoved by Jenny’s story or tears, finds her guilty 
and sentences her to 100 hours of community service - ‘conforming’ 
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in her sentence decision to the prosecutor’s demanded sentence. 
Over lunch after the court session, Judge Mason tells me, still 
somewhat annoyed, ‘Look, she was talking about herself all the time, 
about how difficult this has been for her.’ Rather than a meek and 
cooperative young woman, Judge Mason faced what she perceived as 
a self-centred and self-pitying defendant. And even though Jenny 
echoed Judge Mason’s perception of her as someone who ‘didn’t 
mean to hurt anyone that badly’. Judge Mason could not, then, in 
good conscience, mitigate the prosecutor’s demands.  
This case, I think, is particularly suggestive of the centrality of 
remorse to judges. It shows the courtroom not only to be a site 
pregnant with legal narrative, but also as a setting saturated in 
explicitly moral concerns, questions, challenges and judgments 
(Cf. Emerson 1969: 204); a setting perhaps even of a ‘status 
degradation ceremony’ both legal and moral in character 
(Goffman 1956). More specifically, not only does it show 
remorse to matter, but also that it matters to such an extent that 
both judge and prosecutor aimed to actively elicit it from Jenny 
Carpenter. 
But this observation also complicates understandings that 
would attribute to remorse the status of a given, a ‘sign’ either 
present or absent (Tombs and Jagger 2006). While judges (and 
lay-juries, for that matter) may regularly draw distinctions 
between the ‘remorseful’ and the ‘remorseless’ (Tombs and 
Jagger (2006)), and while its role is well-established in the 
literature (see Bandes 2015; Duncan 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1997; 
Everett and Nienstedt 1999; Martell 2010; Proeve and Tudor 
2010; Sundby 1998; Wood and MacMartin 2007), this case 
demonstrates that ‘remorse’ is far from a straightforward ‘sign’. 
Indeed, this case is suggestive of precisely the uncertainties that 
accompany such judgments of remorse: on the one hand, some 
of Ms. Carpenter’s actions were understood to be indicative of 
her remorsefulness, yet others - specifically the way she objected 
to the public prosecutor and emphasized her own suffering - 
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bespoke of someone not entirely appreciative of the 
consequences of her actions. In other words, even though she 
immediately confessed, Jenny seemed to Judge Mason unaware 
of, and oblivious to her own responsibility for the offense in 
question. 
In this sense, this case suggests that ‘doing remorse’ is crucially 
different from either taking legal responsibility through 
confession or from offering apologies only. Indeed, judges often 
point out that while ‘it helps to talk’, provide a ‘story’, and to 
express ‘shock’ or sincere apologies, remorse is not solely 
established by what the defendant does and does not say. Matters 
are more complicated, for there is always the danger of insincere 
expressions of remorse: ‘after all’, Judge Emerald laconically 
comments, ‘we are among the most lied to professional groups in 
the Netherlands, and remorse tends to come only after the fact 
[berouw komt na de zonde]’. Because criminal justice settings are 
coercive, ritualized, and characterized by unequal power-
relationships between participants, ‘there is always the possibility 
that expressions of self-condemnation will be more strategic than 
authentic, more calculated and ulterior than spontaneous’ 
(Weisman 2009: 51). As these expressions of remorse are always 
already aimed at an interested audience, it is by that definition 
other-directed and taken to be potentially untruthful. Often, then, 
judges need further proof that defendants’ remorsefulness is a 
sincere expression of their authentic and ‘real’ selves. In Jenny 
Carpenter’s case, for instance, Judge Mason had been impressed 
with her efforts to seek contact with the victims: a sign of 
contrition. Indeed, judges tend to look for evidence that the 
defendant has taken concrete steps to reduce his or her risk of 
recidivism. For instance, have they found a job, combatted their 
addiction, and sought help for any psychiatric issues? This 
initiative is especially important given what judges perceive to be 
the defining feature of much of their clientele, that is their shared 
marginalization. One judge sighed and told me, ‘Our clients. Well. 
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They have all had a bad childhood. They all have some sort of 
personality disorder. At a certain point you’re familiar with all of 
it.’ Judge Kingsley similarly characterized the group of defendants 
judges encounter on a daily basis:  
They tend to have so many problems. Financial problems. Problems 
in the relational sphere. Traumatic experiences in the past - abuse 
and such things. Things are difficult for them, society is complicated. 
How would they be able to deal with all that? Think of social 
assistance: you have policy and laws to work through, you have to 
find and sign the requisite forms … All that stuff is too complicated, 
especially if you have difficulties reading or writing. So they struggle, 
have problems of all kinds. 
Defendants’ ‘own initiative’ and their own motivation are valued 
precisely because these are taken to be ‘signs of hope’ (Cf. Tombs 
and Jagger 2006): signs that the defendant, given his or her 
difficult past and circumstances in life, is taking his or her 
responsibility. Indeed, while judges have the discretionary room 
to combine a suspended sentence with the obligation that 
defendants accept certain rehabilitative interventions (individual 
or groups therapy), it is preferable if defendants seek help 
themselves. Judges, then, routinely check if the defendant has 
sought help for drug- or alcohol related issues, for instance, and 
gauge to what extent the defendant shows him/herself a 
‘functioning adult’ with a job or else with a ‘meaningful way to 
pass the day’ by going to college or through volunteering. After 
all, this is taken as defendants’ responsibility - and their 
responsibility only. Judge Emerald comments: 
These are people who tend to have ugly pasts. And at a certain point 
you’re done talking. If you don’t want help repeatedly, well, then you 
shouldn’t look at me but take a good look at yourself. 
Judge Emerald’s insistence on defendants taking responsibility is 
widely shared among the judges studied here, and resonates with 
the oft-noted distinction between defendants who locate 
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responsibility for their crimes externally - that is, locate it outside 
of their own control - and those who locate responsibility 
‘internally’ (Bridges and Steen, 1998; Mascini and Houtman, 
2002). Remorse, then, is about telling a ‘good story’, about 
expressing apology or shock, and importantly: about ‘taking 
responsibility for one’s actions’, preferably on one’s own volition. 
Doing remorse, then, requires both a ‘showing’ and a ‘telling’ (see 
also Weisman 2014). In the absence of either one of these, 
defendants tend not to be deemed remorseful: hence Jenny 
Carpenter’s fate. 
5 Situating Remorse I: Courtroom Catch-22s 
Jenny Carpenter’s case is but one case where the doing and the 
telling of remorse did not exactly line up with each other. While 
Jenny may have ‘showed’ remorse in her actions, she failed to 
‘tell’ it, instead painting herself the victim and in so doing raising 
the suspicion that she was insufficiently appreciative of her own 
responsibilities. Even though remorse is most adequately 
understood as both a ‘showing’ and a ‘telling’, the ‘telling’ part 
still matters a great deal.  
Importantly, that telling often takes place in the courtroom - a 
curiously understudied site in the production, demonstration, and 
contestation of remorse (Bandes 2015: 5). Indeed, the ample 
literature on courtroom dynamics (e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979; 
Bennett and Feldman 1981; Conley and O’Barr 1997; Jackson 
1988, 1996; Komter 2000; Matoesian 1993; Travers and Manzo 
1997) sensitizes one to the narrative and interactional texture of 
courtroom practices and points to the rather intricate tensions 
that often develop between vernacular language and legal 
language (see e.g. Conley and O’Barr 1997). Yet how the 
courtroom as a both legal and moral site shapes the local, 
practical grammar of remorse is a question not well-attended to. 
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The courtroom, conceived as a both legal and moral space, is 
where I seek to further situate remorse.  
A second case, chosen again for its strategic and demonstrative 
value, will help to identify the precise issue at stake here. Read in 
juxtaposition with the case involving Jenny Carpenter it offers 
ways to tease apart just what is expected from defendants in 
court, and demonstrates how both legal and moral demands of 
the courtroom may clash in practice. Enter Judge Starr and 
defendant Harrison.  
Defendant Harrison: Self-Defence or Self-Excuses? 
I am seated next to Judge Starr at her desk. She is about midway 
through the files making up tomorrow’s court session and turns to 
Harrison Smith’s case file. Harrison is accused of assaulting another 
young man just outside a well-frequented bar in the centre of town. 
Even though she notes small discrepancies between various witness 
statements, she does not conceive of this case as particularly 
complex: ‘I know enough’, she says after a few minutes of studying 
the file, ‘it’s all quite typical. Guy goes out, has a few drinks, gets 
angry for some reason, and gets violent.’  
The next day, we find ourselves in court. Harrison is young and 
well dressed, and seems eager to tell the judge his own story. Like 
any court session, the time available for Harrison’s case is divided 
into two stages: first the facts of the case will be dealt with, after 
which Judge Starr turns to questions about his personal 
circumstances and offers him, as is customary, the ‘last word’ 
(often an opportunity for defendants to say or reiterate they are 
sorry). Harrison is obliging. Unlike some defendants I have 
observed he does not, until the second phase of the court session, 
talk about himself much. Neither does he deny the charges. He 
simply tries to answer Judge Starr’s questions factually and 
carefully.  
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While Judge Starr guides Harrison through the events with help of 
temporally and causally-oriented questions like, ‘what time did you 
arrive?’, ‘then what did you see?’, and ‘then what did you do?’, 
Harrison provides a neat narrative. That night, Harrison elaborates, 
he went out for a drink, and while in a bar had accidentally bumped 
into the victim. The victim had reacted aggressively and had gathered 
his friends. ‘Then, they threatened to kill me’, Harrison tells Judge 
Starr, ‘so I went to nearby police officers and asked them for help, 
but they said they couldn’t help, so I went back to my friend, but 
those guys approached me. And that’s when I felt very threatened, 
one of them was getting so close-by … and that’s when I head-
butted him. I shouldn’t have done it.’ 
Throughout his answering of the judges’ factual questions, 
Harrison refers a few times more to the threats issued by the victim 
and his friends and emphasizes his anxious response to such a 
threatening environment, all the while connecting his statements 
using temporal and causal sequential markers such as ‘and then’, or 
‘and that’s why’. Moving onto the ‘personal circumstances’, 
defendant Harrison opens up and tells the judge that he has sought 
psychiatric help: ‘for my aggression, you see. I have been attacked a 
few times and I realize that I can come across as very aggressive 
when I feel threatened.’ He emphasizes that he has sought help from 
a psychologist to deal with his anxieties. The rest of his time he 
spends in school: he is working towards a second degree. His lawyer, 
too, suggests that Harrison’s behaviour is best thought of as self-
defence. Reiterating the threats issued by the victim and his friends, 
she suggests that Harrison should not be found guilty on the grounds 
that his actions constitute self-defence. Given the ‘last word’, 
Harrison states that he is sorry about what happened and that he is 
aware that he shouldn’t have reacted the way he did.  
At first sight, Harrison both takes responsibility and has taken 
steps to mitigate that which made him react violently in the first 
place (that is, he sought help for his anxiety). Not only does he 
express apologies and regrets, he also has a ‘meaningful way to 
pass the day’ and has sought help on his own accord. However, 
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Judge Starr is not so sympathetic to this defendant. She is dismissive 
of what she understands to be Harrison’s ‘self-excuses’ and his 
appeal to ‘self-defence’, and posits that Harrison ‘was not justified in 
his feelings of being threatened.’ Instead she concentrates on 
Harrison’s lack of responsibility. Even if his reaction was due to 
factors outside of his control - either the threats of the victim and his 
peers, or his (then) untreated anxieties in certain social settings - he 
nevertheless had the responsibility to not put himself into such a 
situation. Indeed, Judge Starr suggests that, given his anxieties, he 
might have chosen to stay at home. Judge Starr admonishes 
Harrison: ‘You are an adult man who is expected to take 
responsibility for his actions.’ Not mitigating her sentence, she 
sentences him wholly according to the judicial ‘orientation points’3, 
that is, to 120 hours of community service.  
We see a by now familiar insistence on ‘taking responsibility’. But 
while Harrison seemed at first to ‘tick all the boxes’ with his 
meaningful way to pass the day, his initiative in seeking treatment, 
and his professions of regret and apology, Judge Starr chastised 
Harrison for failing to take responsibility. She did not see self-
defence, but rather: self-excuses. 
This case, I suggest, is demonstrative of the tensions between 
the courtroom’s legal and moral demands. On the one hand, it is 
the setting within which events are to be qualified legally, and in 
legally consequential ways. Self-defence is one such a legal 
qualification, and might have led the judge to dismiss the case. In 
order to assist such legal qualification, Judge Star herself led 
Harrison through a long series of factual questions. Emphasizing 
the messiness of the situation, the role played by the victim and 
his peers, Harrison aimed to sketch the outline of the chronology 
of that evening and the circumstances leading up to the offense. 
On the other hand, the courtroom is the setting where Harrison 
is expected to show contrition, take responsibility, and in doing 
so express remorse. Indeed, the problem for defendants such as 
Harrison is one of both trying to cast a story that would be a legal 
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ground for dismissal and - if that argument should fail - 
demonstrating sufficient levels of remorsefulness. This is a 
slightly different dilemma than that outlined by Komter (1994), 
who diagnoses a tension, for defendants, between appearing both 
cooperative and defensive. In Harrison’s case, he faced a Catch-
22: for how can he both claim - as is his legal right - that the 
offense was self-defence, and to project sufficient levels of 
responsibility? 
Given these intricacies, some argue that remorse should not be 
incorporated into sentencing decisions at all (Ward 2006) or at 
least be excluded from consideration in cases involving 
particularly vulnerable defendant populations, for instance 
adolescent defendants (de Haan and Hielkema 2005). In such 
discussions it is often pointed out that defendants who deny the 
charges or who choose to remain silent cannot, like their 
confessing counterparts, similarly ‘take responsibility’ and express 
regrets, for which reason remorse should not play a role in 
decisions about those who do confess (even if those are 
qualified). As we have seen, not just denial or remaining silent but 
also legal lines of argument - that of self-defence - may interfere 
with judges’ appraisals of the defendants’ remorsefulness. 
Interactional dilemmas of this sort are by no means rare. ‘Staying 
factual’ does not rarely mean a defendant is forced to talk about 
other people’s role in the escalation of the offense in question; 
yet it is also a strategy that, to judges, can cast doubt on the 
extent to which defendants take sufficient levels of responsibility 
for the offense in question.  
6 Situating Remorse II: On Narrative Kinds 
Now, Harrison’s case may seem rare - but to judges it is not. 
Judge Starr herself had suggested it was ‘all quite typical: Guy 
goes out, has a few drinks, gets angry for some reason, and gets 
violent.’ It was ‘just fighting’ [gewoon knokken]: a formulation in 
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Dutch that does not suggest so much that she treats this fighting 
as insignificant, but rather that it is something not unusual, 
something not so unique. Other judges, in their work practices, 
concur. In a similar case of physical assault, taking place under 
similar (intoxicated) circumstances, Judge Dempsey notes that the 
defendant is ‘playing up’ his fear of (what would become) his 
victim. Adopting a purposefully whiney voice, Dempsey reads an 
excerpt from the interrogation with the defendant: 
He says [whiningly], “I was afraid he was going to hit me, and 
something clicked in my head, and then I hit him. I really thought he 
was going to hit me!” With a sardonic smile, Judge Dempsey looks 
up and adds, ‘and that’s when I started to cry!’ In his normal voice, 
he glances at me sideways and says, ‘well, alcohol destroys more than 
it is kind [alcohol maakt meer kapot dan je lief is], doesn’t it?’ 
Cases like Harrison’s - ‘guy goes out, has a few drinks, gets angry’ 
- are, to judges, recurring ones. Often, these are cases of physical 
assault in public [openbare geweldpleging], and involve similarly 
young, similarly intoxicated defendants. That Harrison had been 
drinking, that Harrison was provoked, that Harrison resorted to 
physical violence: all of these aspects of the case make it a more 
or less ‘typical’ incident: these are young men with ‘difficulties 
regulating their aggression’ (Judge Clarens). One judge comments 
that it is not uncommon for such defendants to feel treated 
unjustly: in the circumstances leading up to the offense, there is 
in actual fact little that distinguishes the aggressor from the 
victim: both may exchange increasingly heated words, both may 
push and shove each other … All is unclear, until the situation 
spirals out of control and becomes the object of investigatory 
work. Only then, the distinction between victim, defendant, and 
witness is retroactively drawn: ‘sometimes they say, the one who 
is there as a defendant is the one who won the fight’, Judge 
Dempsey commented on such ‘typical’ cases. Harrison’s appeal to 
self-defence, then, did not come necessarily as a surprise; indeed, 
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it is not uncommon for similarly charged defendants to 
concentrate on the role of the victim in the altercations. Neither 
is it rare for judges to emphasize that it is nevertheless the 
defendant who is on trial; the victim ‘is not the one being judged 
here today’, Judge Carol pointedly warned a defendant making a 
similar suggestion. Judges know, then, on the one hand that the 
responsibility for these kinds of altercations may in actual fact be 
distributed over all participants to the fight, yet tend to interpret 
appeals to self-defence as a refusal to take responsibility for one’s 
own acts.  
A typical case: here is something important. On the one hand, 
Harrison’s case is an individual unit of concern - after all, there 
are his personal circumstances to be taken into account. But to 
Judge Starr it is simultaneously evocative of a kind of story, a 
narrative type, summarized by Judge Starr herself in the barest 
form with ‘guy goes out, has a few drinks, gets angry from some 
reason, and gets violent’. Note that Judge Starr is hence working 
not only with a ‘type’ or ‘kind’ of offense, but with a skeletal 
sense of narrative that includes the specific offense in question, an 
appraisal of the kind of defendant (young, male), kind of setting 
and timing (a bar at night), a specific kind of victim (another 
young male) and the kinds of interactions and events leading up 
to the offense in question. Tata (2007, 1997) suggests we think of 
these narratives as ‘typified whole-case narratives’. These are not 
a simply summations of offender and offense characteristics, but 
rather a causal, temporal, and explanatory (but not necessarily 
justificatory) narrative that ties these together intelligibly. Drawing 
on prior knowledge (Emerson and Paley 1992), judges come to 
recognize some cases as variations upon a similar narrative 
theme. These typified whole-case narratives, Tata (2007) suggests, 
are important to judges because they provide a ‘narrative 
template’ and in so doing reduce complexities and impose order. 
Such narrative forms, Ewick and Silbey (1995) argue, share at 
least three characteristics, all present in this specific case: 
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narrative relies on the ‘selective appropriation of past events and 
characters’ (200); furthermore, these characters and events 
become linked in a temporal order: they have a beginning, a 
middle, and an end. Last, such persons and events are linked not 
just in temporal terms, but also within ‘some overarching 
structure, often in the context of an opposition of struggle’ (id.: 
200). Narratives hence offer intelligibility: connecting 
(imputations of) ‘character’, motive, circumstance and events, the 
operation of ‘emplotment’ (Ricoeur 1992) ensures meaning and 
sense. Yet these narratives also reduce moral complexities: not 
only does it render intelligible Harrison’s appeal to self-defence, 
but also informs Judge Starr’s suggestion that there is no excuse: 
he simply could have walked when provocations started. 
Knowing very well that these kinds of incidents are ‘messy’ 
(Judge Dempsey), it is the judge’s task to focus on the 
defendant’s own responsibility. 
Now, not all cases are so easily ‘typified’: many cases surprise 
judges and thwart them in their sense-making. Nor is the kind of 
whole-case narrative outlined here the only kind. Let’s turn to 
two other salient kinds of typified narratives and the role 
defendants’ demonstrations of remorse plays in these. 
Narrative Kinds: Typical Junkies, Typical ‘Explosive Couples’ 
The narrative kinds I am alluding to here are, first, the ‘typical 
junkie’ engaged in petty theft, and second, cases of domestic 
violence involving ‘explosive couples’. I concentrate on these two 
narrative kinds as judges’ appraisals of defendants’ remorsefulness 
plays a different role in these cases than they tend to do in the 
aforementioned cases of physical assault. That is, while 
demonstrating remorse and ‘taking responsibility’ is of utmost 
importance in public assault cases like Harrison’s, judges attribute 
much less importance to defendants’ demonstrations of remorse 
in these cases, albeit for different reasons.  
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Let’s start with the ‘typical drug-addict’ engaged in petty theft. 
Drug-addicted defendants, according to judges, make up a 
relatively large part of their caseloads (an over-representation 
exacerbated, some of them say, by recent budget cuts on 
psychiatric healthcare and homeless shelters). Often, judges note, 
these defendants are homeless and are ‘known to the police’ (and 
sometimes to judges as well) and generally have long criminal 
records with similar property-related offenses. Morally, this 
typified whole-case narrative reveals some tensions. On the one 
hand, as the life circumstances of these defendants are 
particularly dire, judges may find it difficult to attribute absolute 
moral responsibility to the defendant. Commenting on the host 
of problems usually plaguing such defendants, Judge Curtis tells 
me that these are people ‘without ties to society’:  
They are addicted, without a job, no education or family around him, 
well, then it is important at least something is done about that 
addiction. Of course you can say, he is responsible, and of course 
you can put him in a cell …  
But Judge Curtis is not necessarily satisfied with such a solution. 
Nor is it always possible. After all, ‘I can only offer help when 
they are convicted. Without a conviction I can’t do anything.’ 
Judge Peters is similarly concerned with ‘doing something’. 
Commenting on a middle-aged, female defendant charged with 
petty theft, he sighs and tells me,  
Wow. She’s born in 1962 even. You don’t see that often - to be 
addicted at that age! Well, this is another one of those cases that isn’t 
about the offense as much as it is about the question, what are we to 
do with you?  
However, judges’ rehabilitative impulses tend to be thwarted by 
these defendants’ behaviours. If these defendants do not show up 
in court, for instance, it may be difficult to hear ‘their side of the 
story’. Or, if they do not accept help, or if they have not accepted 
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help in the past, there might be little judges can do. ‘You can’t 
force someone’, Judge Clarens insists, ‘if they are not motivated 
you’re just done. It has to be possible and feasible. If you don’t 
take that chance you’ll have to sit it [the sentence] out [moet je 
maar je straf uitzitten]’.  
Yet even in cases where defendants try their best to show up, 
apologize, and take concrete steps to ‘better themselves’, such 
demonstrations of remorse tend to be treated with weary 
suspicion. Judge Peters for instance recognizes that people may 
make promises, but that ‘their addiction is much stronger than 
their resolution.’ A case in point is the encounter between 
defendant Clarence Jones and Judge Emerald. I had not before 
observed such an overtly contrite defendant, and his investment 
in his own future seemed, at first, quite laudable.  
Clarence has been addicted to crack cocaine for over six years, he 
tells judge Emerald in court. During that time, he frequently stole 
small items from supermarkets and corner shops: crimes for which 
he was repeatedly charged and convicted. Clarence comes across as 
quite genuinely remorseful: he looks not only nervous, but ashamed. 
Clarence is deeply unhappy with the ‘choices he has made’, blames 
himself for everything that happened the last few years, and tells the 
judge that he has been seeking treatment with help of his parole 
officer, whose testimony is also present in the file. Yet that previous 
attempt to combat his conviction had failed: he had returned to his 
habit. ‘I really need help. I … I really want to do my best. I am sick 
of the drugs. That’s not me. It’s my life, but things are starting to go 
wrong. I really need help’. Pleading for a conditional sentence, 
Clarence tells Judge Emerald he is not afraid of any sentence, as long 
as he can continue working with his parole officer. Judge Emerald is 
not swayed. ‘You tell me it is your life we are talking about. Well, I 
tell you to focus on the opportunities you’ve had. It is your own 
responsibility. You are 43! Not 18 anymore. I need to take control of 
your own life, and that is not your parole officer’s job. The only 
person capable of making a change is you, not me.’ Sentencing 
Clarence to an unconditional custodial sentence, Clarence is on his 
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own - without help of parole services, his addiction might be 
excessively difficult to combat.  
After the court session, Judge Emerald agrees with me that this 
was a particularly pitiful case. But: 
Well, certain of these defendants are certainly pitiable. But what we 
see every day is a virtually unceasing torrent of pitiable people … 
And those people have been warned before. Better to be clear, then.  
In this typified whole-case narrative - that of the typical drug-
addict - defendants’ remorsefulness - even if it is established by 
both a ‘doing’ and a ‘telling’ - is not necessarily consequential to 
judges’ sentencing decisions. At a certain point, the suggestion is, 
defendants can’t ask for yet another ‘second chance’. After all, 
their drug-addiction makes them particularity vulnerable to going 
back to their old habits and tends to eclipse their sense of 
‘personal responsibility’. ‘We all know people who try to quit 
smoking all the time’, Judge Fielding comments. It’s difficult and 
they keep falling back into their old habits. ‘That gives you some 
sense of how pernicious this is.’  
Let’s compare, then. The ‘angry young man’, exemplified by 
defendants Harrison, must show remorse - even if that threatens 
his legal defence. There is no excuse: even if in actual fact 
responsibility is distributed over all participants in the fight, it is 
unwise for defendants to point that out to the judge, lest they 
appear to be taking insufficient responsibility. Drug-addicts may 
‘show’ it and ‘tell’ remorse, but it does not always matter even if 
they do: their addiction is stronger than their resolutions. And in 
yet another ‘kind’ of case, remorse plays yet a different role. 
These are cases of domestic violence.  
Importantly, this kind of typification is one that incorporates 
neither only the remorsefulness of the defendant, nor only the 
circumstances leading up to the offense, but the character and 
responsibility of the (often female) victim as well. Following 
Judge Roberts, I will refer to this narrative typification as that 
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involving an ‘explosive couple’. Pointing to the role played by the 
victim in provoking aggressive responses, judges tend to 
emphasize that these are ‘difficult relationships’ within which 
people may think it is ‘normal, to push and shove each other like 
that’ (Judge Starr). ‘Of course’, Judge Starr adds, ‘you wonder 
why these women stay with these men.’ For one judge, this 
tendency to ‘stay with him’ was tied to ‘certain strata in society’ 
[bepaalde milieus]: ‘Look, if my guy ever hit me I’d be out of there, 
crying all the way over to my parents but never going back. It 
makes you wonder, though, why she stays with him.’  
‘Why she stays with him’: this is not an uncommon object of 
wonder for judges, and in that capacity a question that may cast 
doubt on the victim’s motives. Is the victim as innocent as she 
makes herself out to be? ‘Sometimes you see the facts in question 
and you think, this must be a real brute’, Judge Curtis comments, 
‘and then in court you see this tiny little man accompanied by this 
harpy, this huge woman … Well, that changes things.’ The 
victim’s physical size is sometimes referred to, but more common 
are references to her4 personality. On the one hand, the victim 
may be conceived as a strategist, for instance when the couple is 
caught up in legal disagreement over custody. Such a context 
casts doubts on the impartiality of the victim’s account: a 
conviction for domestic violence, judges say, tends to strengthen 
the victim’s position in custody agreement negotiations. At other 
times, judges voice the suspicion that the victims are ‘difficult 
personalities themselves’, perhaps due to psychiatric disorders - 
borderline personality disorder is sometimes referred to - or 
because of their circumstances in life.  
Whatever judges may think about these cases in private - and 
express in conversations with a researcher - does not always 
matter to their sentencing. For instance, while both the defendant 
or his/her lawyer may emphasize the difficult personality of the 
victim, judges may point out his or her own responsibilities. 
Judge Starr sternly admonishes a young man charged with a case 
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of domestic abuse to focus on his own responsibility when he 
argues that ‘even my ex told me she knows she hasn’t been the 
sweetest [geen lieverdje is geweest].’ Sternly, she tells him that ‘You’re 
taking this much too lightly. You say in every relationship there 
are fights like this. Even so you cannot do the things you did’. 
However, there are some indications that such appraisals of the 
victim’s characters and motivates do in fact inform judges’ 
responses to specific cases of domestic violence. It is in such 
cases that defendants’ remorsefulness is not necessarily a 
concern. 
An extreme case exemplifying this kind of appraisal is that 
involving Judge Kingsley and defendant Jeremy Stevens: it 
demonstrates both what this ‘explosive couple’ typified whole-
case narrative looks like, and is suggestive of a particular way of 
evaluating defendants’ demonstrations of remorse.  
The day before the court session, Judge Kingsley is quick to point 
out that the victim of this incident of domestic violence, Jeremy’s 
wife, seems to be suffering from borderline personality disorder. He 
bases his diagnosis on a statement made by defendant Jeremy’s 
brother. ‘He [Jeremy’s brother] is not a neutral party, of course, but I 
do get the impression the victim is making a mess of things. […] 
God, those women - borderline they call it. Of course such labels are 
attached to people too quickly. But borderliners are also very 
manipulative. That’s typical for people with borderline.’ He also 
points out that the couple is caught up in custody agreement 
negotiations, which to his mind casts doubts on her statements. After 
all, does she not have a stake in painting her husband as an 
aggressor?  
In court, Jeremy, a pale and heavyset man in his 40s, tells the story 
of the circumstances leading up to his arrest. He mentions the 
complicated divorce proceedings in which he and his wife are caught 
up, and suggests that she filed a criminal complaint to receive 
custody of the kids. He also tells the judge he has long suffered from 
his wife’s cheating and her mental ailments: ‘It hurts. We’ve been 
together for 23 years. The first time she cheated on me I tried not to 
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care. I did everything, by then: washing up, cleaning, and cooking. I 
was always careful to not irritate her.’ Judge Kingsley, noting a 
previous conviction for domestic violence on Jeremy’s criminal 
record, asks him about that previous offense. Jeremy tells him that 
‘Back then, I was just cooking, cutting up some vegetables, and she 
had half a bottle of coke in her hand, and she empties it over my 
head! Normally I walk away, but that time I thought, enough is 
enough.’ Judge Kingsley also asks him about the anger-management 
course Jeremy had taken as part of his previous parole conditions: 
‘yeah, I did that course. I thought it was me. Therapy and training. 
Until someone said, it’s not you. I’m just a regular guy.’ 
On the face of it, Jeremy does not seem remorseful: pointing at 
his wife’s role in previous, as well as this particular offense, he 
suggests that he is a ‘regular guy’, that ‘it’s not him’. He even 
suggests he is the real victim of his wife’s manipulative ways; the 
court-ordered aggression-relation course he also brushes aside as 
not addressing the real problem, which - again - is his wife. At no 
point does Jeremy ‘take full responsibility’ for what happened. 
Strategic or not, this kind of narrative resonates with Judge 
Kingley’s impression of the case: 
Surprisingly, given the available evidence, Judge Kingsley judges 
Jeremy not guilty: as one piece of evidence was an eye-witness 
statement by Jeremy’s son, he argues that Jeremy’s son was too 
young to testify: ‘he’s only 12 years old, and you can’t expect a 12-
year old to testify in such a case without any kind of expert present in 
the interrogation room.’ With this piece of evidence disregarded, left 
is only the victim’s statement - which itself provides too little 
evidentiary weight, Judge Kingsley argues, to convict Jeremy. 
Crucially, however, Judge Kingsley later tells the researcher that 
convicting Jeremy was simply not an option for him, but that this did 
require some creativity on his part: ‘Leaving out the son’s statement 
is a bit of a ploy, really. I could have used it, but I really didn’t want 
to convict.’ 
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Apparently, performing remorse - as consisting of both telling a 
story through ‘taking responsibility’ and demonstrating it through 
seeking treatment - is in such cases not as vital as it is in cases 
that bear more resemblance to the typified whole-case narrative 
involving ‘angry young men’. In both instances, judges recognize 
the messiness of the human relationships within which violence 
takes place, but in domestic abuse cases this does not always 
translate into the demand that defendants display remorse, that is: 
take full responsibility and seek help.  
7 The Case: A Legal and Moral ‘Grasping Together’ 
Drawing out these ‘typified whole-case narratives’ - the angry 
young man, the drug-addict, and the explosive couple - I have 
demonstrated not only the centrality of remorse to judicial work 
practices, but also the salience, among the judges collaborated 
with here, of three different ‘typified whole-case narratives’. 
These typified whole-case narratives may help to reduce cognitive 
complexities in specific cases, but have been demonstrated to 
serve moral purposes as well. That is, they allow judges to 
evaluate defendants’ measure of remorsefulness in relation to the 
offense and offender in question. The notion of narrative is 
crucial, here: object of typification is not necessarily the offender 
(‘client’), nor the offense itself, but rather the relation between 
these two. This relation is further typified by including the 
circumstances surrounding the offense (e.g. time, place), possible 
motives and reasons for behaviour (intoxication, addiction), and 
to the kind of victim (a stranger or one’s spouse or partner). 
Remorse, then, is mediated narratively: first, judges face a 
narrating subject in court, whose accounts - their ‘story’ - has the 
capacity to inform not only their impression of the defendants’ 
remorsefulness, but also their sentencing decisions. The 
narratives proffered by the defendant face dual and sometimes 
conflicting demands: a narrative offering temporal-causal 
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intelligibility, as is the case in those defendants seeking to argue a 
case of self-defence, for instance, may detract from the successful 
narration of moral and personal responsibility. Second, 
defendants’ remorsefulness is weighed and evaluated in and 
through several ‘typical whole-case narratives’: recurring and 
typified ‘cases’ characterized by different modes of emplotment 
(Ricoeur 1992): different conceptions of what drives people to do 
what they do - anger, addiction, a bad relationship - different 
modes of evaluating the degree to which they are responsible, and 
different modes of retaining the normative expectation that they 
should take responsibility.  
It is in precisely this sense that an emphasis on narrative is 
indispensable. While studies of legal practices or bureaucratic 
practices more generally have demonstrated the existence of 
client typifications or case-typifications (see e.g. Sudnow 1965; 
Lipsky 1980; Lynch 1998), the crucial role of narrative cannot be 
glossed over. Providing the conditions of temporal, causal, and 
moral intelligibility, whole-case narratives tie the specifics of the 
offender, the offense, the witness, the circumstances of the 
offense in question, and the biography of the defendant into a 
more or less orderly and typified whole. I have drawn out, here, 
the relationship between such temporal and causal orderings and 
moral modes of ordering; that is, the way a certain narrative ‘plot’ 
allows both for legal and moral judgment. Truth about the 
defendant, including his or her remorseful ‘soul’ (Foucault 1977) 
is produced narratively: ‘Narrative constructs the identity of the 
character’ (Ricoeur 1992: 147-8; see also Ewick and Silbey 1995). 
In so doing this chapter has made some headway in connecting 
the study of story-telling in legal settings with the role played by 
remorse: remorse itself is established in narrative and evaluated in 
and through narrative. These narratives are crucial not only to 
cognitive, but also moral ‘comprehension’: the activity of 
‘grasping together’ heterogeneous elements into an overarching 
narrative structure. 
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On Narrative and the Question of ‘Social Context’ 
The making of ‘whole-case narratives’ and their typification is an 
activity not fundamentally different from other narrative modes 
of action. People use narrative all the time in making sense of 
their selves, others, and the worlds in which they move. Given 
this affinity between these judicial practices and more 
fundamentally human tendencies to tell stories, a frequently 
raised question concentrates on the relationship between these in-
court stories and the wider social or discursive context.  
Critical discourse analyses of legal language, for instance, more 
generally understand legal narrative to be influenced by and 
embedded in wider societal discourses. Conley and O’Barr (1997), 
in their seminal ‘Just Words’, suggest that the study of courtroom 
interaction and legal language must be combined with a concern 
with discourse and power: 
Discourse is a locus of power. Different discourses compete for 
ascendancy in the social world; one is dominant for a time and then 
may be challenged and perhaps replaced by another. The dominance 
of a particular discourse inevitably reflects the power structures of 
society5 (Conley and O’Barr 1997: 7). 
In a similar fashion, I might point out that the suspicion that the 
female victims of domestic abuse are ‘not innocent themselves’, 
understandings of addiction as not only an illness but a moral 
failure, or the idea that biology (hormones) or peer pressure are 
in themselves an explanation for seemingly random acts of male 
violence, are of course not limited to judges. Exercises in finding 
resonances between these typifications among judges and more 
widely shared ‘discourses’ can certainly be instructive, specifically 
when they delve into underlying presuppositions that govern 
both legal and moral conceptions of guilt and remorse. Such 
exercises, while they are not part of my project here, might also 
contribute to understanding the mechanisms that produce 
inequalities in sentencing outcomes (Conley and O’Barr 1997: 13).  
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However, such approaches do risk portraying these societal or 
discursive ‘contexts’ as an unproblematic explanatory ‘real’ in a 
gesture not dissimilar to those discussed in Chapter 1, in which I 
highlighted the metaphysics mobilized in efforts to explain the 
Law with reference to the social. In doing so we mobilize the 
ontological primacy of the social real over the surface effect of 
legal practices and in doing so, may run into difficulties trying to 
justice the specifically legal character of the kind of narrative 
mediations involved. In other words: while moral responsibility 
and legal culpability may not always be so easily separated - see in 
particular Harrison’s and Jeremy’s cases - the narratives in court 
are not oriented only towards moral judgment in the name of the 
social. In the ethnomethodological sense of the term, these 
narratives are produced in reference to legal purposes and in 
reference to a legal ‘overhearing’ audience (Heritage 1985). Both 
the moral and the legal are narratively accomplished. In addition, 
there is a real risk that we become unable to account for our own 
situatedness with regards with the practices we seek to study. 
Schegloff (1997), drawing in deliberate irony on the same critical 
vocabulary as Conley and O’Barr themselves, warns us that 
analyses of this kind:  
Allow students, investigators, or external observers to deploy the 
terms which preoccupy them in describing, explaining, critiqueing, 
etc. the events and texts to which they turn their attention. […] 
However well-intentioned and well-disposed towards the participants 
[…] there is a kind of theoretical imperialism involved here, a kind of 
hegemony of the intellectuals, of the literati, of the academics, of the 
critics whose theoretical apparatus gets to stipulate the terms by 
reference to which the world is to be understood (Schegloff 1997: 
167). 
The point of this chapter in contrast has been to show that ‘there 
has already been a set of terms by which the world was understood 
- those endogenously involved in its very coming to pass’ (id.: 
167), that is, the three recurring whole-case narratives elaborated 
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on here. Reducing these ‘endogenously involved’ terms to 
‘power’, ‘discourse’, or ‘the social’ tends to place the sociological 
observer in an epistemologically privileged relation vis-a-vis the 
actors studied. However, sociologists are not the only ‘reflexive’ 
actors on the block; nor are the people they study mutes 
incapable of account-giving, of justifying, of rendering intelligible 
what they do and why they do so. Instead of placing ‘behind’ 
these instances of narrative typification a final sociological 
explanans such as power or the social, the focus has here been on 
‘the methods people use locally to produce the truth and 
intelligibility that allow them to cooperate and interact in a more 
or less ordered way’ (Dupret 2007: 82). These methods, this 
chapter has shown, have narrative dimensions: it is precisely in 
and through the explicit and narrative evaluation of cases that 
cases become intelligible both to judges themselves and to the 
observer at their desk or at the judges’ table in court. My efforts, 
then, have stayed deliberately with judicial typification practices. 
Tracing the way judges comment on and make sense of cases, the 
ways they interact with defendants, and their presentation and 
justification of their verdicts, this emphasis seeks not to privilege 
the sociological observer over that of those observed. In so doing 
I have preferred to focus not on imposing social order on these 
practices, but rather aimed to trace how legal and moral order is 
narratively enacted.  
Looking Back: Casuistry and Sociology’s Cross-Sectional Seeing 
Emphasizing the ways judges comment on, evaluate, and justify 
their decisions in specific cases has led me towards a narrative 
understanding of cases. This specific way of enacting cases 
contrasts, of course, with both judicial self-description and with 
socio-statistical accounts of these practices.  
Let’s concentrate on judicial accounts first. I have illustrated 
that judges tend to mobilize a casuistic register in their speech 
about their every-day practices: ‘every case is different’, ‘it all 
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depends on the particulars’. However, my analysis diverges in two 
ways from the ways judges themselves speak about their 
practices. First, while judges may understand themselves to be 
casuistic creatures par excellence, a closer look at their practices 
adds complexity to what is often understood as this juristic 
casuistry. Yes, individual cases are specific and unique. But that 
does not mean that judges do not link cases to recurring, more or 
less typical narrative kinds. In working with individual cases, 
judges are precisely engaged in not only case-making, but kind-
making; drawing on typified whole-case narratives, judges 
routinely employ such narratives to make sense of individual 
cases, and they do so explicitly throughout their preparations. 
Second, this analysis shows that these kinds of ‘intuitions’ are not 
necessarily ‘unconscious’ - as some judges suggest - not necessarily 
pre-verbal or pre-linguistic. Indeed, when talking about specific 
cases, judges draw explicitly on such typifications. The ‘social’, to 
paraphrase Hirschaur (2006), is not ‘silent’ at all, but populated by 
actors capable of commenting on, accounting for, and justifying 
their actions. The point is not to sideline self-conceptions, then, 
but to bring them into relation with the vagaries of practice.  
This emphasis on narrative typification practices contrasts, 
too, with socio-statistical modes of engaging with judicial 
decision-making. If, for the judges, a case is a narrative entity 
involving a narrating and narrated character, the fragmentation of 
‘cases’ into factors that is introduced with statistical modelling is 
bound to alienate. Hence, then, their emphasis on ‘all the 
circumstances’, on the ‘whole case’, on the ‘person’ and his or her 
‘story’. This point pertains equally to judges’ appraisals of the 
‘person of the defendant’. In the kinds of narratives just 
elaborated on, the ‘person of the defendant’ appears not as a 
collection of static factors, but rather as a narrative character with 
a biography, a character relationally connected (or not) to the 
victim, and a character whose needs, wants, and regrets are to be 
taken into account (even if these wants, needs and regrets are 
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then to be sidelined as, considering the defendants’ prior 
biography, they appear unreliable or untrustworthy). This also 
means that the disaggregation of the ‘person of the defendant’ 
into social factors such as gender, age, class and ethnicity or race 
does not resonate particularly well with judges’ way of 
approaching cases. Defendants appear primarily as typified 
characters in typified whole-case narratives, not as bundles of 
factors or exemplars of certain population groups or strata in 
society.6  
Hence, this account has brought us closer to the conditions 
for a rapport between judges and socio-statistical researchers. It 
has suggested that statistical researchers and judges are in fact 
speaking about two different realities. Both are populated by 
cases, but the case is a different thing in both. For judges, the 
case is first and foremost a narrative thing: involving times, 
places, events and characters inextricably linked both to the 
offense in question and to their biographies, their previous 
actions, and the narratives they in turn provide the judge with. In 
sociology’s cross-sectional world, cases are bundles of factors that 
refer back to population groups. Questions asked of cases are 
different, too: in the first, the question with regards to the case is: 
what’s its story? In the second, the question with regard to the case 
is the quintessentially sociological question, what lies behind it? (see 
Luhmann 1994). Both kinds of cases - narrative or statistical - 
also demand different kinds of observers. Judges’ familiarity with 
different whole-case narratives comes as a result of professional 
intimacy, prior knowledge, and practice: trained, but not 
necessarily pre-discursive intuitions and narrative capacities that 
help to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant, the 
remorseful and the remorseless, the typical and the atypical. Its 
objectivity demands not the cancellation of the individual observer 
in an appeal to mechanical objectivity (Daston and Gallison 1992), 
but precisely the mobilization of his or her prior knowledge, 
expertise, and prudence.  
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8 Onwards: Beyond Narrative  
If the preceding chapter has demonstrated the ‘reality effects’ of 
some social-scientific, statistically-oriented approaches to criminal 
justice practices, this chapter has placed emphasis instead on the 
morally-charged and narrative character of judges’ evaluations of 
the case, the defendant, and his or her remorsefulness. In so 
doing it has put centre stage the storied texture of legal work 
practices. It has treated judges as reflexive and accountable actors, 
engaged in the typification of individual cases in order to assist 
their legal and moral judgments. As such this chapter has 
connected an emphasis, in the literature, on story-telling in legal 
settings (e.g. Jackson 1988, 1996) with that of the production, 
contestation, and evaluation of remorse (Cf. Weisman 2009, 
2014).  
In so doing this chapter itself enacts judicial practices in a 
certain way: it enacts these practices as narratively mediated. And 
in so doing, it produces its own aporia once again - an aporia 
rooted in the fact that its emphasis on narrative is itself partially a 
performative effect of the largely orally-mediated collaborations 
upon which this chapter is based. Indeed, the observations 
related to you here are based on moments within which judges 
told me about their appraisals of cases, or on recorded instances 
of courtroom interaction: all largely ‘oral’ moments. This 
chapter’s emphasis on narrative, then, is itself situated within the 
performativities of oral modes of engaging with the object of 
study: in asking questions, I place the ‘informant’ (itself a 
performative effect!) in a confessional and reflective relation to 
his or her own actions and thoughts. Such an approach tends to 
yield comments, justifications, accounts, and: narratives. And of 
course such an account is inevitably limited: not - as is often the 
argument - because what people say they do is not necessarily 
what they actually think. Such a gesture depends for its rhetorical 
efficacy on the ‘head of the actor’ (Garfinkel 1967) and is for that 
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reason not as sociologically relevant. No, this approach to judicial 
practices is limited precisely because it is grounded in specific 
collaborations mediated by oral modes of engagement with these 
practices, that is my question that they tell me what they think 
about this specific case.7 What happens, however, when I start to 
observe what they do backstage? Taking into account that realities 
do not await discovery but are enacted within such collaborations, 
is it possible to defer an appeal to the ‘really real’ and raise 
another question? What are we missing out on if we remain 
content with this appeal to practical and narrative ‘real’? How can 
we move on to different situations, different tools, and different 
collaborations? Are there different ways to enact judicial realities? 
The following chapter aims to do precisely this. It emphasizes 
not narrative mediation in judicial case-making, but instead draws 
attention to the rather quieter and protracted episodes of routine 
‘file-work’ (Scheffer 2004, 2007) taking place ‘backstage’. It raises 
the question how judges ‘visualize’ the case: how they order 
documents, summarize evidence, and produce additional artefacts 
to help them in their sense making. Based on observations of 
judicial work practices and their rearticulation as a consequence 
of a large-scale digitization project in the court, it highlights the 
case file in its materiality. Concentrating on the case file and 
judicial documentation practices it emphasizes writing, not 
speech, and in doing so it departs from more ‘phonocentric’ 
(Derrida 1967) approaches that highlight interactions between co-
present participants in interaction settings. It draws to a lesser 
extent on conversations with judges and instead mobilizes 
observation of their work practices, specifically their pre-trial 
face-to-file interactions (Scheffer 2005).  
NOTES
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Oorschot, I. van, Mascini, 
P. and Weenink, D. (2017), “Remorse in Context(s): A Qualitative  
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Exploration of the Negotiation of Remorse and its Consequences” in Social 
& Legal Studies 26(3): 359-377. 
2 Soon enough I learned to ask more case-specific questions, particularly as I 
would start to prepare and study individual cases on my own and would 
observe judges’ file-work (see Chapter 5) in a practice of ‘shadowing’ (e.g. 
Halliday et al. 2008). 
3 These ‘orientation points’, nationally agreed upon ranges of acceptable 
sentences for certain offences (see de Rechtspraak 2016), are not to be 
confused with the ‘guidelines’ prosecutors use to decide on their demands. 
The difference between the two terms neatly captures a salient difference 
between the judiciary and the prosecuting forces more generally: in the 
emphasis it places on neutrality, the judiciary tends to consider ‘guidelines’ to 
infringe on their discretionary room for maneuver - hence the choice for 
‘orientation points’ - while the prosecution does not seem to share such a 
stance. See for more reflection on the organizational differences between the 
Dutch judiciary and the prosecution also van der Meer and Rottenberg 
(2013).  
4 I use the pronoun ‘her’ here not because men are not victims of domestic 
abuse in general, but because there was not one case I observed in which the 
genders were reversed (or the same, e.g. a lesbian or gay couple).  
5 Although the authors draw on Foucault’s work on discourse, their reading 
disregards some of Foucault’s later writings (see Dingwall 2000: 903), and 
furthermore presents a rather Marxist reading of Foucault. Suggesting that 
discourse reflects power structures in society (Conley and O’Barr 1997: 7) 
erects once again is a distinction between the two - a distinction denied of 
course, in Foucault’s emphasis on power/knowledge. Their emphasis on a 
‘dominant’ discourse furthermore resonates much more with a Marxist 
conception of ideology than with Foucault’s emphasis on multiple 
discourses.  
6 Of course, some of these typified whole-case narratives are more likely to be 
mobilized for certain (what sociologists would call) ‘population groups’ than 
others. The ‘angry young men’ are just that: often men, whose intoxicated 
violence tends to be understood as triggered by threats to their masculinity. 
The idea that domestic violence occurs most often in ‘certain strata of 
society’ [bepaalde milieus] clearly mobilizes classist conceptions about civility 
and interpersonal relationships, while the emphasis on the moral character 
of the (often female) victims in such cases of domestic violence sheds a 
rather sexist light on some of these evaluations. Drug-addicted, homeless 
defendants tend to be economically marginalized, and given the over-
representation of certain ‘ethnic groups’ among the economically 
marginalized, a case could be made that judges’ punitive stance vis-à-vis  
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drug-addicted people in actual fact end up reproducing not just economic, 
but ethnic marginalization. At the same time, such a gesture engages in a 
‘reality game’ similar to the kind I have commented on in reference to 
critical discourse analysis: what happens, concretely, in legal sites and 
practices is yet again treated as an expression of an underlying social ‘real’ 
(even though that ‘real’ is one of social facts or structures, not of power and 
language).  
7 It is for this reason that I am not wholly ready to ascribe to Tata’s (2007) 
decidedly naturalist appeals. Writing about judicial practices and contrasting 
these ‘factorial approaches’, Tata (2007) not only suggests that a study of 
typified whole-case narratives offer a unique insight into judicial practices - a 
methodological point - but draws on an implicit naturalist realism, 
contrasting the formalism of socio-statistical modelling with the singularity 
of actual practices. Again, it has to be born in mind that all methods of 
inquiry have performative effects, and that they all, for that reason, enact 
realities in specific ways. My concerns throughout this book, then, are 
perhaps less naturalist, but not one ounce less realist than Tata’s (2007).  
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5 Visualizing Cases 
1 From Story-telling to File-Work 
Born out of largely conversation-mediated and interaction-based 
collaborations with judges, the preceding chapter demonstrated 
the centrality of defendants’ remorsefulness to judges’ appraisals 
of individual cases and demonstrated how such remorsefulness is 
narratively established and narratively evaluated. In so doing it 
resonates not only with those studies taking seriously the way 
language and narrative come to matter in legal settings, but also 
with judges’ emphasis on ‘a good story’. Guilt, responsibility and 
remorse are narratively mediated accomplishments - not 
unproblematic ‘signs’ or ‘case factors’. Legal practices, specifically 
as they pertain to the remorsefulness of the defendant, have a 
storied texture. 
Yet an exclusive focus on spoken language - both as 
something in and of legal practices, i.e. courtroom interaction, and 
as a method we use in collaboration with these legal practices, i.e. 
by talking with judges - introduces its own limitations. That 
narrative and story-telling make up an important part of legal 
practices cannot be denied. Yet there is a real risk, here, of 
forgetting that legal practices are not just that. They also, Dupret 
(2007: 85) argues, ‘constitute an activity accomplished on a daily 
basis, of an overwhelmingly routine character, the place of 
production and reproduction of professional practices’. Scheffer 
(2010) similarly warns against the tendency to concentrate 
exclusively on the verbal production of order (Cf. Atkinson and 
Drew 1979) or on interactions in court (Cf. Conley and O’Barr 
1990). Doing so runs the risk of phonocentrism (Derrida 1967): 
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of treating as more primary the spoken word over writing. Legal 
practices are themselves notably phonocentric: many jurisdictions 
for instance privilege oral testimony over written testimony. Yet 
there is no reason for us to reproduce this phonocentricity in our 
accounts - especially not if in doing so we miss out on large 
swaths of file-work (Scheffer 2005, 2007). In this chapter, I 
concentrate on these practices of file-work. Instrumental in 
judges’ pre-trial ‘visualization of the case’, these practices of file-
work demonstrate both the centrality of the case file in judicial 
practices in particular, and the materiality of knowledge practices 
more generally.  
This chapter 1, then, speaks to a curious hiatus in legal as well 
as socio-legal understandings of legal practices. Focused on the 
technicalities of legal reasoning (Riles 2005) or on verbal 
interaction (Conley and O’Barr 1990; Atkinson and Drew 1979), 
dominant approaches to legal practices tend not to pay much 
attention to the case file. Reasons for this neglect of backstage 
file-work are not difficult to fathom. There is a real attraction in 
the tragedy of the courtroom: promising unity of place, time and 
act, the courtroom evokes and dramatizes the encounter between 
the subject and the Law. It also speaks to the sociological 
imagination, calling upon researchers to understand, in classical 
fashion, the intricate relationship between personal troubles and 
public issues (Mills 1959: 226). On a more practical level, 
courtrooms tend to be publicly accessible and as such raise fewer 
barriers to curious researchers. Documents, in contrast, do not 
perhaps make for the most exciting of research objects (Latour 
(1990: 54) quips they may be among the ‘most despised of 
ethnographic objects’), and in their association with backstage 
legal practices make their use and operation difficult to access. 
Nor are different national jurisdictions equally reliant on written 
materials: Anglo-Saxon courtroom tend to emphasize speech 
over writing, whereas Dutch criminal law draws more extensively 
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on the official dossier as a carrier and transporter of evidentiary 
materials.  
‘Seeing the Case Clearly’  
However, these official dossiers are a principal object of and for 
work for the judges studied here. Indeed, much of judges’ time is 
spent in their offices, where they try to ‘see the case’, ‘attempting 
to ‘see the full picture’, all the while remaining sensitive to their 
‘blind spots’. While these visual metaphors - like many of such 
metaphors (Haraway 1988) - seem to suggest this is quite an 
unproblematic, cognitive operation, their work practices are 
revealing of active, sometimes fraught, practices of visualization; 
visualization practices, moreover, that take place in relation to the 
legal case file.  
I arrived at these practices not from a vantage point in the 
courtroom, but rather through the observation of judicial 
practices of file-work backstage. This place - seated next to the 
judge, tracing and recording the judges’ file-work - afforded me 
some sense of these practices of visualization. An exemplification: 
This morning I join Judge Roberts in her office to observe her 
preparation for tomorrow’s court session. She is almost ready to 
start, she tells me, as she drops a large stack of files on a corner of 
her desk and takes seat behind her desk. ‘There are a couple of big 
ones’, she tells me as she points to a set of particularly thick files, ‘I 
hope we have enough time to discuss these in court tomorrow; it 
looks like they’re going to be complicated.’ In front of her, she has a 
smaller stack of single sheets of paper. These are copies of the 
summons sent out to individual defendants detailing the charges. 
These copied summons all have hand-written notes on them. I know 
that these have already been ‘prepared’ by the clerk who is assisting 
Judge Roberts with tomorrow’s court session. On her left is a small 
collection of coloured pens, post-its, and yellow markers. I am seated 
to her right, and glance over her shoulder while she studies the case 
files. ‘Can you see it alright?’, she laughs, and starts her preparation 
of tomorrow’s court session.  
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Methodically, Judge Roberts first takes a yellow marker and marks 
certain phrases and words on the summons accompanying the first 
case file. ‘See, you have the tendency to delve right into the file. But 
it is important to first look at the charges. With that in the back of 
your mind you then enter the file.’ Reaching to her left to pick up 
one of her coloured pens - a red one - she tells me, ‘I like to use 
coloured pens when I work with the clerk’s written preparation on 
the summons. That way it’s clear what exactly I wrote down myself, 
my own notes stand out.’ Opening the case file, she takes out a letter 
from the defendant’s lawyer; with a red pen, she then writes down, 
on the summons, the name of the lawyer. This type of back-and-
forth between the case file and her own notes is repeated throughout 
her preparation: leafing through the file and reading several 
documents, she uses her pen to cross off the clerks’ notes and 
occasionally exchanges her red pen for a yellow marker to highlight 
specific phrases and words in the case file. She says, ‘See, I am 
checking each and every part of the charges now’, and shows me 
how, having found the relevant information in the legal case file, she 
checks off the location of the crime, the name of the defendant, and 
the specific acts that were involved with small, v-shaped scribbles on 
the text of the written charges. ‘So what I am looking for is whether 
the clerk has written everything down and whether all of it is in the 
file.’ Getting ready to close the file she hesitates: ‘I forgot to read the 
parole service report!’ Rummaging through the file she halts when 
she sees a small, pink post-it peeking out from the now slightly 
messy-looking file. ‘Ah, there it is!’ Slipping the document out of the 
file, she reads the concluding section in the parole service report, and 
mumbles, ‘so, this guy probably left the Netherlands again while he 
was still on parole …’ Having taken some notes again on the copy of 
the summons, she is done with this file. The elastic binder snaps the 
case file closed.  
Taking some 20 minutes, this case was not very difficult to ‘see 
clearly’, she told me: the case file was complete, the evidentiary 
materials mostly in order, and the clerk’s preparation was up to 
par.  
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Doings with Paper or Digital Documents 
What appeared, in Chapter 3, as an input-output system 
distributing justice, and in Chapter 4 as a highly morally charged, 
narrative practice, now starts to look slightly more mundane. 
Seated at the judges’ desks to observe their work I learned that 
judicial work is also a practice of lugging heavy files to one’s desk; 
of ordering documents in the file; of leafing through them, in 
search of that one piece of testimony or that one expert witness 
report; and of using pen, pencil and paper to distill, from the file, 
an operative sense of ‘the case’. These judicial practices are 
practices of extraction (Latour 2010): of extracting from the case 
file ‘the case’ it supposedly enfolds. For many court workers, 
then, ‘ordinary case work seems to a large extent a face-to-file 
interaction’ (Scheffer 2005: 75) rather than face-to-face 
interaction. ‘The case’ is buried in the file - and the judge’s task is 
to see it clearly. 
Such extraction is not always easy. Case files themselves may 
resist the effort: their sheer size, incompleteness, or their 
‘messiness’ may thwart judges’ pre-trial preparations. These little 
recalcitrances were exacerbated, for judges, when the Court 
introduced digital case files. Part and parcel of a broader program 
aimed at streamlining the organization of the Court and its 
communication with its ‘chain partners’ [ketenpartners], digital files 
held the promise of reducing administrative personnel costs and, 
particularly so in civil law cases, of rendering access to legal 
procedures easier and swifter. Judges however were not quite so 
enthusiastic about these digital files. Indeed, many lamented the 
transition. ‘I kept thinking, you know, if only I could see that 
stack of files in front of me!’ a judge sighed wistfully when 
recounting her first difficulties with the digital case files. Her 
colleague added, ‘if only to get that first impression, even! Like, 
what case files are thick, which are thin, that kind of thing.’ 
Clerks, too, complained: ‘It’s presented to us as a time-saver. I 
can tell you, it’s not!’. They, too, faced new demands as they were 
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asked to work digitally, and they, too, only gradually settled into 
this unfamiliar medium of work.  
These observations sketch the outlines of the central problem 
addressed here: the relationship between the materiality of the 
case file on the one hand, and on the other, judicial visualization 
practices. They point towards not only the centrality of the case 
file as a material entity in, and active constituent of, judicial sense-
making and visualizing practices, but also to the ways this 
materiality starts to matter in the migration of one medium (paper 
files) to the next (digital files) (Lanzara 2009). The question is 
hence how, through various types of file-work, an elusive ‘image 
of the case’ emerges in the interaction between file and file-
worker, and crucially, how such taken-for-granted sense-making 
practices are variously disrupted, rearticulated, or painstakingly 
maintained when judicial professionals face a shift in the tools of 
their trade.  
2 Judicial Thinking, Seeing, and Visualization 
Unpacking the implications of these observation leads not only to 
a rearticulated understanding of just how we may inquire into 
‘judicial thinking’ (Cf. Possner 2008) or Hart’s ‘internal point of 
view’ (1994 [1961]); accompanying this effort is also an account 
of the challenges that attend to our efforts to take the abundance 
of written artefacts in our fields of research seriously.  
In this sense, this intervention takes place against a 
background of conceptualizations of judicial work that are, 
explicitly or implicitly, cognitivist. Possner (2008), drawing on 
experimental and survey data, raises the question as to ‘how 
judges think’, suggesting that psychological mechanisms or 
economic incentive structures shape and structure judicial 
thinking. In so doing, legal decisions are first and foremost 
understood as a product of cognitive processes upon which other 
cognitive biases, e.g. psychological mechanisms or economic, 
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profit-maximizing orientations, exert their influence. A similar 
emphasis on judicial cognition is present in Wermink et al. 
(2012a), who suggest that different sentencing outcomes are due 
to processes taking place in the ‘unconscious’. As I have argued 
in Chapter 3, such an approach to judicial decision-making treats 
not only the legal system at large as an input-output system; it 
also places within that black box yet another, explanatory black 
box: the head of the judge. The implicit assumptions that action 
is the product of cognitive processes, and that such cognitive 
processes exist only in the ‘head of the actor’, contrasts sharply 
with approaches to cognition that treat it as embodied and 
situated. Combining insights from a wide variety of sources, e.g. 
activity theory and developmental psychology, practice theory, 
and American pragmatism, these approaches treat cognition not 
as a consequence of detached and unmediated knowing activity, 
but intimately bound up with the material environment (see e.g. 
Hutchins 1995; vom Lehn et al. 2001; Orlikowski 2006; Schatzki 
et al. 2001). Intellectual tasks conceived in this way often ‘appear 
to be highly embodied activities, in which on-going interactions 
with the immediate surroundings play a key role’ (Berg 1996: 
504). People think not only with their heads, but with their 
‘hands’, too (Latour 1986). An appreciation of file-work hence 
defers the necessity to ‘black-box’ judicial thinking in the ‘head of 
the judge’, and treats it primarily as a situated and materially 
mediated activity. In contrast with a cognitivism that leaves us 
with a ‘“dematerialized” understanding of conduct and action’ 
(vom Lehn et al. 2001: 208), this understanding of judicial 
knowing practices also opens these activities up for empirical 
inquiry, rather than locking it up in the ‘head of the actor’.  
Permutations of Perspectivism: Point of View, Vision, Visualization 
Some of this situatedness of knowing is attended to in 
approaches to legal work that draw, like the judges studied here, 
on a perspectivist register. Judicial thinking is not just any kind of 
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thinking: there is something uniquely ‘legal’ about it. It is, 
according to Hart (1994 [1961]) the attitude of the practical-rule 
follower: seeing the rule is an immediate and unreflexive grasping 
of the rule (see Shapiro 2006). Not only does this emphasis on 
the internal ‘viewpoint’ resonate with judges’ own conception of 
what they are doing when they are doing file-work - after all, they 
are trying to ‘see the case clearly’; it also resonates with those 
seeking to study ‘vision’ in relation to specific professional 
practices. Goodwin (1994), for instance, suggests that different 
professional practices rely on cultivated and materially mediated 
modes of distinguishing figure from ground, information from 
noise. Yet while Goodwin (1994) treats these professional 
practices as intimately bound up with specific socio-material sites 
and settings - collecting soil for testing, recognizing and pointing 
out, for others, ‘aggression’ in a defendants’ behaviour caught on 
videotape - Hart’s perspectivism falls prey to a similar kind of 
cognitivism: for him, the grasping of the rule is a disembodied, 
immaterial process.  
Hart’s internal point of view, however, does allude to 
something specific to legal practices: that is, the legal rule itself. 
These are central to legal practices: in ethnomethodological terms, 
they are to what action ‘oriented’. It is through this very act of 
orienting oneself to the rule that these rules become implicated in 
action. While legal rules, then, may pre-exist their implication in 
concrete practices, the very fact that they pre-exist concrete 
instances of implication does not make their ‘hold’ on concrete 
practices unproblematic. For socio-legal scholars, the question 
remains, for how, as a matter of practical activity, are rules oriented to 
at all? In the social study of legal practices, this problem is also 
known as the ‘missing-what’ (Dupret et al. 2015). Lynch 
summarizes this ‘missing what’ as born out of a tendency to  
describe various “social” influences on and implication of the growth 
and development of legal institutions while taking for granted that 
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lawyers write briefs, present cases, interrogate witnesses, and engage 
in legal reasoning (Lynch 1993: 114). 
Accompanying this tendency is treating legal categories and rules 
as self-evident ‘prescriptions and proscriptions for action’ 
(Dupret et al. 2015: 4). Yet the practical and concrete question is 
one that would highlight precisely how legal rules are ‘oriented to’ 
at all as a matter of situated and practical activity. File-work, as 
the location of coming to the case, of grappling with it, of turning it 
around in one’s thoughts while browsing the file, is a plausible 
candidate to start to begin inquiry into this kind of apprehension.  
Legal Case Files 
Latour (2010) and Scheffer (2005, 2006) are notable here, as they 
have explicitly traced the ‘doings with documents’ (Harper 1998: 
3) in legal settings. For both, legal practices take place in relation 
to both spoken word and written text. For both, the case file is a 
crucial agent in these practices. For instance, Latour (2010) 
locates the quintessential legal activity of finding the means (the 
legal argument) in the file-workers attempts to build a ‘fragile 
bridge of texts’ between the case file and the letter of the Law 
(2010: 83) in a series of sequentially distributed note-taking and 
summarizing operations. Especially helpful is his attention to the 
distributed character of such practices over various kinds of file-
workers, and his sensitivity to the sheer amount of work that goes 
into extracting, ‘like diamonds […] from the ore (Latour 2010: 
102), the ‘case’ in its purest form from the case file. Scheffer 
(2005, 2006, 2007, 2010), too, concentrates on the implication of 
the documents in the case file in the formation of a criminal 
defence in his study of defence lawyers’ file-work, focusing on 
the interplay between written and spoken text in the construction 
of lawyers’ defence pleas. Emphasizing the intricacies of file-
work, both authors move away from treating case files as 
unproblematic representational devices: the file does not speak 
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for itself. At the same time, both authors highlight above all else 
the textual contents of the case file, and in so doing risk 
reproducing some of the cognitivism or dematerialized 
perspectivism I have sought to make problematic here. It treats 
knowing as a product of unfolding and practical ‘microformation’ 
(Scheffer 2005), yet loses out of sight the fact that the case file is 
not only a container of information but a material object as well.  
Combining both a concern with the practical ways legal actors 
orient their action to legal rules and an emphasis on the 
materiality of such practices, I suggest we think of these practices 
as practices of visualization. With Goodwin (1994), I would suggest 
that these practices may be rather specific to certain professions 
or communities of practices. With Lynch (1993), Scheffer (2004, 
2007) and Latour (2010), I would suggest the ‘missing what’ of 
much socio-legal scholarship lies precisely in its disregard for the 
practical and material activities of orienting action towards legal 
rules and categories. Yet the notion of visualization has additional 
affordances in the study of legal practices. Unmooring it from its 
dominant coupling with discussions about big data (Halpern 
2014) or new media technologies (Mirzoeff 2015), the notion of 
visualization is suggestive of purposeful and operational 
modalities of ‘seeing’ that require active schematization and 
ordering. It is related to the question of visibilities, that is 
‘historically stipulated apparatuses for producing evidence about 
bodies, subjects’ (Halpern 2014: 23). Continuing to emphasize the 
practical and situated character of such practices, I am less 
interested here in questions about visuality as these are linked to 
governmentalities or indeed, history. Instead, I want to 
concentrate on the small acts of apprehending, of coming to the 
case, as these takes place in relation to the case file. The notion of 
visualization helps me to do so, as it precisely ‘straddles the actual 
practices of depicting and modelling the world, the images that 
are used, and the forms of attention by which users are trained to 
use interfaces and engage with screens’ (Halpern 2014: 23, 
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emphasis added) - or, as I will show, with an object that is both a 
semiotic surface and a physical thing. 
In order to demonstrate what such an attention to file-work 
may yield, I now take you to the offices and file-rooms making up 
the court’s ‘backstage’. I give up my position as spectator in the 
courtroom and interrogator of judges for an observational mode 
of inquiry that traces case files from their entry into the court to 
the judges’ desk.  
3 Visualizing the Case: A Paper-Specific Account 
What does it take, then, to ‘see’ the case? It takes, first of all, a 
case file. Gathering together evidentiary materials, expert witness 
reports, and documents testifying to the specifics of the case, the 
case file promises to enfold ‘the case’. In their paper form case 
files arrive in the court’s administrative offices; there, their arrival 
is registered in one of two digital registration systems (the older 
Compas or the relatively new GPS). Administrative workers must 
furthermore check these files according to a checklist that is 
attached to their inner sleeve. Among other things, they check 
whether the case file meets certain procedural demands and take 
note of its components. For instance, does it include a separate 
binder for information on, and correspondence with, a possible 
victim? Does it include a parole service report? Most files, 
however, are far from complete upon arrival: not only may 
further reports be added to them once they are sent to the court’s 
administration, but on-going correspondence between the 
prosecutor or the defence attorney and the Court must similarly 
be added to the case file. Latour (2010), drawing on 
colloquialisms shared by the administrative workers in the 
Counseil d’Etat, speaks of these processes as one of ‘ripening’. In 
the court studied here, files stored in the file-room are considered 
quite ‘open’ and even ‘alive’.  
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‘Reading’ a File: Material Clues 
To the uninitiated, files look very much alike. As standardized 
objects, files are precisely instruments of deindividuation, 
physically and materially embodying procedural ‘equality before 
the Law’ (Cf. M’charek, Hagendijk and Prainsack 2013). Yet 
seemingly slight differences between them assume importance to 
both clerks and judges. For instance, paper files in police judge 
cases may be quite thin or quite thick. Or their sleeves may be 
worn - when the case has been adjourned, perhaps more than 
once, in its past - or rather new and sleek. Clerks’ and judges’ first 
encounter with their ‘cases’, then, is visual and perceptual: they 
simply face a stack of files, which they might have to move from 
one location (the file room) to their own offices. This stack itself, 
as well as the thickness and age of individual files, allows clerks 
and judges to gauge the case load, that is, it allows them to assess 
not just exactly how many cases are scheduled to appear in court 
in a single court session (done by counting), but also the relative 
complexity of individual cases. Clerks and judges regularly make 
distinctions based on the thickness of individual files, as they 
have come to learn the bigger files are usually more complex 
cases, with more evidentiary materials: a case of physical assault, 
perhaps, in which victim’s, witnesses’, and defendants’ statements 
are notoriously incomplete and contradictory, and in which 
correspondence with the victims may have generated more paper. 
Thinner files are perceived differently; these are probably ‘simple’ 
cases of petty theft, in which defendants are caught red-handed 
and (usually) confess.  
Once the paper file is opened, the physical qualities of its 
component parts afford the same intuitive gauging processes to 
take place, prior, even, to reading one word of its textual content. 
For instance, a thick folder of evidentiary materials suggests not 
only that the case is more (legally) complex (as more evidence has 
been gathered), but also that the judge will be dealing with a 
defendant who pleads innocent: a clerk explains that in such 
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cases, ‘police officials have to work harder to find the two pieces 
of evidence we need to convict someone and, well, they use a lot 
more paper.’ The criminal record, as a physical object, is 
particularly suggestive here, too: it allows clerks and judges 
acquire an ‘image’ of the defendant as e.g. a particularly 
troublesome repeat offender or a one-shotter, which ‘image’ in 
turn helps them evaluate punishment options if the defendant is 
found guilty. Leafing through the file, judge Dempsey, with a 
surprised look on his face, showed me a particularly thick 
criminal record: ‘Look at this! You can seriously injure someone 
if you hit him on the head with a criminal record this thick. Well, 
if he’s found guilty we won’t have to explore the option of a 
community service; he passed that station twenty-five cases ago!’ 
Here, the physical qualities of the paper case file become 
instrumental in conceiving of the case as characteristic of a 
certain narrative kind. Concerning ‘offense types rather than 
specific individuals’ (Dupret 2011: 142), judges’ narrative 
typifications (see Chapter 4) may already be mobilized at this 
early stage of their file-work. Gauging the physical qualities of the 
case file and its component parts provides file-workers with a set 
of material clues instrumental in structuring and timing their pre-
trial preparations. Their informational value is not limited to their 
textual or graphic content: case files are both texts and physical 
objects.  
Of course, it takes experience to be able to make such 
distinctions. For a novice, the case file is utterly bewildering. 
Looking all very much the same on the outside, their insides are a 
jumble. Documents are not necessarily ordered chronologically. 
Folders within folders raise the question what logic guides their 
inclusion into each other. And what are all these scribbles about? 
Why all the stamps? What do all these abbreviations mean? 
‘Reading’ is a word ill-suited to describe my first studies of the 
case files; ‘struggling with’ being an arguably much more astute 
nomer. Case files very much resisted a ‘politics of immediation’ 
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(Mazzarella 2006) that expects immediate and unproblematic 
access to ‘what really happened’. Judges and clerks, then, have 
developed ways to ‘tame’ the file in order to extract the case.  
Taming a File 
Before the file arrives at the judges’ desk it has first passed 
through the hands of an assisting court clerk. These clerks are 
tasked with making the file a more easily-navigable and structured 
object. Kirsch calls these practices ‘informational jigging’: these 
are practices in which ‘an agent will arrange items (consciously or 
sometimes unconsciously) [in the material environment] to draw 
attention, to cue cognitive events or processes in himself or 
herself or another agent’ (Kirsch 1995: 38). Coding, for instance, 
is the practice by which court clerks physically mark some parts 
of the paper file with colour-coded stickers. Showing me his 
selection of red, orange, blue, green and pink post-its, clerk Lee 
explains:  
So what they want from us is to mark the documents in the case file, 
so that they can switch to whatever documents they are interested in 
right away when they are preparing cases. So we use orange for the 
criminal record, red is for his statement in the police interrogation, 
blue is of course for the police findings [referring to the colour of 
police uniforms], the victim’s statement is marked green and then 
there is the pink sticker for the parole service report. That is if there 
is a parole service report present. 
Showing me a drawer full of these coloured stickers, he chuckles 
and adds, ‘By the way it is really annoying when we run out of 
these post-its, so I and some other clerks are hoarding them’.2 
Here, clerks’ coding practices assist judges’ future navigation of 
the case file. Court clerks may also draw out relevant passages 
from the police observations or interrogations by highlighting, 
with a pencil, certain important words and sentences in the case 
file, hence directing attention to those ‘sensitive text zones’ 
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(Fraenckel et al. 2010) in which the judge is anticipated to find 
answers to questions of legal relevance: ‘it’s just to sort of 
underline the things a judge might be interested in, like the 
defendants’ statement or a witness’ observations, stuff like that’, a 
clerk tells me. In their highlighting, they also ‘transform the 
future reading of the copy’ (Scheffer 2006: 308), drawing 
attention to salient phrases or accounts.  
Judges, too, engage in such informational jigging activities - 
although they, unlike clerks, may prefer to use yellow markers in 
their highlighting practices (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Juxtaposing conflicting accounts, a yellow marker ready 
Assisting both clerks’ and judges’ ‘reading’ of the file is yet 
another affordance of paper files, that is the fact that component 
parts can be spread out on a desk. Especially in cases involving 
multiple witness accounts, the ‘ecological flexibility’ (Luff et al. 
1992) of paper files allows file-workers to easily switch between 
different accounts. In, we see a judge engaged in precisely such 
highlighting and juxtaposing work.  
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Making a Summary: Disentangling and Assembling Work 
Throughout their gauging, jigging, and juxtaposing work, clerks 
and judges are first and foremost concerned with the extraction 
of ‘the case’. Their extractions [uittreksels] are always geared 
towards the official charges: these they use to ‘apply a filter’ 
(Judge Beech) and to distinguish signal from noise. These charges 
are legal-formulaic in nature, and are drawn up in order to cover 
various modalities of the crime in question (e.g. whether the 
person committed the crime alone or in association with others, 
whether the person hit or merely slapped a person), e.g.:  
That he, on or about the [date] in [place] together with and in 
association with others, or alone, maliciously maltreating a person or 
persons, hit/kicked a person [name victim] multiple times (with 
force) on/against the head and/or back and/or leg/legs and/or on 
another part/on other parts of the body, as a result of which [the 
victim] has suffered pain and/or injury.  
These charges are, to speak with Latour (2010), a tentative bridge 
between the case file and the letter of the Law. They fold within 
the formulation of the legal rule - ‘maliciously maltreating’ - the 
specifics of the offense in question - the date and place of the 
offense, the name of the victim, and the precise alleged actions, 
i.e. ‘hit/kicked […] on/against the head and/or back/ and/or 
legs’. The file, once ordered and jigged, is read and summarized in 
relation to these summons. These charges, one judge emphasises, 
‘anchor’ her navigation practices.  
Some judges additionally visually draw out the case as a more or 
less provable entity using the text of the charges on the copy of 
the summons. Translating the information in the file into an 
‘image of the case’ may for instance be done through the marking 
of specific terms, or crossing through terms in the charges that 
the judge expects cannot be proven, superimposing the facts of 
the case onto the formal charges:3 
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That he, on or about [date] in [place] together with and in association 
with others, or alone, maliciously maltreating a person or persons, 
hit/kicked a person [name victim] multiple times (with force) 
on/against the head and/or back and/or leg/legs and/or on another 
part/on other parts of the body, as a result of which [the victim] has 
suffered pain and/or injury.  
Yet the surface of the summons is not only instrumental in 
extracting the case-as-event. Further bits and pieces are added to 
it, in particular information with the case as a procedural entity 
and information with regards to the ‘person of the defendant’. 
Often, these bits and pieces are spatially clustered on the surface 
of the summons. Take, for instance, the anonymized copy4 of 
one of the judges’ notes in Figure 3.  
Here, we see in the right hand corner information with regards 
to procedural elements of the case. This specific defendant has 
spent 1 day in custody, the judge notes (‘IVS: 1 dag’), and the 
summons have been handed over in person (‘DV: IP’). It also 
includes a brief summary of the defendant’s criminal record 
(‘DOC’), which has in this case two counts specified with use of 
the Dutch Criminal Code’s numbering: one, a count of public 
assault (‘141’) and another of theft (‘310’). Detailing, too, the 
specific sentence decided on (e.g. ‘40 u ws’ means 40 hours of 
community service), this preparation form allows the judge not 
only to place the current event in a more or less criminal history, 
but also to take into account the (relatively new) rule stipulating 
that defendants do not receive a community service for a similar 
offense within five years after their first conviction.5 
Moving on, what appears is information with regards not to 
‘the case’ as a procedural entity, but as an event. The judge has 
noted that two witnesses [‘gt’ - getuige] to the offense - a case of 
sexual assault - have only been heard in situ. Below the charges, 
we also find a brief summary of the defendant’s words, drawn 
from the process-verbal of his interrogation: ‘had eye-contact. 
She got angry. Did not do anything. Others could not have seen it’. 
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Figure 3: The product of a judge’s case-extraction on the (copied) summons 
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Included, too, is a rudimentary version of the victim’s account. Its 
use of both the first- and third person (not second-person) 
evokes the activity of stitching together both the first-person 
account of the victim and the third-person summarization of the 
judge while simultaneously allowing the judge to distinguish 
between the victim’s statement and his own summary: ‘was in 
[bar name]. Went outside. Addressed by random person. Passed 
her, he put hand under dress, rubbed her vagina. I hit him and 
security guard intervened.’ In extracting the basic informational 
coordinates of the offense in question, judges may sometimes 
take care to summarize the offense as a narrative. For instance, 
Judge Roberts adds to the summons the following note: 
big fight, two stages. Def.[endant]. issues threat, tapping knife on 
window, throws table through door -> police. Def. sleeps. Again 
fight + verbal threats, grandmother and daughter now present. Kicks 
in front door.  
Yet not all judges do so, as it may render it more difficult to keep 
apart exactly what was said by whom. Drawing distinctions 
between the account of the defendant and victim, as visible in 
Figure 3, assists judges especially in cases where different accounts 
diverge significantly.  
The case as event, and the case as a procedural entity: both are 
now neatly separated. While this judge has not included notes on 
the defendant’s personal circumstances, many judges do so in the 
lower corner of the copied summons. If the defendant is found 
guilty, these notes assist judges in accounting for the defendants’ 
personal circumstances in crafting a suitable sentence. Judge 
Dempsey, including information about the defendant’s addictions 
to heroin, cocaine, and alcohol, notes down the following on his 
preparation form:  
her/coc, alc, no fixed income, daughter, debts up to 30.000 euros. 
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The case’s ‘microformation’ (Scheffer 2006), then, is a practice 
revolving around a move from a ‘first glance’ towards a more 
specific ‘seeing’: a ‘seeing’ that distinguishes between the case as a 
procedural entity, the case as an event, and the case as involving 
an individual defendant. Yet together, these three spatial clusters 
also do something more: they mutually elaborate each other (Berg 
and Goorman 1999). They are not discrete bits and pieces of 
information, but are interpreted together. For instance, whether 
the summons has been handed over in person or not is important 
in a legal-procedural sense; at the same time, this legal-procedural 
element of the case structures judges’ expectations with regard to 
what kind of defendant they will be dealing with: If the summons 
has not been handed over in person, judges know that the 
defendant is probably homeless - an association, we know by 
now, that evokes not only drug-addiction, but petty theft as well 
(see Chapter 4). Similarly, the precise nature and modality of the 
crime charged may (or may not) seamlessly ‘line up’ with the type 
of defendant into a more typical narrative. For instance, 
assembling the information from the defendant’s criminal record, 
a parole service report, and the specificities of the event in 
question, judge Roberts, having taken some notes giggled and 
told me:  
See why I am laughing? He’s still on parole for a previous offense, 
and part of his parole conditions was participation in an anger 
management course … So him kicking in that door [one of the 
offenses in question] doesn’t come as a surprise!  
Jigging, coding, highlighting, juxtaposing and summarizing work, 
then, produce what we may call a ‘story-before-the-trial’ (Cf. 
Jackson 1988, 1996). Then, one judge proclaims, ‘you can send 
me into the courtroom with this one piece of paper!’  
 
 
Visualizing Cases 
 191 
4 Digitization: Struggling to Visualize 
Against this background of socially textured and materially 
mediated practices of visualization, the digitization of case files 
was met with hesitancy and frustration. Judges lamented the 
presence of computers in court, suggesting that these notorious 
slow computers perched on the judicial desk would significantly 
hamper their interaction with defendants. But backstage, too, the 
digitization of case files led to some confusion. On the one hand, 
paper case files continued to trickle in; linked to an older 
registration system (Compas), these paper case files tended to be 
part of the prosecution’s backlog of cases. As such, the court was 
not, at any point of my fieldwork, wholly without paper case 
files.6 Yet more and more cases were not delivered to court in the 
form of paper files, but rather ‘made available’ through the new 
file viewer, Divos 2. Throughout my fieldwork, these digital files 
were all scanned copies of paper files; only in a later stage of 
digitization will all documents in the file be produced digitally.  
I received access to these digital files as part of a broader 
digital access to the court’s computers. While judges and clerks 
could use Divos 2 to check up on their own caseloads, I had 
access to all PR caseloads through Divos 2. While this slow but 
sure ‘infrastructural inversion’ (Bowker and Star 1999) would 
present court workers with practical hurdles in visualizing cases, it 
turned out an unexpected, methodological boon for me. As clerks 
and judges were able to highlight passages in the file and draw up 
digital, rather than paper, preparation forms, I now was able to 
trace (even in real-time) clerks’ and judges’ preparations. Divos 2 
rendered available and visible especially clerks’ preparation 
practices and their both formal and informal standardization over 
time. While the preceding observations are based, then, on close 
observation of work practices - the ‘shadowing’ of individual 
judges - the following part of this chapter draws additionally on 
these digitized preparation forms. 
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Let’s first discuss the digital file-viewer. First of all, working 
with digital files is no more or less material than working with 
paper files: it still requires of judges that they be seated in a 
particular place and engage with specific materials (desk tops, 
desk chairs, computers). However, the file-viewer quite radically 
disrupted judicial methods of gauging cases in relation to the look 
and feel of individual case files. Instead, the perceptual field of an 
as-of-yet unknown caseload is materialized as a digital interface in 
the digital file viewer, Divos 2 (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Screen shot of Divos 2 displaying one caseload, anonymized 
Note that the file-viewer indicates only the number of pages as an 
indicator of the file’s ‘severity’ or ‘complexity’. In fact, this 
indication was only added to the software after judges expressed 
discomfort with an earlier version of Divos 2. Without any clue 
as to how thick the file would be, judges had difficulties 
structuring their workflow. Yet even the number of pages in the 
file detracted from the more immediate gauging afforded by the 
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physical look and shape of the file. Both clerks and judges 
reported having difficulties translating the number of pages of a 
digital file into a sense of how thick or thin the paper equivalent 
would have been. Similarly, the component parts of the case file - 
a criminal record, the evidentiary folder of the police - lack a 
material ‘body’ or physical substance. In a similar vein, judges and 
clerks were not always happy with the software as it disallowed 
their ‘navigation-by-thumb’. Capable only of displaying two 
separate documents at the same time, the file viewer did not allow 
its users to juxtapose more sources of evidence - a technique 
especially useful in cases involving more than two pieces of 
evidence.  
The file-viewer did, however, allow them to ‘tame’ the file in 
ways not dissimilar to what they were used to. For instance, it 
allowed its users to digitally highlight selected sentences and 
words in the various components that make up the case file. 
When selected and highlighted, these phrases and words are 
marked in yellow (see Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Highlighted text in a digitized process-verbal 
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Also, the file viewer anticipated existing summarizing practices: it 
provides the option to open and save a digital preparation form, 
in which information can either be typed out or copy-pasted 
from the digital file. Last, the digital file-viewer offers its users a 
way to code the information using hyperlinks, which appear as 
underlined and blue text in the digital preparation form (e.g. 
‘statement defendant’, ‘parole service report’). Clicking on a 
hyperlink, the user will open the hyperlinked file in the right half 
of the screen, in which the hyperlinked phrases will appear 
highlighted (see Figure 5). 
Yet these digital affordances, while they seem ways to meet 
existing practices and ‘user-demands’, in effect had significant 
consequences on the social distribution of these work practices 
between clerks and judges. Take, for instance, clerks’ preparation 
forms. In the case of paper files, clerks’ tended to write these by 
hand, either on a separate sheet of paper or, like judges, on a 
copy of the summons. Judges could then either start their own 
preparation practices with a ‘clean’ summons or, often using a 
different colour pen, add their own notes to the prepared 
summons.  
The paper-based preparation of clerkperformed through 
manual note taking onto the copy of the judicial summons, had as 
an advantage that it tended to be brief and to the point. After all, 
writing can be rather arduous and slow, and the physical space on 
the paper copy of the judicial summons is simply limited. The 
graphic layout of the preparation form, and the informal routine 
of presenting information in two or three separate spatial 
clusterings, further assisted the visual extraction of the case. 
However, faced with the affordances of the digital preparation 
form, clerks tended to present significantly more information and 
text. Not only is typing less arduous than writing and the space 
on the digital preparation form unlimited, the file viewer also 
rendered it possible to copy-paste whole swaths of texts into the 
digital preparation form. Copying and pasting text from the file 
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into the digital preparation form is easier than writing a summary 
oneself, while the digital preparation form can incorporate as 
much information as the clerk deems necessary - the space it 
offers is, in principle, unlimited. While some clerks used headings 
and subheadings to present the information, the preparation form 
would often take the visual form as a list (of bullet pointed bits of 
information or quotes) or a text. Some clerks, too, would neglect 
to incorporate the charges itself - hence requiring judges to 
navigate not only the documents ‘in’ the case, but also to keep yet 
another document in sight, that of the official summons.  
The possibility to present large swaths of texts, sometimes 
literally copied from the texts in the digital file, met clerks’ user-
needs very well - their task, after all, consists of being complete. 
However, used in this particular fashion it failed to meet those of 
judges, some of whom in turn missed the brevity, clarity, and 
spatial clustering of information on the one-sheet, paper 
preparation forms had offered them. Without the brief and 
visually-concentrated presentation of the facts of the case, the 
digital file viewer in effect shifted more of the summarizing work 
to judges, who now not only had to navigate the wealth of 
information in the file, but the large swaths of text in the digital 
preparation form as well. It was only as a result of feedback from 
individual judges and the introduction of summarization 
guidelines for clerks that clerks started to strive once again for 
brevity. Commenting on a clerks’ preparation, Judge Jamison  
What I like about these here is that they include the charges in the 
same [digital] field: that way, I immediately have some image of what 
we’re talking about. Very good is also her brevity, in particular her 
summation of the defendants’ criminal record. Some clerks in 
contrast simply copy all kinds of texts, while I will still have to check 
in the file whether that is all the relevant material. Copying like that, 
by the way, is a sure way to make the preparation form almost as 
unclear and extensive as the file itself - that doesn’t work for me at 
all.  
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Taking the shape of a list or a text, the digital preparation form 
was not, furthermore, spatially clustered in two or three visual 
fields. In response to what they perceived as overly-extensive 
preparation forms, then, judges tended to continue to work with 
their own copies of the summons. Perceived as more trustworthy 
than the digital preparation form, the paper copy of the summons 
continues to be the preferred way for judges to prepare their 
cases - even though some judges were slowly ‘settling’ into the 
new medium (Cf. Lanzara 2009). However, the fear that the 
computer may fail them in court motivated many judges to 
continue to rely on their own note-taking on the summons. 
Perceived as more ‘comfortable’ and ‘stable’ to work with, the 
paper summons continued to act as the surface of the visual 
concentration and mutual elaboration of information. It also 
supported judges’ reliance on manual note-taking and their 
interweaving of reading (the digital file) and writing (by hand) 
without having to switch screens on their computers (Cf. Sellen 
and Harper 2003), which, seeing as the computers in court are 
notoriously slow to operate, significantly speeded up their 
preparation practices.7  
It is salient that the use of paper preparation forms came over 
time to be reserved mainly for the judges. Clerks’ digital 
preparation forms were not completely sidelined: some judges 
would print these out and read the digital file in relation to both 
the paper summons and the clerks’ preparations. Checking their 
own work against that of clerks was also deemed necessary when 
the digital case file had been highlighted and hyperlinked digitally. 
On the one hand, these digital hyperlinks facilitate a ‘horizontal’ 
and flexible navigation through the file, jumping immediately 
from digital preparation form to the information the clerk has 
highlighted without the necessity to scroll through the entirety 
case file. Similarly, digitally-highlighted text allowed judges to 
arrive at crucial bits of information almost immediately. Yet some 
judges remain hesitant to only use the clerks’ digital directions: 
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after all, a clerk may overlook a piece of information or fail to 
select (and hyperlink) an important passage in the file. In paper 
files, this is not necessarily a problem: the feel of the file affords 
some sense of how much text preceded salient information in a 
witness report or a transcription of the interrogation of the 
defendant. After all, it matters, to judges, whether a defendant 
confesses at once or is guided towards confession; it also matters 
whether a victim or witness has important things to say about the 
circumstances leading up to the event, or is rather brief about 
these. Post-its and pencilled highlights, coupled with a tactile 
sense of the number of pages preceding a confession or 
description of the event assisted judges in their visualization. Yet 
precisely this tactile dimension was lost: left only were the 
hyperlinked, but dematerialized and decontextualized passages. It 
is for that reason judges expressed some hesitancy in following 
only the clerks’ digital ‘directions’: it would disallow precisely 
such judgments about the ‘con-text’ of the case. That is, using 
only the clerks’ hyperlinked passages might mean they not only 
fail to read salient texts presented in other parts of the file; it 
would also means they might not fully understand the context of 
the offense itself. Pointing, for instance, to a defendants’ off-
handed remark that he always carries a knife in the process-verbal 
of the defendants’ interrogation, Judge Masons suggested that it is 
precisely these bits and pieces that inform her ‘image’ of the case: 
This is important. It isn’t related to this specific case, perhaps, but it 
strengthens the idea that there are significant problems there, that he 
moves in strange circles [milieu].  
As these bits and pieces - the ‘context’ - are instrumental in 
building that ‘image’ of the case, judges rarely rely on these 
hyperlinks only.  
Of course, over time and with practice judges and clerks 
seemed to slowly but surely ‘settle into’ (Lanzara 2009) the new 
medium. For instance, while clerks may have copy-pasted long 
Ways of Case-Making 
 198 
swaths of texts, the digital preparation forms are slowly but surely 
decreasing in length, and judges may ask of clerks to make use of 
the newly introduced standardized digital preparation form. The 
relationship between specific individual clerks and judges may 
also play a role in how judges work with the (digital) file: when 
judges have worked with a specific clerk before, and were 
satisfied with his/her performance, the selection of information 
made by the clerk is trusted, while in other cases the clerks may 
not have a particularly good reputation, or such trust may as of 
yet not had a chance to develop (with new clerks). Both these 
inter-professional claims to professional legitimacy, control, and 
ownership of the judicial decision, as well as individual 
relationships between judges and clerks are without doubt to play 
a role in the further development of digital work practices. 
5 Visualization and ‘Doings with Documents’ 
The preceding pages have demonstrated how cases, over the 
course of practical face-to-file work, are visualized; how, in other 
words, caseworkers render both the truth of the matter and its 
legal qualification visible both textually and graphically. In doing 
so this chapter ‘materializes’ our understanding of both legal 
practices of truth-telling and practices of legal qualification: that 
is, it treats these practices as materially mediated. Apprehending 
the case is coming to an operational sense of ‘what really 
happened’ in relation to the letter of the Law. The paper 
summons operates, in these practices, as a both conceptual and 
physical ‘bridge’ between the text of the file and the text of the 
Law (Latour 2010). ‘Micro-formation’ (Scheffer 2005) of cases is 
enacted over the course of distributed and materially mediated 
activities of glancing at files, of gauging them, of ordering and 
taming them. If Hart’s internal point of view (1994 [1961]) is that 
of the practical rule-follower making his or her intuitive leap into 
the rule-governed dark, judicial work practices first and foremost 
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suggest that ‘visualizing the case’ is a practical activity that 
unfolds over time, that is helped along or thwarted by the specific 
affordances and recalcitrances of case files, and that is distributed 
over judges and clerks. It is not a purely textual practice: instead, 
it draws on the para-textual and non-textual affordances of 
(paper) case files. In emphasizing these distributed, materially 
mediated practices of visualization it makes problematic both 
cognitivist appeals to ‘how judges think’ as well as an insistence 
on a dematerialized ‘point of view’.  
Praxio-graphy: A Practical Understanding of Writing and Infrastructure 
Such an emphasis on practices of visualization, rather than on 
points of view or ways of thinking, would necessarily demand of 
us a practical understanding of the production and use of 
artefacts in the sites we study. Bureaucratic settings, to be more 
specific, are rife with files, documents, and administrative forms. 
The problems they pose are diametrically opposed to that of the 
metaphorical anthropological fieldworker who confronts a 
‘society without writing’ (Levi Strauss 1961: 292). These are 
settings that, in contrast, depend on and hang together by virtue 
of writing: the rule of the desk (Weber 1978 [1922]) alludes 
precisely to the desk, where files are compiled, ordered, and 
processed. Yet a decidedly ‘phonocentric reflex’ (Cf. Derrida 
1967) remains tempting. In other words, there is a tendency, 
within social inquiry, to not spend too much time on these 
artefacts, and instead to focus on the richness of face-to-face 
interactions. It is this same tendency, I think, that makes the 
court’s ‘frontstage’ such a well-studied setting relative to the 
court’s ‘backstage’. As a result of this phonocentric reflex, the 
fact that bureaucratic actors themselves are very much concerned 
with administrative forms and artefacts can hence be glossed or 
itself be made into an exotic curiosity: look at how they fetishize 
these objects! Look at how they place excessive trust in writing! 
Such ironic readings, in my view, do little to appreciate just how 
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much of bureaucratic or legal practices hang together not or not 
only because its human members share a professional world-view 
or culture, but by their shared (if diverging) engagements with the 
bureaucratic ‘mutable mobile’ (Cf. Latour 1986) of the case file. 
Speaking of Prussian bureaucracy, Latour marvels that: 
The “rationalization” granted to bureaucracy since Hegel and Weber 
has been attributed by mistake to the “mind” of (Prussian) 
bureaucrats. It is all in the files themselves. […] The “cracy” of 
bureaucracy is mysterious and hard to study, but the “bureau” is 
something that can be empirically studied, and which explains, 
because of its structure, why some power is given to an average mind 
just by looking at files. […] Common sense ironically makes fun of 
these “gratte papiers” and “paper shufflers”, and often wonders what 
all this “red tape” is for […]. In our cultures “paper shuffling” is the 
source of an essential power, that constantly escapes attention since 
its materiality is ignored (Latour 1986: 26).  
The centrality of these travelling documents in these settings also 
means that ‘the social’ is not mutely awaiting a researcher to give 
it voice (Hirschauer 2006). In contrast: bureaucratic practices are 
shaped and structured by their own many documentary 
secretions. Taking organizational documents seriously, however, 
is not always easy. Garfinkel (1967) notes for instance that 
organizational documents are quite difficult objects in and of 
study. They are drawn up with specific audiences in mind and 
produced in reference to specific organizational contexts, and the 
researcher hoping to learn from them may be very much 
disappointed to learn he or she was not among the intended 
audience. Berg (1996) similarly draws attention to medical 
records, which have different organizational uses and as such 
cannot simply be used to ‘learn more about the patient’. 
Representation of ‘a case’ may be only one, and even subservient, 
of the purposes of a document. Those interested in textual or 
graphic ‘inscriptions’ (Cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979) in various 
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settings may surely take this to heart: representation is not necessarily 
the organizational point.  
Nor is ‘representation’ an unproblematic given. Even if 
documents may ‘want’ to represent - in this case, we could say 
that these case files have as their purpose the transportation of 
the event in question - this chapter shows that these case files still 
have to be ‘brought to life’ (Berg 1996: 501) through organized 
and distributed practices. A case file never ‘speaks for itself’. 
Successfully navigating its information relies on material work, 
like highlighting, coding, and summarizing practice; the ‘case’ as 
such interactively emerges and is not in any simplistic way 
‘contained’ in the case file. Case files may mediate epistemic 
access to a specific event in history, but it requires a 
professionally-situated set of techniques to organize this access to 
be able to ‘see like a judge’ (Cf. Law 2009; Scott 1998). In these 
kinds of ‘epistemic practices’ (Lynch 1993), documents are better 
analysed as concrete ‘technical objects’ that are deployed in 
making out a more abstract ‘epistemic object’, that is ‘the case’ 
(Ewenstein and Whyte 2009). What is more, the file is operational 
in ways that have nothing to do with its textual content proper, 
but instead with its material properties (wear and tear, its 
thickness, weight). Approaching documents in this non-
representationalist manner allows us hence to put the senses back 
into our conceptualizations of sense-making activities, and 
appreciate the relevance of these sense-making activities for 
practitioners faced with high caseloads and the requirement to 
efficiently ‘get things done’ (Garfinkel 1967). If there is one thing 
to learn from this chapter it is that such representation takes not 
a simple glance or reading, but a specialized kind of ‘professional 
vision’ (Goodwin 1994) or rather, professional practices of 
visualization, to make case files do representational work at all. It is 
only by becoming familiar with these objects, and through 
developing ways to ‘boil them down’, that it becomes possible to 
‘read’ them representationally and visualize the case.  
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The emphasis I have placed on digitization as a potentially 
disruptive event should interest researchers at the intersection of 
knowledge practices and digital artefacts more generally. In a 
context where digitization is increasingly understood as both a 
money-saver and a catch-all solution to public services’ 
presupposed lack of transparency and efficiency, this chapter is in 
many ways a cautionary tale. An understanding of documents that 
treats these as transporters of information may do little to 
apprehend how knowledge practices are both profession- and 
medium-specific and implicated not only in individual, but also 
collective work practices. For instance, case files are, as I have 
shown, subtly implicated in the reproduction of the professional 
boundary between judges and assisting clerks (see for a similar 
case in medical settings, Berg and Bowker 1997). For instance, 
judges may use yellow markers to highlight text while clerks use 
erasable pencils, and continue to use the paper summons while 
clerks are expected to adapt to the digital files. These 
observations also point to the way technologies not simply 
mediate individual sense-making practices, but are deployed in 
‘rich, densely structured landscape[s] of identities and working 
relations’ (Suchman 2002: 141). Also, at stake in intraprofessional 
struggles over control and legitimacy is in this case not merely the 
question as to who can ‘legitimately see’ (Goodwin 1994), but 
also: who, and with help of what specific instruments, can 
‘legitimately visualize’. At the same time, it is important to avoid a 
technological determinism that treats human activity as fully 
dependent on its material parameters. While following digitization 
some work practices become irretrievably lost, other practices are 
rearticulated or maintained. Indeed, digital practices may also 
come to exist alongside paper-based practices that to participants 
simply feel more comfortable, reliable, and flexible (Sellen and 
Harper 2003). And even where such digital media may attempt to 
replicate paper-based practices (e.g. the coding and highlighting 
affordances of the file viewer), work practices may not ‘naturally 
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and unproblematically adapt to the new technology’, nor will 
workers automatically ‘take advantage of the ‘obvious’ benefits 
afforded by new computer based systems’ (Heath et al. 2000: 
301), as existing practices are maintained or rearticulated. In other 
words, materials matter - but where, how, and to whom are 
questions badly-attended to in either overtly human-centred or 
technology-centred accounts. The trouble is, as always, in the 
middle: in the relations between files and file-workers. 
6 Onwards: Matter and Time 
The preceding pages have demonstrated what an attention to 
materiality may do to our understanding of legal practices. That 
is, an attention to the medium-specificity of judicial work 
practices has assisted us in taking seriously the material mediation 
of both judicial ‘thinking’ and ‘seeing’. I have paid specific 
attention to the various affordances and recalcitrances of case 
files. As physical objects, they allow for an intuitive gauging and 
sequential operations of ‘taming’ of the case; as digital objects, 
they lose some of these recalcitrances - their internal order may 
be standardized, for instance - yet they gain some, too: digital files 
remain difficult to gauge and summarize.  
Case files, then, matter. That is: their materiality is 
consequential in and material to judicial visualization practices. 
Yet case files have yet another mode of mattering: not in the 
spatial sense of the term, but in the temporal sense. That is, their 
purpose is rendering the there-and-then of the event in question 
available in the here-and-now of judging activities; their role in 
allowing action-at-a-distance is one of creating a passage from the 
court setting towards the event in question. If they duly perform 
this task, time is folded: the there-and-then rendered accessible in 
the here-and-now. But they do not always succeed. Drawing 
attention not to the time and place of the event in question, but 
rather to their own history of production, case files may fail to 
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mediate this temporal folding. The following chapter 
concentrates on the ways case files mediate this folding of time - 
and what happens when they fail to do so. As such, it is both a 
discussion of the temporalities in and of objects more generally as 
an account of the enactment of procedure in this legal setting. In 
order to make this point, I stick to no place in particular but am 
led only by legal procedure: I switch from file to courtroom and 
back again, tracing the ways time, histories and futures are 
implicated in the making of a here-and-now of the decision.  
NOTES
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Oorschot, van I. (2014a) 
“Seeing the Case Clearly: File-Work, Material Mediation and Visualizing 
Practices in a Dutch Criminal Court” in Symbolic Interaction 37(4): 439-457. 
2 Judges may similarly keep coloured post-its ready to hand. One of the judges 
I shadowed was quite proud to show me a flat, wooden post-it dispenser 
with room for five or six different colours of post-it notes. He had made it 
himself over the Christmas break.  
3 These routine techniques resonate in striking ways with the more 
fundamental role of the act of crossing through in the history of legal 
practice. Vismann (2008), for instance, concentrates not on writing, but 
rather the crossing through, the cancellation, of writing as constitutive of 
legality. The chancellor is quite literally, she shows, the canceller of provisions, 
stipulations and legal texts.  
4 All identifying characteristics of the case - names of the defendant, victim, 
witnesses - as well as the place and time of the offense and court are struck 
through.  
5 This rule (art. 22b Wetboek van Strafrecht) has been operative since January 
3 2012 and as such was still quite a novelty for the judges during my 
fieldwork. It stipulates, most importantly, that offenders cannot be punished 
with community service once they have been punished for a similar offense 
with community service in the last five years. Many of the judges I spoke 
with were quite unhappy with this rule, not only because it set a limit to their 
own discretionary space for manoeuvre, but also because they perceived the 
rule to be born out of an overtly punitive political attitude many of them did 
not share. Faced with this rule, some judges I worked with would, counter to 
the punitive ‘spirit’ of the rule, not opt for a prison sentence (perceived to be  
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more punitive than a community service) but for a fine (perceived to be less 
punitive). If I have spoken, briefly, of the kind of political, often right-wing, 
pressures judges perceive themselves to be subjected to (see Chapter 4), this 
strategy amounts to a subversion of that kind of pressure.  
6 Although the dictum that ‘everything is digital now’ was the ‘official line’, 
this insistence sometimes bordered on the absurd. For instance, when a new 
assisting clerk was introduced to the administrative offices, one senior 
administrative worker proudly proclaimed that ‘there are no paper files 
anymore. We do everything digitally now’ - while standing right next to a 
trolley loaded with paper files.  
7 One judge told me that his colleagues in kantonrecht - a field of Law 
incorporating minor civil and criminal law cases - face up to caseloads of 80 
cases per day and had quickly returned to paper files, as opening and closing 
the digital files on the Court’s computers in session had proved to be too 
time-consuming. I have not been able to verify this story, however.  
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6 Folding Times, Doing Truths 
1 From Here-and-Now to There-and-Then 
The preceding chapter suggested we think of judicial work as 
materially and socially textured practices. Distributed and 
sequentially organized practices of visualization extract, from the 
file, an operative sense of the case. Active in, and constituent of, 
judges’ visualizations of the case, case files matter both materially 
- as physical or digital objects - and semiotically - as containers of 
texts. This kind of action, of course, is oriented towards the 
courtroom future. A good visualization is a helpful, productive 
visualization that serves both communication and fact-finding 
goals in court, allowing a decision in the here-and-now of the 
court session to be made about the there-and-then of the offense. 
It is in this sense that the case file is not only a mediator in the 
‘spatial’, physical sense, nor only a semiotic object. It is also active 
in allowing retroactive truth-finding and future-oriented courses 
of action. In other words: it is an object that renders available 
different times and places in the here-and-now of the decision 
(Scheffer 2010).  
Sometimes, however, such temporal bridging is barred. Take 
the court cases involving defendant Jack Ross. He is accused with 
the breaking and entering of his ex-girlfriend’s house and 
additionally charged with the damaging and theft of some of her 
belongings. According to the prosecutor’s version of the events 
in question, Jack climbed into his ex-girlfriend’s house through a 
rooftop window in the summer of 2013 while she was 
vacationing abroad. Jack is quite young - 24 years of age - but 
does not make a nervous impression when he is questioned by 
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the judge. After all, his lawyer has prepared an elaborate closing 
argument. His lawyer begins his plea: 
Your honour. I will start by saying that there is only one witness to 
the breaking and entering, and [the statement] is far from sufficient. 
This witness does not describe any of my client’s defining [physical] 
characteristics. So how can we be sure that it was indeed my client 
who was seen entering this apartment? The police never organized a 
line-up either, so we can’t quite identify the person who was seen 
breaking and entering yet. Then there is this other statement, the 
statement made by the affected party. Well, this statement is 
completely contradictory: [the victim] mentions different time 
periods in which she would have been abroad, for instance. And 
some of her statements are simply incorrect: for instance, she told 
the police she did not know that my client, her ex-boyfriend, had 
been under electronic house arrest. But she did know, because she 
has previously assisted with the electronic surveillance of my client 
[after a previous conviction], that is, when they were still together! 
Baffling are also the damage claims she filed against my client: in her 
first statement she never talks about what goods had been stolen, 
while, all of a sudden, she speaks of stolen goods with a value of 
1000 euros in the damage report she later filed. As for the damaged 
goods: in the case file I don’t see pictures anywhere of those 
electronic appliances that my client allegedly damaged. 
Referring, again and again, to the evidentiary materials in the legal 
case file, Jack’s lawyer aims to cast doubt on the public 
prosecutor’s version of the events in question. The legal case file 
is implicated in his story-telling, focused on answering the 
question: what really happened? And who, precisely, is behind it? 
Can we rely on the identification made by the affected party’s 
neighbour, if this neighbour - who is supposed to remember and 
know the defendant, who lived together for a while with his now 
ex-girlfriend - tells the police that he recognized the defendant, but 
has not explicitly described the defendant’s physical characteristics? 
Can we trust the statement made by the victim, considering the 
fact that she denies any knowledge of her ex-boyfriend’s previous 
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conviction while she must have known very well he had been 
convicted earlier? Does it furthermore not seem she is frustrating 
the court’s truth-finding, as she sees the trial as the opportunity 
to claim money? And was she not caught lying about the period 
she spent abroad? Seen in this light, can her statements be 
considered trustworthy enough to merit conviction of the 
defendant? What can these statements tell us about what really 
happened?  
Jack’s lawyer, however, goes on: 
Besides, when we look at the process-verbal of the interrogation with 
my client, I see, typed down, in the middle of one of my client’s 
questions, the phrase, “theft, unqual.”, which arguably stands for 
“theft, unqualified”. But my client would never express himself this 
way, nor would other defendants, presumably. So who is speaking here? 
The police officer or the defendant? Furthermore, the victim has told 
the police, and I quote, that “all the neighbours have seen it”. So why 
was their testimony not taken? I think the police has indeed talked to 
these neighbours, but that they [their statements] are not present in 
the case file. My last point is that the police suggest, in the file, that 
they would further investigate the site for traces of my client’s 
presence, but the results of this investigation are curiously lacking 
from the case file. It seems to me that exculpatory evidence has been 
excluded from the file, so that the evidence is wafer-thin.  
Jack’s lawyer here enters a different mode of asking questions 
about the ‘truth-value’ of the file. Here, he does not only offer an 
interpretation of the different stories present in the file; he also 
tells us a story about the file. This lawyer first challenges the 
neutrality of the written transcription (process-verbal) of the 
interrogation with the defendant. He suggests that the police 
officials have been so set on shaping and rewriting his client’s 
words that it has now become unclear who precisely is speaking - 
something clearly at odds with the demand that defendants’ 
statements must be ‘verbalized’ [geverbaliseerd], that is, written 
down, in accordance with the defendant’s ‘own words’ (see art. 
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29 lid 3 Wetboek van Strafvordering). If police officials complement 
his client’s words with phrases like, ‘theft, unqual.’, then how can 
we be sure that the rest of the client’s statements in this process-
verbal are truly his - and not added by zealous police officials? 
Secondly, this lawyer suggests that the case file offers only a 
partial rendering of the full police investigation: the police, he 
suggests, have indeed spoken with more witnesses but these 
statements never made it to the legal case file. Police officials also 
mention additional investigation into traces of his client’s 
presence in the house, yet he cannot find the results of such 
testing anywhere in the file. Does this imply that the prosecution 
failed to exercise due diligence? At stake, at this point in his plea, 
is not a set of statements or stories in the file, but their absence.  
All in all, a smooth transportation from the here-and-now of 
the court session towards the time and space of the offense is 
barred: not only because the individual witnesses are necessarily 
unreliable (although according to Jack’s lawyer, they are that, too), 
but also since the case file is the product of specific modes of 
translating oral statements into written evidence and of practices 
of partial inclusion and exclusion. In other words: the case file 
itself has a history, and it is that history Jack’s lawyer mobilizes in 
his attempt to thwart conviction.  
In this chapter1 I am interested precisely in the case file’s status 
as both a neutral transporter and carrier of evidence and a non-
innocent, perhaps treacherous, object that inevitably transforms 
reality, an object with a complex history. As such this chapter 
does not highlight its material and physical recalcitrances, but its 
temporal ones. It asks the question, first, how the case files 
manages to build a bridge between offense and court session, and 
secondly, how traces of its own disavowed histories allow actors - 
most notably defence lawyers - to question the validity of the 
facts it presents. It is interested in the relationship between legal 
procedure and fact-finding, yet refrains from treating legal 
procedure as an unproblematic ‘legal context’ to practices of fact-
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finding. Instead, it highlights how both ‘factuality’ and 
‘procedure’ are enacted in and through the case file. The notion 
of the ‘folded object’ (M’charek 2014) is particularly useful in 
doing so: offering a vocabulary within which to begin to 
understand the multiple and dense temporalities of objects, it is 
especially suited to inquiry into the relationship between Law, 
truth and time.  
2 Law, Truth, Time 
In its concern with the histories and uses of the legal case file, 
this chapter is meant as a respecification of dominant approaches 
to the relationship between legal procedure and legal truth-
making.  
‘Guarded by Procedure’: Procedure as a Frame 
There is a clear connection between procedure and legal modes 
of truth-making, especially so in Dutch criminal law. While civil 
legal procedure may work with a more ‘virtual’ sense of the truth 
- the truth of the matter is simply and a priori established by 
virtue of agreement between parties - criminal law has a more 
subtle and hybrid relationship with the truth. Cleiren (2001: 16) 
for instance notes that ‘the criminal process is aimed at finding 
truth in order to punish those guilty. Verification of the facts of 
which the accused is charged is therefore prime goal of the 
criminal process.’ But because there is a real danger of convicting 
innocent suspects, such ‘verification’ must be safeguarded 
procedurally: 
the function of criminal law is to be formulated hybridly: on the one 
hand, it is the finding of truth in order to punish transgressions of 
material law, and on the other hand, the protection of citizens against 
far-reaching governmental breaches of their constitutional rights, 
understood to include the prevention of the punishment of those 
innocent (Cleiren 2001: 18).  
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On the one hand, then, the truth of the matter is carefully 
guarded by procedure - not all facts may come to bear on the 
matter at hand, for instance when evidence is attained by 
illegitimate means. On the other hand, it is not entirely up to the 
affected parties to deliver the facts and agree, among each other, 
on the delineation of the case: it is the judge, in Dutch criminal 
law, who decides on both the facts (their admissibility and 
relevance) and the Law.2 The ‘material’ truth matters, and 
precisely because it matters so much its establishment is guarded 
by procedure.  
It is tempting, within this rather general mode of addressing 
the relationship between legal procedure and the production of 
legal facts, to treat procedure as an unproblematic ‘context’ to the 
production of legal facts. Procedure then functions as a ‘frame’: 
something that both structures and contains practices aimed at the 
truth of the matter.  
Doing Truth and Procedure Together 
Such an approach effectuates several things at once. First, it 
glosses over the question how ‘facts’ with regards to the specific 
offense in question are made, and made to matter to the decision 
at hand. In other words, it treats the ‘facts’ as already established 
and of equal relevance and weight to the decision at hand. Of 
course, facts may be contradictory - as was the case in Jack’s case, 
within which different witness statements did not cohere very 
well - but they are already there nevertheless. In doing so such an 
approach fails to address the question of how and where such facts are 
made, and how these are made to matter to the decision at hand. This 
question, crucially, is precisely the question Jack’s lawyer raises 
with regards to the case file as a producer of facts: how is the case 
file made? What is lost? What is distorted? Not only does this 
vignette alert us to the intricacies involved in ‘doing procedure’ 
and ‘making truth’; it also points to the case file as a central 
artefact in the production and contestation of the ‘facts’. Second, 
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and vice versa, treating ‘procedure’ as a context risks treating that 
same context as similarly ‘already there’ as a stable frame and 
container for practices of legal truth-telling. But did not Jack’s 
lawyer precisely implicate a concern with procedure in his plea? 
That is: is not ‘procedure’ drawn on, evoked, made consequential 
within and to the decision it is supposed to merely ‘enframe’? 
Procedure, then, does not enframe ‘the truth’ in any 
straightforward matter: it is a ‘moving horizon’ (Scheffer 2010: 
45). Both truth and procedure, then, have to be done somehow, 
somewhere.  
Procedure and Time 
Taking the simultaneity of ‘doing procedure’ and ‘doing truth’ 
seriously positions this effort also in relation to questions about 
legal temporalities more generally. As such it draws inspiration 
from approaches to legal temporalities that treat temporality not 
as a backdrop or temporal container of practices - in which legal 
events happen ‘in’ time - but rather as something that is 
effectuated within practices, giving rise to multiple and specific 
ways of making pasts, presents, and futures. Latour (2010) points 
for instance to Law’s strange ‘timelessness’. The Law, he states, 
never fundamentally changes. Law-making, among the 
counsellors of state, is always understood as a practice of finding 
Law, not creating it. Law only evolves - but it does so always with 
reference to precedent, that build-up of past decisions. But taking 
place in reference to precedent does not quite make Law a 
historical being itself: as something that can be found, it was 
always already there, a timeless totality that places itself outside of 
chronological time. Law knows no beginning or end; only a 
perpetual now. Yet this sense of timelessness, of a-historicity, 
contrasts with the slow pacing of the counsellors’ work practice, 
Latour notes (2010): there, predictability is ensured through 
doubting, through hesitations: that is, by not hurrying. The 
timelessness of capital-L Law contrasts with the temporal pacing 
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of its practices; both are specific ways of ‘doing time’. Luhmann’s 
efforts resonate to some extent with those of Latour. If Latour 
emphasizes the production of predictability, Luhmann (2004) 
emphasizes normative expectations. Legal norms, according to 
Luhmann, presuppose an unknown future. In relation to this 
unknown future, they make the promise that whatever may 
happen, the legal norm will hold. As such legal norms allow for 
the stabilization of expectations in an operation of ‘time-binding’ 
(Luhmann 2004). It is, by the way, in this ‘time-binding’ that the 
legal subsystem contrasts sharply with the political subsystem, 
being concerned not with the stabilization of expectations but 
precisely the articulation of future possibilities. Grabham, in 
taking seriously the temporal products of legal regulation, instead 
turns her attention towards specific modes of analogizing of time 
spent working and time spent off work in work-life legislation 
(Grabham 2011, 2014). Legal practices, then, both take and make 
time.  
The Case File: Mediating Time and Truths 
With procedure and facts, we hence enter the problem of legal 
temporalization: the way pasts, presents, and futures are made 
and remade in legal practices. In doing so it treats neither 
procedure nor time itself as a container of or for action; instead, 
it suggests that chronological time and procedure are themselves 
the outcome of specific modes of ‘sorting time’ (Latour and 
Serres 1995). In doing so my efforts diverge somewhat from 
Latour’s treatment of temporalization: while he concentrates on 
Law’s ‘timelessness’ and contrasts it with the diachronic pacing of 
file-work, I am interested instead in the way the case file itself 
folds time - and how such folds create the very possibility of 
unfolding and refolding in other sites, in other times.  
In so doing, I follow up on M’charek’s (2014) crucial 
contribution to the study of temporality: that is her suggestion 
that objects are not to be understood solely in spatial terms, but 
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in temporal ones. With help of three narratives on the history of 
the first genetic map of human beings - the Anderson sequence - 
M’charek illustrates how objects fold time within themselves. 
Folded into them are their histories, which in turn are 
entanglements of places and times: ‘the essence of the folded 
object […] lies in the intricate ways in which it gathers 
heterogeneous spaces and temporalities together’ (M’charek 2014: 
33). This Anderson sequence is unproblematically used in some 
practices, for instance in laboratory practices where it allows 
comparison with other genetic sequences. At such moments, it 
hides the places and times that have become entangled within it, 
and have been folded into it: ‘Once made, they appear to be 
independent of human action, “thrown at us” and assuming an 
allegedly stable state’ (id.: 30). M’charek (2014) further argues that 
the times and places folded into objects remain, however, present 
- perhaps absently present. A folded object ‘indexes and enacts its 
history’ (id.: 29) even though that history may not be immediately 
visible. M’charek’s analytical work consists precisely of attempting 
to unfold this object and trace the times and places within it. 
Where and how is this object made? In what precise ways have 
various times and places become entangled? But also: where and 
how does this object make its own history invisible, and where 
and how does it inadvertently betray itself by showing traces of 
its past? 
With the folded object, then, we are closer to understanding 
the relationship between the sorting and folding of time and the 
making of legal truths. It suggests that objects are not simply used 
‘in time’, but that they both enact and render invisible different 
times themselves. Drawing on this notion, I am interested, first, 
in how the legal case file folds within it multiple histories in its 
effort to render history - the offense in question - available; and 
second, how the case file may itself become the object of un- and 
refolding practices in the making and remaking of that same 
historical event. The following is an elaboration.  
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3 How to Transport an Event: Traceable Materials 
‘We weren’t there when it happened’, one public prosecutor 
insists. ‘And that is why we press the world onto paper.’ The 
Dutch phrasing ‘op papier persen’ is not only suggestive of the 
preferred medium of storage - paper - but simultaneously 
evocative of reducing something, of transforming something into 
something else. Indeed, this is the case file’s first method of 
rendering an event available in the future. Entrusted to paper are 
heterogeneous entities such as spoken words, observations, traces 
of blood, plastic bags of weed, video materials and decisions 
made by police officials and prosecutors. Indeed, while 
digitization may have plagued judicial ‘end-users’, not much has 
changed in these sites of production (yet): all these various kinds 
of things are translated into paper documents (which are only 
later scanned and digitized). Case files are hence ‘comprehensive 
recording devices that register […] events, voices, gestures, 
appearances’ (Vismann 2008: 10). They do so through the 
medium of writing, through schematic and graphic materials, and 
through photography. Written materials - e.g. witness statements, 
expert reports, transcriptions of the interrogation with the 
defendant - as well as printed maps or photographs of crime 
scenes or injuries are added to the file. Together, these materials 
must allow its users access to ‘what really happened’. Both written 
and visual materials require an almost forensic sensibility: the 
ability to trace clues, to connect statements, to consider the 
plausibility and reliability of these various human and non-human 
witnesses. Figure 6 and Figure 7 - evidence, in an age of CSI and 
post-modern genetic ‘silent witnesses’ of the persistence of 
proverbial ‘good old-fashioned police work’ - is suggestive of the 
kind of forensic sensibilities required of the file’s users: arriving at 
‘what really happened’ is practice of tracing clues and of re-
tracing (sometimes literal) investigatory steps.  
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Figure 6:  Photographic evidence 
of the traces of the  
suspect's shoes 
Figure 7:  A map tracing the 
 direction of the suspect’s  
footprints  
However, sheets of paper are not quite documents yet - that is, 
they have not yet acquired a status as ‘evidence in support of a 
fact’ (Briet 1951: 7; see Buckland 1997). In order to allow access 
to the event in question, the case file must trace itself. That is, it 
must account for its own history of production as proof 
‘procedure’ was followed. This tracing has two modalities. On the 
one hand, correspondence between the evidentiary materials itself - a 
spoken word, a trace of blood on a curtain, plastic bags of 
marijuana - and its paper ‘double’ needs to be carefully traced. 
The legal case file ensures such correspondences by tracing 
precisely where, how, and by whom the piece of evidence was 
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found, elicited, or investigated. Tracing these ‘chains of reference’ 
is key to ensuring the ‘chain of custody’ (Lynch and McNally 
2005): the case file must ensure these small correspondences 
between, for instance, that trace of blood on a curtain, a 
numbered sample of this trace, and a report of the Dutch 
Forensic Institute that matches this trace with a known offender 
(see also Toom 2010).  
A second kind of tracing is that of authentication. Sheets of 
paper become evidence through signatures of the various (human) 
actors contributing to the file: witnesses, defendants, victims, 
police officials. Stamps, furthermore, meticulously trace the dates 
documents were sent, received, or filed. Copies of original 
documentation are similarly stamped with ‘copy conform 
original’, and in rare cases, these stamps themselves need to be 
authorized with a signature. The case file’s production needs to 
be accounted for, procedure ‘observed’: that is, procedure must 
be enacted by testifying, in writing, how, when, and where an 
investigatory ‘act’ has happened. Only then are statements able to 
become legally relevant. The case file as such participates in ‘a 
specific social economy’ (Kozin 2007: 195), an economy 
concerned with the attribution of statements to ‘authors’, or 
rather, ‘authorizers’ (Pottage 2012: 177). Considered in this light, 
the etymological connection between ‘act’ and ‘enactment’ is 
surely no coincidence (Cf. Vismann 2008).  
The case file as a whole also traces its own development: 
within it are not only primary documents testifying to the case at 
hand, but also documents that offer official notification of 
decisions made throughout the investigation. On its paper 
surface, the case file’s travel through the legal-bureaucratic 
networked is traced by, again, stamps, signatures, and stickers (see 
Figure 8): ‘Signs of its history are continuously and deliberately 
inscribed upon the artefact itself’ (Hull 2003: 296). As such, the 
case file is a ‘chronicle of its own production, a sedimentation of 
its own history’ (id.: 296).  
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Figure 8: Stamps, signatures, and stickers testify to the file’s trajectory 
Ways of Case-Making 
 220 
Through these techniques, which allow decisions to always be 
traced back in time and place, the case file also becomes 
compatible with its anticipated future use in court. Only if it has 
carefully traced small correspondences and attributed 
accountabilities it can be employed in the investigation in court. 
This way, it folds both history and future within itself. Tracing is 
a crucial way to ‘index and enact’ its own history (M’charek 2014). 
Rendering available, through documents, acts in the past the case 
files allows both retroactive tracing of past events and ensures the 
file’s forward push along legal-procedural paths.  
Writing Up in Anticipation of the Future  
However, the case file has another existence, too: ‘it is [both] and 
object and a story’ (Kozin 2007: 195). And in the stories it tells it 
similarly anticipates its future, and similarly produces its own 
visibilities and invisibilities. 
Take the process-verbals in the case file. These process-verbals 
are documents, often composed by police officials, which report 
on the police’s findings, witness statements, or interrogations 
with defendants. These process-verbals are written in a field of 
tension: on the one hand, victims, witnesses and defendants are 
required to tell their stories in ‘their own words’. Only if the 
document permits no doubt as to who precisely said, saw, or 
witnessed what, can it be used in court. On the other hand, these 
documents have to be able to make clear precisely how the event 
in question - ‘what really happened - can be related to one (or 
more) of the formal description of illegal activities found in the 
letter of the Law. In other words: these process-verbals must 
anticipate the operation of legal qualification, i.e. the question 
whether ‘what really happened’ can indeed be subsumed under a 
description of illegal activity in the criminal law code (see for this 
point Komter 2002, 2003, 2006). These two demands produce 
very particular visibilities and invisibilities. Take the following 
fragment from a process-verbal reporting on a criminal 
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complaint, lodged by Nancy Carr, female victim of domestic 
abuse:  
I wish to lodge a criminal complaint of assault against my ex-
boyfriend, named Stan Dwyer. I will tell you exactly what happened 
this afternoon. This afternoon, Thursday the 3rd of May, around 
3:15 p.m., I was at the TileStore shop on Regent street number 70 in 
[place]. […] I went outside and saw that Stan was indeed in front of 
the door. […] Stan said he really wanted to talk to me. I told him I 
did not want that. Stan asked me if it was really over between us. I 
told him that I thought it had been over for a while. […] heard that 
Stan repeated to me that it was really over then. Subsequently I saw 
and felt that Stan hit me with a flat hand on the right side of my face. 
I felt an enormous pain on my face. 
Reporting on her story this way, the process-verbal anticipates 
the criminal charge of physical assault with criminal intent, this 
being defined in the Dutch criminal code as the ‘intentional 
infliction of pain or injury or other physical harm or suffering 
onto the body of a person’. First, the victim reports that it was 
Stan who hit her (and not someone else); she reports that she felt 
his hitting, which she felt on the right side of her face (the hit was 
hence directed against her body); and she reports having felt pain. 
This report also localizes the event in space (a specific address in) 
and time (the 3rd of May, 2012). This, too, is legally relevant, as 
the formal charges have to similarly describe the event along 
these spatio-temporal coordinates. Indeed, the charges read as 
follows: 
that he in [place] on or about the 3rd of May 2012, intentionally 
abusing a person (namely N. Carr), has (forcefully) hit/slapped 
in/on/against the face multiple times or at least once, as a result 
of which this person has suffered injury and/or pain. 
Note how the bold text, original to the documented charges, 
refers to the particulars of the event in question: they refer to the 
time, place, name of the victim, and the specifics of the event, 
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which here cover slightly different accounts. The regular text 
refers to the formal definition of assault as found in the Dutch 
criminal code. As such these charges weave together both event 
and criminal code. In this case, like in other cases involving 
material damages or physical injuries, additional photographic 
material of the injured body part is included in the file (materials I 
have, for obvious reasons, not reproduced here), adding to the 
victim’s statement that she felt pain also the visible fact of injury.  
Let’s take a closer look, however, at the victim’s statement. 
This process-verbal has effectuated a couple of things. A dialogue 
taking place at the police station has been translated into a 
written, first-person narrative. The dialogue itself however has 
been rendered invisible: we only know that it took place, but the 
particular ways police officials elicit this story have been rendered 
inaccessible. These prompts and suggestions, of course, are 
precisely how the story becomes formatted to anticipate the 
criminal assault charges (see for this point Komter 2002, 2003, 
2006). Komter (2006) hence argues that ‘considering the way in 
which this text has emerged, it will be clear that the interrogator’s 
activities are “noticeably absent”’. Or perhaps: absently present. In 
this translation of talk into text a certain history has been written 
- a particular story about ‘what really happened’ on the 3rd of 
May 2012 - but another history - the history of a conversation 
between police officer and victim - is at first sight erased. But is it 
lost? 
Working towards the time and place of the court hearing and 
the text of the Law while tracing actions and times in its past: this 
is how the case file mediates access to ‘what really happened’. 
Making the event in question ‘judgment-compatible’ (see Latour 
2010) here consists of rendering histories visible as well as 
invisible. It is precisely these temporal in/visibilities that allow the 
case to proceed, that is: move forward in time and space. Yet all 
its histories - even the ‘invisible’ ones - are not lost: ‘history’, we 
will see in court, ‘can strike back capriciously’ (M’charek 2014: 31).  
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4 The File on Trial: Times-in-Use  
The case file folds within itself multiple histories: a historical 
occurrence which is simultaneously a potentially criminal event; 
the bureaucratic time of legal acts; the times and places in which 
written and graphic materials are made. If all goes well, these 
temporalities are kept separate and partially invisible, so that the 
time of procedure functions smoothly as a frame, the time of the 
file’s production is conveniently glossed over, and the historical 
event of the alleged offense becomes an object of concern.  
The question, then, is how to keep these temporalities 
separate; how, in other words, to trace some histories while 
forgetting others. Within the court, such practices are distributed 
over various court workers. When a case file arrives in the court, 
administrative workers for instance check whether the file meets 
a set of procedural requirements - work that in many ways is both 
‘logistic and legal’ (Latour 2010: 79). It consists of tracing 
signatures, stamps, and dates: when did the file or document 
arrive in the court? Where is the authorized process-verbal of the 
interrogation with the magistrate judge? Is the original ‘process-
file’ - the sub-file that reports on the criminal investigation - 
present, and, if not, at least a properly authenticated ‘copy 
conform original’? Clerks and judges similarly take note to trace 
the file’s histories, knowing full well that in its legal-bureaucratic 
temporalities lay possibilities for the undoing of a case. In 
particular, the presence of a document testifying to the receipt of 
the summons is crucial. The court must know that the defendant 
knows he or she is charged. Hence, in the previous chapter, the 
judge’s care to include on the paper summons the note that the 
summons had been handed over ‘in person’ (on the form, this is 
abbreviation to ‘IP’). Only if the case file, and the documents 
within it, has correctly traced its procedural path can the file be 
used in court. 
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It is however on the court session I wish to concentrate here, 
as it is there that the case file becomes implicated in a complex 
intertextual field (Lynch and Bogen 1996; Scheffer 2006). The judge 
in criminal justice practices ‘inquires mostly paper testimony and 
technical reports’ (Otte 2015: 102) which, in court, are added to, 
challenged, or given new meaning:  
There is hardly any gathering of new evidence, but rather the gauging 
of the value of the already gathered evidence. […] if witnesses are 
heard at all, those tend to be witnesses who have, throughout the 
earlier investigation, have been heard before (van Veen 1985: 3-4 
cited in Otte 2015: 103-104).  
In this intertextual field, written and photographic evidence are 
weaved together with the spoken accounts of the defendant. 
Written testimony here structures the interaction between 
prosecutor, defendant, lawyer and judge in a practice that Lynch 
and Bogen, nodding to Garfinkel’s ‘documentary method of 
investigation’ (1967), have coined ‘documentary methods of 
interrogation’ (1996). It is in this setting that the case file sometimes 
remains folded - and is employed as a neutral container of 
evidence, allowing for smooth travelling between the here-and-
now of the court session to the there-and-then of the offense - 
while at other moments, it is unfolded, that is, employed as a 
material object with a complex history. At such points its ‘truth-
function’ (Vismann 2008) is endangered in the here-and-now of 
the court session.  
Histories of Production 
Take yet another case, that of Martin Galloway, a private security 
guard of a nightclub. Martin was charged with the physical assault 
of a young woman, which offense he allegedly perpetrated in his 
capacity as a security guard. This woman, Helen Amis, had been 
quite drunk and rowdy, and had resisted Galloway’s attempts to 
isolate her from the small crowd outside the nightclub. Having 
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restrained her Galloway tried calling the police, at which point the 
woman tried to escape from his hold. In the brief, physical 
struggle that ensued, Galloway allegedly hit her in the face, which 
the public prosecutor sought to qualify as physical assault. The 
case file includes some contradictory accounts of various 
eyewitnesses: two accounts of bystanders, and two accounts of 
colleagues of the accused. Galloway himself strenuously denies 
that he hit the victim: in the struggle that ensued, he argues, she 
tried to hit him, while he only tried to ward off her assaults.  
Let’s listen closely to the way in which these statements are 
used in court. Take, first, the prosecutor, who concentrates on 
the two witness statements from Galloway’s colleagues. These 
two statements may appear exculpatory, the prosecutor suggests, 
but she has an explanation for their content: 
Yes, your colleagues tell us that they didn’t see anything untoward in 
your conduct. Well, I’ve seen things like this before, where people in 
your business stick up for each other. Bearing that in mind I can’t say 
that these are, strictly speaking, exculpatory accounts. 
Here, the prosecutor expresses her reservations with regard to the 
truth-value of these two documents. She casts doubts on the 
impartiality and hence reliability of the two witnesses. They may, 
in other words, be lying. Of course, Galloway’s lawyer draws on 
precisely the same two documents to argue the opposite: these 
two statements clearly contradict the victim’s account. While both 
know that the process-verbals are not ‘exact representations’ of 
what was said to the police, the prosecutor and the lawyer 
nevertheless treat these documents as ‘at least […] reflection[s] of 
what has been said in the interrogation room’, or indeed at the 
scene itself (Komter 2006: 222). And precisely because these 
process-verbals are relatively truthful reflections of ‘what was 
really said’, they enable the production of potentially competing, 
but ideally plausible and coherent accounts of ‘what really 
happened’.  
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Yet this kind of use of the file does not exhaust its 
possibilities. The histories of the case file itself can become 
implicated in lawyers’, defendants’, and even prosecutors’ truth-
telling activities. In such cases, these parties do not concentrate 
on the stories in the file, but rather tell stories about the file, 
bringing to life its partially invisible histories. Galloway’s lawyer 
leverages precisely this strategy when he commences his 
concluding plea, which concentrates on the eyewitness account of 
the victim’s friend: 
My client insists that he has only warded off her attempts to assault 
him. One of the Miss Amis’ friends says here [pointing to the 
process-verbal] that she saw the movement of my client’s arm, but it 
must be said she did not see that mister Galloway indeed hit Miss 
Amis. Things like this have to do with the way police officials write 
things like this down, you see. They will ask, “did you see the 
accused hitting her?”, and then the eyewitness might say “no”, or 
something else. But the police will write down, “did not see whether 
the accused hit the victim”. Which makes the statement neither an 
exculpatory, nor an incriminating statement: this way, it just seems 
that the eyewitness simply didn’t see anything. But it could have been an 
exculpatory statement: maybe the eyewitness saw that something or 
other did not happen, and then we would have ended up with an 
exculpatory statement.  
Here, the interrogation of the accused about the events in 
question shifts to an interrogation of the document itself (Cf. 
Lynch and Bogen 1996). Placing us in the interrogation room, 
where police officials are busy translating talk into text, the lawyer 
suggests that the statement can be read in two competing ways: 
either the eyewitness saw that Galloway did not hit the victim, or 
the eyewitness did not see whether he hit the victim. In this case, 
the exploitation of this ambiguity in the process-verbal works: the 
judge, ‘unwillingly’ (sic) declares the defendant not guilty. The 
process-verbal reporting on the conversation with the eyewitness 
is no longer successful in corresponding to ‘what was really said’, 
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so that it can neither tell us something about ‘what really 
happened’ at that nightclub some months ago.  
How Police Officials Write Things Down: Institutional Writing in a Bind 
Galloway’s case casts ‘the way police officials write these things 
down’ into sharp relief. As we have seen, these writing practices 
take place in a zone of tension: on the one hand, police officials 
must aim to retain people’s ‘own words’ and ‘own observations’; 
on the other, these process-verbals need to render the event in 
question judgment-compatible. This is their conundrum: 
emphasizing the naturalist portrayal of interaction as it actually 
took place risks not only including swaths of irrelevant material; 
the risk is also that parts of the charges cannot be substantiated. 
Focusing, on the other hand, on massaging the text to be able to 
meet legal rules and definitions may lead the document to betray 
its own history of production. Judge Fielding commented 
ironically: 
Some things they can’t seem to write down anymore. They never say 
[write], “I felt I was being hit”, but rather say something like, “I saw 
and felt I was apparently receiving a blow to my body.” It’s a kind of 
fear - after all, they know how we work. 
The problem is magnified, for judges at least, when police 
officials write down their own observations in the official, 
‘ambtshalve’ process-verbal [proces-verbaal van bevinding ambsthalve 
opgemaakt]. These kinds of process-verbals tend to be used more 
widely as indications of what the police officials in question 
observed when arriving at the scene of the alleged offense, but 
may also be used to write down observations of what they heard 
(or overheard) the defendant say after the offense. Such process-
verbals may include incriminatory utterances by the defendant 
without his or her counsel being present or without the 
defendant even knowing that certain words are committed to 
paper (for instance, the defendant tells someone else in a 
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temporary holding cell that he did it; this comment is overheard 
by a police official checking in). Aside from the obvious legal 
implications of such ‘overheard talk’ committed to writing, judges 
tend to comment largely on the practical difficulties that 
accompany reading, evaluating, and using such process-verbals. 
For instance, as police officials tend to work in pairs, such 
process-verbals tend to be signed by two persons. Of course, the 
question is whether both or merely one of the two officials saw 
an incriminating act - a question that that may come up in Court. 
At the same time, police officials are to be believed at their 
written word, even if that written word does not specify the 
observations individually: the relationship, Judge Jamison 
suggests, is one of necessary and ‘institutionalized trust’.  
Graphic Materials: Photography and Film as Mediators 
Similar concerns - both among judges, and in court - play out in 
relation to the evidentiary value of photographic materials. While 
photography - less fallible than human memory - has historically 
promised transparency and visibility to decision-makers in legal 
settings (Mnookin 1998), like written materials it, too, can either 
be mobilized as a neutral carrier of evidence or an active 
transformer in itself. It is not uncommon, especially in cases of 
physical assault, for court actors to focus their attention on what 
is and is not rendered visible in the photograph taken of the 
victim’s injuries. The fact that copied versions of the file are in 
black and white adds to the problem: if the victim’s injuries - e.g. 
a swollen lip, a bruised nose - are not immediately visible on the 
photographs in the file, does that mean that there was in effect 
no injury, or that the photograph merely distorts the actually 
existing injury? It is not uncommon for lawyers to request they 
see the photographs in colour; requests judges summarily deal 
with by showing them the relevant photographs in court. The 
transforming character of photography can also play a role in 
different kinds of cases, for instance the case of Abbas. Abbas, 
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having a long history of migration from the African subcontinent 
to the Netherlands, had been charged with carrying of false 
identification papers. In a routine check, his passport had come 
up as non-existing in the national registry. Abbas’ lawyer went to 
great lengths to describe the way Abbas had requested a renewal 
of his passport in his home country and had received the 
document that would prove later to be falsified. As ‘things are 
done differently there’, meaning in his home country, the lawyer 
argued that Abbas could not have known that the passport he 
received was tampered with; as such he was not to blame either. 
Based upon Abbas’ testimony and a scanned copy of the falsified 
passport, the judge acquitted Abbas. Later, the prosecutor 
suggested it was a shame the actual passport was not present in 
the courtroom: the judge could have seen that its first page 
seemed tampered with, ‘as if someone just glued something on 
top of it’. Even if Abbas had not himself falsified the document, 
these obvious marks of falsification should have alerted him to 
the possibility that his passport was falsified.  
Both writing and visual materials, then, introduce into the 
court session not only a concern with ‘what actually happened’, 
but with the times and spaces of their production. These times 
and places, absently present in the file, may be successfully 
mobilized: ‘history is never lost’ (M’charek 2014) indeed.3  
Unaccounted Histories: The Decisions Not To 
A third way within which the file’s hidden histories of production 
are rendered relevant in the here-and-now of the court session is 
in its erasure of the decisions to not act. For instance, while the 
case file always traces its growth - by attributing authorship to, 
and hence accounting for every step in the criminal investigation 
- it does not similarly account for the decision to stop the criminal 
investigation or to refrain from undertaking certain investigatory 
actions. In other words, while the case file accounts for the 
evidentiary materials present in the file, it does not similarly 
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explain the absence of other pieces of evidence. These 
unaccounted decisions, inaccessible to the parties in the 
courtroom, may come to ‘haunt’ the proceedings in court. For 
instance, the lawyer in the introduction of this piece suggested 
that the police had actively barred competing and exculpatory 
eyewitness accounts from the case file. Defendants, too, may 
level similar objections to the judge, like for instance this young 
man accused of stealing a mobile phone in a bar: 
So why have they never checked the phone for fingerprints? They 
tell me I would have been the last to have it in my hands before they 
found it in my vicinity, according to their story, but they never 
bothered to check. And by the way, it’s a bar, there must be security 
camera footage they could have checked? Again they didn’t bother. 
All this seriously hurts my defence! 
The ‘decision not to’ is unaccounted for in the file - even though 
the file itself, having moved from prosecutorial offices to the 
court, is pretty much an indication of the case file’s presumed 
‘completeness’. As files become inserted into the intertextual field 
of the courtroom, their supposed completeness may however be 
cast into doubt. A partial file inexplicably missing crucial pieces of 
potentially exculpatory evidence, for lawyers, is proof that the 
prosecution has failed to exercise due diligence. Sometimes, 
lawyers couple this line of reasoning with a request for additional 
witnesses to be heard, or security camera footage to be collected. 
These appeals are, at times, successful in that they lead judges to 
require additional evidence to be gathered. However, lawyers may 
also be quick to point out that hearing additional eyewitnesses is 
not going to help the defendant in his or her defence much: after 
all, (chronological) time has passed since the offense, human memory 
is fallible, and witness testimony is likely to become less 
trustworthy over time.  
When judges grant requests like this, concerns with the correct 
‘folding methods’ take centre stage again: not any document can 
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be folded into the case file. Decisions like these are recorded by 
assisting clerks and later expanded into a formal document 
testifying to the reasoning behind these decisions. Having been 
signed by the presiding judge, these documents will be added to 
the file while the file itself will await additional documentation, 
like authorized process-verbals drawn up by police officials or 
expert witnesses. The case files are then kept ‘open’ and ‘alive’, 
that is, until the newly appointed court date. All in all, defence 
practices do not only consist of coming up with a ‘better story’. 
They also consist of playing with the case file’s temporalities, of 
leveraging invisible and inaccessible histories to thwart a guilty 
verdict in the here-and-now, or at least, to adjourn the case; to 
allow the case file to proceed further into a deferred and 
uncertain future.  
5 Making Facts, Unmaking Cases, and Temporal 
 Interferences 
The preceding chapter has been an attempt to start accounting 
for the intricate relationship between Law, time, and truth. In the 
previous pages I have attempted to show how struggles over 
‘what really happened’ in courtrooms do not simply draw on the 
stories present ‘in’ the file, but that such interpretative struggles 
are extended to the file itself. Understanding how and why this 
happens is assisted by a conception of the legal case file as an 
object that has folded times, places and actors within itself that 
nevertheless may come to ‘haunt’ the procedures in court: 
‘history can be can be recalled in objects. History is never left 
behind’ (M’charek 2014: 3). A focus on these histories - either 
explicitly accounted for, or made absently present - allows one to 
carefully trace the way the case file mediates epistemic access to 
the event Law seeks to judge. That is, it takes seriously the way 
the case file builds correspondences with ‘what actually 
happened’, while it simultaneously underscores how this 
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particular way of building correspondences and tracing histories 
offers the parties to the case unexpected possibilities to make or 
unmake a case. This way, the legal construction and 
deconstruction of cases is shown to be not only a matter of 
‘disturbing the social and cognitive networks that surround and 
strengthen […] [truth-] claims’ (Fuchs and Ward 1994: 482); the 
making or unmaking of cases extends itself precisely to the objects 
in these practices: ‘the strength of the case usually depends on the 
careful choreography of several witnesses, expert testimony, [but 
also] physical evidence, documents, and so on’ (id.: 487).  
It is in this sense that this chapter diverges from Latour’s 
treatment of case files and the ‘legal mode of existence’ (2010, 
2013). As elaborated on in Chapter 1, Latour (2010, 2013) quite 
rigidly distinguishes between the legal and the scientific mode of 
existence ([LAW] and [REF] respectively). Delegating all factual 
questions to the mode of existence [REF], his purified sociology 
of Law becomes unable to attend to precisely the ways truths are 
legally made, and the ways procedure and the case file’s history of 
production become themselves objects of epistemic attention in 
court.4 Of course, differences between ‘legal’ and ‘scientific’ 
modes of making facts cannot be glossed over. For instance, 
scientific truth-making often relies on what Latour and Woolgar 
(1979) have coined the ‘deletion of modalities’: the deletion of 
contextual qualifications - among which are authors’ names! - that 
make simple statements into facts. The case file draws on a 
similar kind of operation when it renders invisible the context of 
the interrogation, that is, in the transformation of a complex face-
to-face interaction into a written document. However, legal truths 
can only be made when other kinds of qualifications and ‘con-
texts’ - literally, semiotic artefacts like autographs and stamps 
accompanying these texts - remain present, at least until the 
hearing. Certain precise dates, times, persons and bureaucratic 
‘authors’ (or rather: ‘authorizers’) can not be deleted, as the case 
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file is not only active in the transportation of evidence, but also in 
the enactment of procedural justice (M’charek et al. 2013).  
Furthermore, this chapter has made problematic a rigid 
distinction between ‘procedural context’ or ‘frame’ on the one 
hand, and legal modes of arriving at the ‘material truth’ on the 
other. ‘Observing procedure’ is a practice of enacting procedure; 
‘acquiring the facts’ is similarly a practice of folding statements 
and utterances into legal space-time. It is important to note that 
this mode of making facts is different from how we may 
understand the making of facts within scientific practices. 
Highlighting, furthermore, precisely the connections between ‘doing 
time’ and ‘doing truth’, this chapter has refused to treat one as a 
context for the other. The case file, transporting and 
transforming evidence, is a crucial object doing both legal and 
truth-telling work.  
Temporal Interferences 
In emphasizing the making of multiple temporalities this chapter 
has paid specific attention to phenomena we can now start to 
recognize as moments of temporal interference: that is, the moments 
in which the time of procedure, the time of the file’s production, 
and chronological time cannot be neatly kept apart but rather 
interfere with each other to produce barriers to truth-making. In each 
of the cases drawn on in this chapter, the time of procedure, the 
time of the production of the file, and the time of the offense are 
evoked and ‘brought to life’ simultaneously, producing a situation 
both propitious (for the defendant and lawyer) and challenging 
(to prosecutor). These moments of temporal interference 
demonstrate that, even though while great care is taken to set the 
procedural stage for truth-making - to make procedure into a 
context - such efforts do not necessarily succeed. ‘Procedure’, as 
well as the times and places of the case file’s production, can be 
evoked to bar access to the truth. To speak with Barad (2003), 
processes of mattering - of something becoming material to and 
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consequential for, of making differences that make a difference - 
have, then, both spatial and temporal dimensions. Or rather, 
spatiality and temporality are themselves the product of  
ongoing open process of mattering through which “mattering” itself 
acquires meaning and form in the realization of different agential 
possibilities (Barad 2003: 817).  
Both ‘temporality and spatiality emerge in this processual 
historicity’ (id.: 817-818). The case file’s multiple temporalities 
play a crucial role in these practices of translating between the 
there-and-then of the offense and the here-and-now of the court 
session. By folding, ordering, and sorting different temporalities, 
the case file is both what allows procedure and facts to be ‘kept 
apart’ as much as it presents the possibility of such temporal 
interferences, and with these, the undoing or unmaking of a case. 
Indeed, M’charek (2014) locates politics not necessarily in what is 
‘contained in’ objects - a presupposed substance - but rather in 
the ways they are folded: how they make certain histories 
immediately present, and how histories linger on in obscurity. 
Building upon this recognition, this piece has also suggested that 
this temporality is also key to understanding not just power, but 
also its subversion. As it is possible to make these histories present 
again, it is possible to turn the tables on this object, to act in the 
face of an accusation, to keep, in other words, a human body in 
movement. Recognizing that objects are political things, 
recognizing, too, that part of their politics resides in their 
temporal fold, is hence key to understanding how they can be 
unfolded and refolded. 
Process/Event Distinctions 
In highlighting practices of temporal sorting, this account has 
similarly bracketed distinctions regularly drawn between the 
process of inquiry and the event of the court session. Such distinctions are 
not necessarily made explicitly. Conversation analytical 
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approaches to legal practices, for instance, tend to emphasize 
courtroom interaction, glossing over inquiry into the practices 
that chronologically ‘precede’ and structure these interactions, e.g. 
file-work - a tendency commented upon in Chapter 5. In working 
with a very narrow conception of ‘context’ as utterances 
produced in court, such approaches gloss not only over the fact 
that these in-court interactions are ‘bound’ in crucial ways to 
previous utterances and statements (see Scheffer 2010), but also 
the way these accounts are bound to written accounts. In other 
words, the past of these case ‘reaches out into the present’ 
(Scheffer 2010: 53): court parties not only have to ‘tell their story’, 
present evidence, or produce lines of attack and defence, all in 
relation to the case file’s written and unwritten histories. Similarly, 
accounts that focus exclusively on the in-court production of 
narrative or discourse (e.g. Conley and O’Barr 1990) are similarly 
presentist. While they may work with a broader sense of societal 
or discursive context, histories of frequent and local relevance to 
in-court actors are glossed over. This analytical presentism risks 
underestimating the extent to which the dramaturgical unity of 
space, time, and act so central to court proceedings is itself made 
possible and plausible only by virtue of active and partial ways of 
accounting for and erasing of histories. It also shows that the 
‘process’ that precedes, in chronological time, the ‘event’ of the 
court is itself always already oriented towards that event: process and 
event, past and present, are difficult to tease apart a priori. 
Indeed, it is only through the spatial and temporal enactment of a 
‘cut’ (Barad 2003, 2007) that process and event are separated: 
only then it makes sense not to speak of an unfolding process but 
an event with a before and after; only then can both ‘procedure’ 
and ‘investigatory process’ appear as ‘context’ to the event in 
question (Scheffer 2010: 186-188). The challenge, then, is to 
inquire into how, where and when such cuts are made; how, in 
other words, events are processually enacted.  
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6 Visionary and Forensic Approaches to Documents: Or, 
What to Learn From Lawyers 
There is another lesson, here, and it is one that pertains to 
documents and to our modes of treating them. That is, while I 
warned, in the preceding chapter, against both our ‘phonocentric’ 
reflex and a ‘politics of immediation’ (Mazzarella 2006) - the 
tendency to treat organizational documents as self-evident 
representations of (social or organizational) realities at the cost of 
understanding documents as physical, material objects - I aim 
now to add a further note to these praxiographic concerns with 
documents in practices. I want to warn against a third habit of 
thought in relation to the documents we encounter in fieldwork 
settings: the tendency to treat these not as unproblematic 
representations of the world, but rather as documents that can be 
read hermeneutically - in search of authorial intent - or else 
interpreted as signifying dominant world-views, (sub)cultures, 
discourses, or mentalities (Hull 2012; Prior 2008). Of course, 
both approaches are useful to some extent. From pre-sentencing 
reports we may, for instance, aim to distil not just information 
with regards to the defendant but also try to read them as the 
product of the author’s intentions. Did this or that parole officer 
really think this defendants is willing to change, or is he or she 
subtly letting the judge know rehabilitation is not to be expected? 
Indeed, this ‘hermeneutic’ reading of pre-sentencing reports is in 
fact a local mode of approaching pre-sentencing reports, both in 
the site studied here as elsewhere (see Tata et al. 2008). For 
instance, it is not uncommon for the judges studied here to treat 
standard, routine, and very short pre-sentencing reports as an 
expression of the individual parole service worker’s lack of 
confidence in a specific defendant. Secondly, elucidating as well is 
the mode of reading that treats documents as signs of wider 
societal or cultural logics, discourses, or world-views. Take pre-
sentencing reports again: we might wonder how pre-sentencing 
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reports reflect wider societal shifts in conceiving of and dealing 
with crime, deviance, and risk (see e.g. Maurutto and Hannah-
Moffat 2006; Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto 2010). These two 
ways of approaching documents, however, contrast sharply with 
the kind of understanding of documentation developed in this 
chapter. Indeed, both these approaches treat the document as a 
sign of something else, e.g. the author’s intentions or socio-
cultural or discursive realities. In a way, its treatment of 
documents is almost visionary: the gesture places behind the 
document an intentional subject or a world of which the 
document is mere testimony.  
In contrast, I would like to develop here an understanding of 
documents in a different key; an understanding for which we do 
not need a visionary, but rather, a forensic sensibility. It is 
concerned not with the ‘meaning’ of documents, nor with their 
‘truth’; instead it seeks to understand their operation, their effects, 
their moments of mobilization, production and use. And if (but it 
is a big ‘if’) such operations include ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’, both can 
be analysed not as something given or exterior to the document, 
but as operations of the document itself. A forensic sensibility 
with regards to documents is interested less in treating them as 
signs of, but rather as clues to (Cf. Valverde 2008: 13). It treats them, 
at first sight, superficially, ‘dermatologically’ (Deleuze 1990: 120). 
Tracing their moments of production, mobilization and use, this 
mode of inquiry is concerned with finding a trajectory through 
different practices. It is a kind of approach quite close to what 
lawyers, with their skilled forensic eye, do when they aim to 
mobilize documents’ histories of production. Leading us from 
different ‘heres’ to ‘theres’, from presents to pasts and to 
potential futures, this forensic approach treats the document as a 
trajectory. Keep following it - as lawyers may do - and we may 
end, not in the generalities of ‘procedure’ or ‘truth’, but rather in 
local, concrete modes of doing both.  
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7 Onwards: Productive Fictions for the Description of the 
Law 
Highlighting the doing of truth and the making of multiple times, 
this chapter has suggested, crucially, that these legal practices are 
characterized by sophisticated practices of making and sorting 
time. As such this chapter contrasts sharply with a conception of 
Law that places it outside history and time; a conception within 
which the Law, Derrida writes, must always be ‘intolerant to its 
own history’ (Derrida 1992: 112). Instead, this chapter has 
concentrated on different operations of sorting and making 
multiple times. 
Looking back and pushing forwards, the following chapter will 
aim to relate my travelling so far to the question that has been 
plaguing us ever since the beginning of this book: that is, in 
essence, a question about the relationship between capitalized 
abstractions of Science and Law on the one hand, and the 
practical and concrete robustness of both scientific and legal 
practices. What is it these ambulations, these different ways of 
collaborating with and within concrete legal practices, have taught 
me? What can we learn, both about ‘the Law’ itself and about our 
methods, approaches, and descriptions? What abstractions will 
help us ‘hop, skip and jump’ some more? In the following 
chapter, I argue that we need productive fictions that set us in 
inquisitive motion, that ground our trajectories, that alert us to 
specificity and concreteness, that defer generalizing abstraction 
itself. The notion of the hyper-object (Morton 2013) does exactly 
that. Onwards, then, once more.  
NOTES
 
1 Parts of this chapter, as well as parts of its arguments, have been published 
as two venues, the first being Oorschot, I. van (2014b) “Vouw - en 
Ontvouwpraktijken in Juridische Waarheidsvinding” in Sociologie 10(3):  
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301-318, and the second, Oorschot, I. van (forthcoming) “Doing Times, 
Doing Truths”. In: Grabham, E. and Beynon Jones, S. (eds.) Regulating Time. 
Routledge Social Justice Series.  
2 Arguing that legal practices are partially ‘epistemic’ is crucially not meant to 
imply that truth in such settings is sought at any cost, nor that these truth-
making practices are adequately understood as the grasping, through purely 
mental and creative labor, of the final truth of the matter. Indeed, the judge 
in criminal justice practices ‘inquires mostly paper testimony and technical 
reports’ (Otte 2015: 102) and practices, in the court room, a kind of legal 
‘verification’:  
There is hardly any gathering of new evidence, but rather the gauging of 
the value of the already gathered evidence. […] if witnesses are heard at 
all, those tend to be witnesses who, throughout the earlier investigation, 
have been heard before. Their [in-court] statements allow that which has 
been stated before to be checked. (van Veen 1985: 3-4 cited in Otte 2015: 
103-104). 
 Such practices may not meet the stringent, epistemological demands placed 
on ‘truth-finding’ within a purely positivist register, but within a pragmatic 
register these do, in fact, amount to ‘epistemic practices’ (Lynch 1993). 
Making this troubling presence of the ‘truth’ productive - as I aim to do here 
- is assisted by taking these practices quite seriously. 
3 Throughout my fieldwork I encountered one case within which videotaped 
materials - not stills - played a role in court. This was a case involving a 
young man accused of physically assaulting another customer at a bar at 
night. The incident was caught on the bar’s security camera. After some 
difficulties getting the digitized videotape to play on one of the court’s 
computers, both prosecutor, judge and defendant took place at the 
prosecutor’s desk to witness the events unfold. In exercises reminiscent of 
Goodwin’s (1994) description of the use of videotaped material in the 
Rodney King trial, the prosecutor used his finger to point out, within the 
videotaped episode, ‘aggressive’ and ‘provocative’ behaviour on the part of 
the defendant, suggesting that he ‘is like a devil in a box’ attacking an 
innocent, if somewhat grating, victim. The judge quickly silenced him: ‘I 
have to see for myself, have I not?’ was her icy comment. In this case, the 
mediations introduced by the videotape were very much on everyone’s 
minds, specifically the manner in which its perspective and frame rendered 
invisible certain acts outside the camera’s, and by extension the judges’, line 
of sight.  
4 The difference between Latour’s account and mine is arguably rooted in the 
specificity of the two sites studied: while the ‘material truth’ is very much a 
local concern in ‘my’ lower court criminal justice practices, Latour’s Counsel  
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of State - the highest administrative appellate court - is arguably a setting 
emphasizing legal qualification over the making of (legally relevant) facts. All 
the more reason, I would argue, to not generalize too hastily.  
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7 Productive Fictions for the Study 
of the Law: From Hyper-
Explanation to Hyper-Object 
1 An End to Journeying 
Jurists write arrêts (Latour 2010): statements that want to bring 
discussion to a close, to bring us to halt. Scientists, in contrast, 
write ‘please-go-ons’ (id.) efforts that call upon others to try for 
yet another approach, make yet another leap. In this sense, a 
scientific case is always a cause hoping to mobilize, in that it 
‘obliges those who belong to this [scientific] field, forces them to 
think, to act, to invent, to object’ (Stengers 2015: 91). Whether 
this characterization of the status of legal and social-scientific 
writing can be elevated to a defining or typical characteristic of 
both practices in toto I dare not say anymore - for that, I am much 
too weary of sociological purification and totalization. But as a 
reflection on the different purposes of much legal and scientific 
writings, it is quite apt. Beholden, as I am, to description, the final 
thing to do for me here is to allow inquiry to go on. 
The following chapter, then, looks back as much as it aims to 
push inquiry onwards and outwards. Emphasizing the multiple 
ways ‘the Law’ has been enacted throughout this book as well as 
the categorical troubles evident within both scientific and legal 
practices, I will suggest we choose to understand legal practices 
through the prism of a fiction that effectively bars us from having 
the final word, a fiction that stops us stopping. If we are truly 
interested in description, I think we must refuse conceptual 
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confinement. Instead, we must insist on our capacity to engage in 
real conceptual movement (Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). 
Because the demand that we write ‘please-go-ons’ is not assisted 
particularly well by our own tendencies to generalize, totalize, and 
purify. The notion of the hyper-object, in contrast, promises to 
stop us from stopping. As a fiction to think with, the notion of 
the hyper-object suggests we are never quite ‘in’ or ‘out’ ‘the 
Law’; instead, it asks that we find concrete passages, paths and 
burrows. It does not prioritize contemplation but calls us to find, 
like Joseph K., yet another entrance, and behind that entrance, 
yet another door, yet another office. Deferring totalization and 
finalization, the hyper-object keeps us in inquisitive motion. 
2 Looking Back 
Let’s first, however, briefly revisit the three central questions that 
have guided this inquiry. The first pertained to sociological 
accounts of the Law and the work they do, inquiring into the 
performative dimensions of sociological knowledges about the 
Law. The second question concentrated not on sociological ‘case-
making’, but rather focused on the legal case-making practices I 
encountered in ‘the field’, and aimed to pay particular attention to 
the role of the legal case file in mediating epistemic access to the 
events and persons in question. The third question required me 
to introduce accountability into my own account and focused on 
tracing the performativity of my own methodological 
collaborations with these legal practices.  
All three questions were born out of the observation that 
theorization regarding the relationship between sociological 
description and legal practices itself is largely unhelpful when 
confronted with the vagaries of both scientific description and 
legal practices. On the one hand, there is always more to legal 
practices than the application of norms or rules: legal practices 
need knowledge of and reference to events and persons for them 
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to proceed to become anything else than self-referential. On the 
other hand, while an emphasis on accurate representation of the 
world ‘out there’ may sound like a worthy scientific goal, it 
nevertheless fails to address the performative dimensions of 
scientific practices themselves. When taken to its logical extreme, 
the norm-fact distinction underlying these two mandates gives 
rise to paradigmatic conundrums.  
In Chapter 1: Contemplating the Law I presented these 
conundrums and emphasized the theoretical dilemmas that 
accompany thinking about the Law in abstracted terms. Not only 
does it concentrate on the by now well-known contrasts between 
sociological and legal-positivist understandings of the Law - the 
first tends to treat the Law as a surface effect of deeper social 
processes or structures, while the second instead understands the 
Law as a being suspending itself miraculously above the mire of 
social, political, and cultural concerns - but it also emphasizes 
precisely their common disregard for concrete representational 
and legal practices. Even Latour’s sociology of Law, grounded in 
robust, fine-grained ethnographic fieldwork falls prey to the 
purification inherent in any effort to isolate Law’s proper, true 
being. Perspectivist thought regarding the Law has not been 
shown to be quite helpful either in this specific instance: 
Bourdieu’s account because his sociology of Law presumes an 
impossible ‘view from nowhere’ upon legal practices, Hart’s 
because his internal viewpoint is in effect no epistemic viewpoint 
at all. Again, the choice seems to be one between either an 
understanding of the Law’s true being, or a description - but not 
both. And because the Law is identified with norms or rules and 
Science with the accurate representation of reality, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to account for the impurities and troubles 
represented, first, by performative dimensions of knowledge 
practices - the fact that accounts of the world do things in and 
with worlds - and second, by epistemic practices within legal 
settings - the fact that judges need a sense of what they are talking 
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about when they are judging. While it may be the case that the 
Law has at its purpose the provision of legally sound judgments, 
and while Science may have at its telos the provision of truths (I 
find nothing objectionable in either standpoint), neither of the 
two practices is adequately grasped in these binary terms. For 
within these practices dwell impurities and troubles: 
performativities attending to scientific efforts at representation, 
epistemic practices necessary for legal practices of judgment. Of 
these troubles, the Leiden study is but one exemplar, but - as I 
hope to have shown throughout this book - in this case a worthy 
exemplar to think with. 
In contrast to purified conceptions of the Law or a 
problematic, unmediated perspectivism with regards to the Law, I 
aimed to develop a more pragmatic and concrete appreciation of 
both scientific and legal practices in Chapter 2: A Guide for the 
Perplexed. There, I argued that lacking from the theorizations of 
the Law presented in Chapter 1 was, in the case of Kelsen, Hart, 
Bourdieu, Black and Marx, an appreciation of the Law as first and 
foremost a practice, in this case a practice of shuffling documents, 
of translating events into judgment-compatible language, of 
comparing statements, of quiet file-work and of fraught 
interactions in Court. In other words, in their overt abstraction, 
these accounts failed to understand ‘the Law’ as a concrete being. 
This is not to gloss over important differences between these 
strands of thought: after all, lines of reasoning contrast sharply. 
On the one hand, there is a tendency within legal positivism to 
understand that abstraction Law in reference to a foundational 
Norm or taken-for-granted, structuring Rule. On the other, 
sociologists are more apt to treat the Law as a sign of something 
more real, particularly as a surface manifestation of deeper ‘social’ 
processes or structures. And while Latour does attend to these 
concrete legal practices, he nevertheless falls prey to that both 
juristic and scientific tendency of purification: separating the 
properly legal beings from other kinds of beings (or modes of 
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existence), his sociology of Law delegated to other fields of 
inquiry the question of, within legal practices, truths and facts are 
made. A similar problematic characterizes the implicit 
understanding of scientific (or ‘positive’) description in these 
accounts. Kelsen and Black are perhaps most explicit about the 
demands they place on description: it must be ‘pure’, separate 
contingencies, concreteness, and ‘mess’ from what is purest to 
this phenomenon the Law. But Bourdieu’s mode of description, 
if more implicitly, similarly asks of description that it occupies the 
impossible, Archimedean point of view. And while Hart pays 
some attention to the internal or external situatedness of 
viewpoints, his conception of these viewpoints treats them 
nevertheless as unproblematic positions instead of concrete 
accomplishments. Indeed both authors treat such viewpoints as 
simply preceding actual practices of inquiry and investigation. In 
other words: description itself is also conceived of abstractly, and 
not as a concrete practice of jostling, collaborating, transforming, 
intervening in, and running op against the solidity of concrete 
realities. As such, the question as to how, concretely, description 
is achieved and how, concretely, epistemic ‘standpoints’ are made 
is glossed over. In Chapter 2, then, I aimed to make concrete 
both ‘the Law’ and ‘description’, pragmatically respecifying the 
question ‘What is the Law’ into a version that attend to how, 
where, and when the abstraction ‘the Law’ is concretely done. I 
also paid attention to how, where and when ‘description’ occurs 
and is made possible. Characterizing this pragmatic respecification 
is further an attendance to the agency of objects in these legal and 
scientific practices: in the first case, I introduced case files as 
crucial to an understanding of concrete legal practices; in the 
second case, I pointed to concrete practices of measurement, of 
‘gathering’ data, of sorting, ordering, and hence making realities.  
This pragmatic respecification offered me the tools to start my 
journeying. Starting with the categorically troubling Leiden study, 
Chapter 3: Dealing with Difference is an attempt at both diplomacy 
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and accountability. It seeks to create not harmony, but some 
understanding between practising jurists and social-scientific 
observers. It does so by providing an account of the specific 
realities enacted in statistical research of legal practices. It has 
aimed to demonstrate to jurists precisely what kind of reality 
statistically-inclined social scientists tend to enact and speak about 
when they engage in statistical modelling of sentencing practices. 
It shows that criminal justice, in and through such statistical 
modelling, is enacted as a distribution machine taking as its object 
of knowledge a population internally stratified along several axes 
of difference. In this case, the meaningful differences made 
pertain to both ‘legal’ and ‘extra-legal’, that is social, ‘factors’, 
most notably in this instance defendants’ phenotype and 
administrative category as a Dutch citizen. In so doing, Chapter 3 
cautions us against making two assumptions about criminal 
justice practices and the role played by the individual judge. First, 
it suggests that the legal promise to ‘treat equal cases alike’ is not 
a promise made based on sociological equivalences between 
population groups. Such an epistemology of legal practices not 
only introduces equivalences and differences where legal actors 
make different differences - e.g. in terms of individual defendants’ 
remorsefulness, as I show in Chapter 4 - but also risks expecting 
criminal law to combat institutional and structural racisms. 
Second, placing that burden not only on criminal law, but on the 
individual judge and his or her (un)conscious thinking may be an 
unhelpful, even harmful, gesture, precisely because it treats racism 
itself as something that structures only ‘outcomes’, and not 
people’s ‘starting positions’ in highly unequal structures of 
inequality more generally.  
Chapter 4: Situating Remorse is the result of a different kind of 
entry into the practices of the judges I studied. Empirically, it is 
an effort to stay with judicial conceptions of practice as an 
intuitive, partially moral and evaluative kind of work, including a 
concern with the legal category of the ‘person of the defendant’. 
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At the same time it has zoomed in on a friction between these 
judicial, casuistic self-descriptions and the three recurring typified 
whole-case narratives, suggesting that these typified whole-case 
narratives are instances of cases not existing as a singular whole 
but rather as an exemplar or kind of a narrative kind. Relying on 
conversations with judges and the observation and transcription 
of in-court interactions, this chapter has tried to connect two 
separate bodies of research: on the one hand, research into 
narrative in legal settings; on the other, research on the role and 
production of remorse in such settings. Both audiences may find 
things of value in my account of these practices: those concerned 
with ‘signs of remorse’ (Tombs and Jagger 2006) may come to 
appreciate the interactional and narrative complexities of ‘doing 
remorse’ in courtroom contexts; those concentrating on the in-
court production of stories and facts may appreciate the centrality 
not only of legal modes of story-telling, but their relationship 
with moral modes of interrogation (see e.g. Jackson 1988, 1990). 
Taken together, these two chapters demonstrate and contrast 
the performativities of statistical modelling of sentencing 
practices (Chapter 3) and those accompanying a more verbally 
mediated emphasis on account-giving and narrative (Chapter 4). 
However, these two modes of collaborating with these legal 
realities do not exhaust our possibilities; indeed, once I ventured 
‘backstage’ and delved into files and started to trace ‘file-work’, a 
phonocentric emphasis on the spoken word made way for an 
appreciation of largely silent and protracted instances of ‘file-
work’. Chapter 5: Visualizing Cases is rooted in yet another mode of 
collaboration with the practices at hand. Grounded in 
observations of backstage file-work, this chapter has called 
attention to the material texture and social distribution of judicial 
work practices and the implication of the case file in coordinating 
and distributing clerical and judicial visualizations. In that sense 
this chapter is also a meditation on the role played by objects, and 
the strange and shifty part they play in our relationship with the 
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world. Objects, Heidegger (1962) suggests, have a tendency to 
withdraw from us when they are implied in ongoing action; that 
is, when they are ready-to-hand [Zuhanden]. Moments of such 
naturally occurring ‘infrastructural inversions’ (Bowker 1994; see 
also Star 1999) do not rarely represent ruptures in every-day work 
practices. They are moments when the tools of one’s trade 
become not an object implied in action, but objects of 
contemplation: not only did judges reflect on the affordances of 
the paper versus the digital file viewer, however; implied in that 
reflection was also a recognition of their dependency on clerk’s 
brief and to-the-point summaries. This chapter has also 
demonstrated the conceptual limitations of both cognitivist and 
‘perspectivist’ understandings of judicial work practices, as both 
judicial ‘thinking’ and ‘seeing the case clearly’ are by no means 
wholly individual nor purely mental practices. Visualization of the 
case, I have shown, is a distributed and materially mediated 
practice involving the affordances and limitations of both paper 
and digital files. The ‘internal point of view’, in so far as one 
wishes to speak about it, is better grasped not as one point, nor 
does it involve an unmediated view but rather distributed, 
networked, and mediated practices of visualization. 
Chapter 6: Folding Time, Doing Truths took up the case file not as 
a material, but as a temporal, ‘folded object’ (M’charek 2014). It 
has paid attention not to ‘Law’s’ supposed timeless being, but 
rather to the vernacular and multiple ways times are enacted as a 
matter of legal practice. The event of the offense, the time of 
procedure, the time and space of future-oriented production of 
evidence, the retroactive reading of documents to retrieve, from 
them, a sense of these times and places lost, all this taking place, 
again, within the pacing introduced by statutes of limitations and 
the fallibilities of human memory: these are the temporal 
ingredients of making a decision in the here-and-now about the 
there-and-then. The timelessness of abstracted ‘Law’ - in which 
Law is only ‘found’, never ‘made’ (Latour 2010) - contrasts with 
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these multiple ways of sorting, ordering, and folding time: in fact, 
it may be predicated upon it. After all, there can be no event - no 
cut, no rupture between past and future - without these many 
ways of doing process/procedure. In a way, this is also a way of 
speaking about the relation between the legal archive - precedent, 
rules, and case-specific communications - and the decision. The 
archive, Derrida (1995) suggests, can be thought of as a site of 
the command and of the commencement, or in more familiar 
terms: of a rule and a beginning. As such they are flexible, 
moving horizons (Scheffer 2010: 45) to everyday judicial 
practices. Folding an event, as the beginnings of a ‘case’, into the 
circuitry of legal practices is an archival practice, much like the 
decision is itself a mode of making a relation between the case 
and legal rule. This chapter has zoomed in especially on the doing 
- enacting - of procedure and its crucial role in the doing of ‘the 
Law’.  
Looking back, it is evident that my journeying has yielded 
distinct chapters. Staying on the move, moving from different 
epistemic positions vis-à-vis legal practices, has meant that these 
different chapters all make contributions to different bodies of 
research, and are grounded in different modes of collaboration 
and methods with sociological and legal realities. The first is an 
account of the performativities of a survey-format; the second 
concentrated on the morally dense interactions in Court; and the 
following two chapters concentrated on the material and 
temporal recalcitrances of legal case files. These chapters place 
different interventions in different bodies of literature: in 
examinations of the performativities of social-scientific 
measurement (Chapter 3), in elaborations of the role of narrative 
and remorse in legal settings (Chapter 4), in accounts of the 
materiality of legal work specifically, and work practices more 
generally (Chapter 5), and theorizing regarding truth-telling, time 
and procedure in legal settings (Chapter 6). These different 
chapters are in turn rooted in specific and varying kinds of 
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collaborations with realities, e.g. reading peer-reviewed articles, in 
correspondence, in gathering newspaper clippings, in talking with 
judges, in transcribing courtroom proceedings, in observations of 
backstage file-work, and in struggles with the case files 
themselves. Methodologically, each chapter similarly makes a 
contribution to our understanding of both sociological and 
judicial ways of case-making. Chapter 3: Dealing with Difference 
enquires into the making of an ‘external point of view’ upon the 
Law, and pays specific attention to both affordances and 
limitations of such a statistically mediated perspective. Chapter 4: 
Situating Remorse is suggestive of what a concentration on verbal 
interactions in court and a method of pre- and post-trial informal 
conversation helps to render visible - and what it fails to address. 
Chapter 5: Visualizing Cases is as much a reflection on backstage 
practices of case-making as it is a demonstration of how ‘access’ 
to these backstage practices significantly rearticulates just how we 
collaborate with legal practice. It also draws attention to that 
mundane object of legal work: the case file. Chapter 6: Folding 
Times, Doing Truths offers a methodological discussion of the 
fraught collaborations with case files and is suggestive of 
challenges facing researchers in bureaucracies more generally. 
Drawing on judges’, prosecutors’ and lawyers’ selective 
mobilization of the case file’s histories of production, it develops 
a forensic sensibility with regards to organizational documents: an 
approach that focuses not on what documents mean or signify, 
but rather on their trajectories through bureaucratic networks and 
their moments of production and mobilization.  
Letting go of the demand that description be pure, letting go 
of a perspectivism blind to mediation, this book has sought to 
stay with the troubling presence of both social-scientific enactments 
of reality and of epistemic work in legal practices. Such an effort 
has required methodological agility and has emphasized the 
finding of paths over the stability of established and rather static 
‘points of view’. Indeed, in contrast with approaches that 
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emphasize stable and static epistemic situations - one method, 
one theory, one well-defined object of study - I have sought to 
expunge from my account neither the fact of journeying itself nor 
the multiplicities my concrete collaborations with legal practices 
have yielded. As such the chapters also speak to different 
audiences and may generate different kinds of publics. Of course, 
I am not in control of either my readership’s reactions, or of this 
book’s travels and implication in the formation of publics. Yet I 
do want to venture a series of speculations grounded in the 
specific contributions of each individual empirical chapters.  
3 Speculating upon Multiple Publics: Taking up the 
 Separate Chapters 
Taking up Difference 
Chapter 3: Dealing with Difference has been an attempt at both 
diplomacy and accountability. It seeks to create not harmony, but 
some understanding between practising jurists and social-
scientific observers - and it does so by providing an account of 
the specific realities enacted in statistical research of legal 
practices. It has zoomed in on the question of discrimination and 
its measurement, warning specifically against the expectation that 
criminal law can and should combat institutional and structural 
racisms. As it furthermore treats the ‘head of the judge’ as the 
locus of discriminatory stereotypes - conscious or unconscious - 
this kind of approach may yield counterproductive results when, 
as is often suggested, judges are made to be aware of these 
unconscious biases. For instance, it has been pointed out that 
efforts to train people to reflect on their unconscious biases, it 
seems, not infrequently have the precisely opposite effect of 
validating bias (Duguid and Thomas-Hunt 2015). Sentencing 
guidelines introduced in most notably the United States, similarly 
introduced to combat the hold of unconscious bias upon judicial 
discretion, similarly have had mixed results. It seems minimum 
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sentences in particular have the tendency to drive up disparities in 
outcomes (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012). In the Dutch 
context, then, the recently introduced rule barring judges from 
deciding on community service for offenders with similar 
recidivism in the past five years is perhaps a more immediate 
target for those concerned with inequalities in sentencing 
outcomes. Furthermore, taking away discretion at the level of the 
judiciary may also shift that use of discretion to ‘lower’ levels in 
the criminal justice chain - where decisions and actions are not 
necessarily object of explicit review procedures as are in place 
within the judiciary (i.e. appellate courts) (Heaney 1991). In the 
Dutch context, I am thinking here specifically of the fact that 
increasing amounts of cases are diverted to public prosecutors, 
who are able to offer defendants a ‘transaction’ - hence cutting 
the costs of having these defendants appear in court. In essence, 
this is a kind of plea-bargaining; and plea-bargaining, may mitigate 
ethnic inequalities in sentencing duration or severity (because 
defendants are offered typically lower ‘transactions’ than the 
punishment they risk in court) - however, as these transactions 
are included in people’s criminal records, these are also included 
in routine background checks employers may run on prospective 
employees. As such the question remains whether such a 
developments may not inadvertently and cumulatively harm those 
with the least (legal) resources at their disposal. Similarly, 
proposals to cut publicly funded legal assistance might endanger 
precisely the socially and economically vulnerable. It seems to me 
that, without a concern for the relations between practices of crime 
control and the problematization of certain individuals and 
populations; without attention paid to the intersections between 
social, economic, political, and legal forms of marginalization; 
without considerations of individuals’ differential levels of access 
and differential resources, an approach that locates the problem 
of the social reproduction of inequalities in judges’ unconscious 
biases represents a significant and, in my view, unacceptable 
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narrowing down of the both epistemological and political 
problems surrounding equal treatment.  
In any case, both legal practices and the victims of racism 
deserve more sustained attention to how and where differences 
start to make a difference. Such a recognition opens up inquiry 
not only - as I have shown - into concrete legal practices of case-
making, but also into the very different sites and settings where 
racial differences are made and how these achieve plausibility and 
salience (see in particular M’charek 2013). In such examinations 
of ‘race-making’ the role of ‘science’, even that of the social 
sciences, cannot be glossed over. Sociological research routinely 
works with the fact-fiction of the ‘population group’. Precisely to 
what extent sociologists are happy to perpetuate - even if only 
‘instrumentally’, even if only to measure different ‘outcomes’ - 
this conception of a population quite naturally falling apart in 
groups (sharing blood, soil, or culture) is a question that needs to 
be addressed sooner rather than later (van Reekum 2016). Key to 
sociology’s public relevance, I argue, is the willingness to critically 
interrogate its own fact-fictions. The notion of the population 
group and the work it does in reifying and solidifying cultural or 
ethnic differences would, I think, be a necessary step in that 
attempt. Can and should we do perhaps without? Yet how can we 
continue to address issues of unequal treatment while 
simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls of reification?  
Remorse and Rehabilitation 
Chapter 4: Situating Remorse again raises a set of important 
questions about the desirability of judging remorse by placing 
different evaluations of ‘remorse’ within the fraught context of 
the courtroom and within three typified whole-case narratives. 
That is, if certain people may have difficulties negotiating the 
interactional dilemma’s accompanying the court’s both legal and 
moral purposes, is it desirable to make such distinctions at all? 
Some have argued that the evaluation of defendants’ 
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remorsefulness is a questionable business fraught with the 
potential of miscommunication (Ward 2006; de Haan and 
Hielkema 2005). With regards to specific typification practices, 
we could wonder whether the differential evaluations of 
remorsefulness in cases of public assault and domestic violence 
may end up doing disproportionate harm to not only the victim 
of domestic violence, but also to those typically present in the 
domestic sphere as well, i.e. children. In other words: while the 
(often) female victim may not, in the words of one judge ‘be an 
angel herself’, we might start to address the question whether it is 
desirable that the demonstrations of remorse on the part of the 
(often male) perpetrators of domestic violence are deemed 
somewhat less necessary than in other (kinds of) cases. A similar 
gesture is possible in the case of drug-addicted defendants, whose 
remorsefulness is sidelined as empty promises and posturing: we 
may wonder how the pathologization of drug-addiction remains 
bound up with moral discourses about selfhood and 
responsibility, and whether this entanglement is politically 
desirable. 
The intricacies of demonstrating, perceiving, and evaluating 
remorse in legal settings remains a fruitful site for future research 
- especially, I should add, against a background of rivalling modes 
of responsibilization. Relying on the capacity of people to relate 
themselves morally to themselves, the emphasis on remorse 
highlighted here may be understood as a specific mode of 
responsibilization: of asking of individuals to negotiate a morally 
self-aware and self-reflexive relationship with themselves. Yet 
there are other ways to ‘responsibilize’ individuals, and fields like 
psychiatry and neuro-criminology seem to rearticulate just what it 
means to ‘take responsibility’. Dehue (2014) for instance shows 
how advances in the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD tend to 
be cast in a language of responsibilization. ADHD is not, in other 
words, something to be passively accepted about oneself, but 
something to be actively managed (through medication, for 
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instance). With recent advances in neuro-criminology, a similar 
move may be made when it is suggested, for instance, that 
criminal behaviour may be steered by the brain (or genes), so that 
the individual defendant is asked to take responsibility for their 
own brain or genes. Precisely how and where neurological and 
moral modes of ‘taking responsibility’ play out in legal settings 
remains to be seen; indeed, the frequent use of cognitive 
behavioural therapy presented as a way to manage stress, anger, 
and anxiety for certain types of offenders suggests that the two 
are folded into each other already. How the ‘soul’ (Foucault 1977) 
as a locus of intent and intervention is rearticulated against the 
background of these emerging expert knowledges, then, is an 
important avenue to explore.  
Decentring the Judge, Introducing Other Actors in the Process 
Chapter 5: Visualizing Cases demonstrated how judicial ‘thinking’ is 
a materially mediated and socially distributed accomplishment. In 
a way, judges’ dependency on clerical assistants contrasts sharply 
with juristic understandings of the autonomous and neutral judge. 
At the level of visualization - of the ordering of information, in 
the extraction of a case - judges are in a real sense dependent on 
clerks’ preparations, and they may not be entirely comfortable 
with that: hence the emphasis some of them place on ‘reading 
everything myself’. The tension between the demand of legal 
accountability, asking that the judge is responsible for the verdict 
reached, and actual work practice, in which the judge relies on 
files and clerks, is one that should be explored further. I am 
thinking here in particular about the careful negotiation of both 
legal demand and practical reality as they affect other practices of 
advising and informing the legal decision-making process. 
Important efforts here are those by Holvast (2014), who studies 
the role played by clerical assistants in legal practices. However, 
important efforts have also zoomed in on the role of scientific 
expertise and forensic evidence in legal settings (see especially 
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Jasanoff 1995; Lynch et al. 2008). Especially salient, in these 
encounters between scientific and legal modes of making 
knowledge, is the way legal actors deal with the fact that scientific 
knowledges or experts typically do not guarantee truth, but 
merely speak of probabilities. Where scientific experts are 
typically quite comfortable with a margin of error and with 
statistical uncertainties, judges typically need more than a high 
probability to sentence accordingly - after all, the evidence needs 
to be deemed both lawful and convincing [wettig en overtuigend]. At 
the same time, it seems that the judiciary is not always equipped 
to interpret scientific or statistical forms of evidence (Derksen 
2006). Against the background of this problematic, a recent pilot 
project involving clerks trained in forensic technique and 
measurement experimented with the introduction of clerks that 
would help judges understand forensic evidence (de Rechtspraak 
2014). Interestingly, the pilot had to draw not only a distinction 
between these ‘forensic employees’ and the category of the 
‘expert-witness’, but also between the clerks’ ‘own interpretation’ 
and practices of ‘assisting in understanding forensic evidence’ (de 
Rechtspraak 2014: 5). These distinctions represent, of course, 
boundary-work in action (Gieryn 1983) - and as such offer not 
only an opportunity to study what can concretely be done to 
equip judges in their dealing with the information ‘input’ of other 
actors. They also represent a moment in which conceptual and 
social distinctions are reproduced or challenged, e.g. the 
distinctions between the probabilities offered by science and the 
legal demand for certainty beyond reasonable doubt, the 
distinction between ‘mere fact’ and ‘interpretation’, the 
distinction between judge and expert. Precisely how and where 
boundaries between legal and scientific facts, expertise, and 
jurisdictions are drawn are fruitful sites of further research in line 
with this chapter’s attempt to ‘decentre the judge’.  
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Im/materialities of Work 
I also think Chapter 5 in particular offers judges a vocabulary 
with which to begin talking about their work-practices in terms 
not governed by a conception of ‘knowledge work’ as a cognitive, 
mental effort only. The importance of the humble materials of 
one’s trade may pale in comparison with the abstractions one 
serves - Justice, the Law - yet are not, for that reason, 
inconsequential or irrelevant. Recognizing the centrality of the 
paper case file in their practices may not only help judges to 
articulate opposition; it may also help to put into words just what 
they need a digital file viewer to do in order for them to do their 
work well. In addition, my emphasis on the affordances of paper 
files may also help the judiciary in anticipating troubles and 
challenges when other technologies of witnessing are increasingly 
included in judicial practices - particularly video-materials (see e.g. 
Lanzara 2009).  
Other publics, however, could be just as interested: if we 
accept the premise that knowledge work takes place within 
specific material infrastructures and have in that sense become 
more or less medium-specific, we may similarly find a language 
within which to negotiate a robust critique of organizational 
efforts that intervene in the media of everyday work practices. I 
am thinking of digitization projects more generally, but also a 
recent push towards open office plans - evident within some 
courts and the public sector more generally (including, too, 
universities). Framed as allowing a transparent atmosphere of 
collegial camaraderie and collaboration (or else as a measure to 
cut costs), these open office plans, researchers have suggested, 
tend to also increase stress- and distraction levels in ways that 
may significantly affect not only workers’ productivity, but their 
health and well-being in general (Baldry and Barnes 2012; 
Danielsson and Bodin 2008). Additionally, the fact that 
disruptions in the media and infrastructures of work are often 
intimately bound up with budgetary concerns suggests, too, that it 
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might be necessary to start to connect this discussion of 
materiality to the word’s Marxist history. To put it rather 
provocatively, speculatively: working within a public sector 
modelling itself after the competitive demands of private 
industry, within office buildings that function less as sites for 
intellectual work than as instruments of rent-seeking, within 
offices that emphasize flow, transparency and immediation 
(Mazzarella 2006), we might want to start drawing connections 
once again between the two intellectual histories of the concept 
of materiality. Woolf, after all, had it quite right when she 
suggested that if women are to write - and let’s include men here 
as well - they need both ‘money and a room of one’s own’ (1929: 
1). How and where ‘money and rooms’ shape what kind of 
material and immaterial laboring needs to be explored further.1  
Studying Bureaucratic Action-at-a-Distance 
Together with Chapter 5: Visualizing Cases, Chapter 6: Folding Times, 
Doing Truths, has taken up the challenge of studying the use, 
production, and circulation of documents in legal practices. Both 
Chapters 5 and 6 are also efforts to move away from three 
dominant understandings of documents: the informational-
representational register (in which a document simply stands for 
the world it seeks to represent), the hermeneutic register (in 
which a document is primarily understood as a reflection of an 
author’s intentions) or interpretative register (in which documents 
function as signs of broader world views or discourses). Both 
Chapters 5 and 6 are efforts to treat the representational, truth-
telling value of documents as a both pre-trial and on-trial 
accomplishment and not a given. Both Chapters 5 and 6 have eye 
for the limitations of treating documents as containers of 
information: Chapter 5 emphasizes the case file’s non-textual 
affordances, while Chapter 6 concentrates partially on its absently 
present histories and their mobilization in the court session. 
Neither Chapter 5 nor 6 read these documents primarily as 
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reflections of either authorial intent or as a sign of broader 
cultural, political, or social logics; instead, such concerns are only 
addressed if and when legal actors themselves evoke these. Think, 
for instance, of the evocation of ‘how police officials write these 
things down’, or the suggestion that the public prosecutor has 
failed to exercise ‘due diligence’: these moments represent, if you 
will, local hermeneutic moments. Yet such hermeneutic readings 
do not exhaust the case file’s uses (and, of course, its 
recalcitrances). 
It is in this sense that especially Chapter 6: Folding Times, Doing 
Truths represents an alternative mode of engaging with 
documents and their use in practices. I have referred to this mode 
of engagement as forensic. It treats the document not primarily as a 
sign of something else (worldviews, authorial intent, cultural logics, 
etc.) but rather as a clue to yet other practices, yet other sites, yet 
other offices. It is also a pragmatic and casuistic sensibility: it 
emphasises this particular case, this particular truth (Valverde 
2008), and in that sense helps to defer unwarranted totalization, 
purification, and abstraction. It is a sensibility I learned to adopt 
in the field, as legal actors engage themselves with questions 
about the documents’ trajectories and more or less immediately 
present histories. This forensic sensibility is especially helpful, I 
think, to those studying bureaucratic practices more generally. 
Bureaucracies, we know since Weber (1978 [1922]), are sites of 
distribution, fragmentation, even extensification: of cutting up 
tasks, of distributing accountability, of rendering replaceable 
human actors and of relying extensively on the non-human 
mediators of bureaucratic power: case files, archives, registration 
systems, etc. In other words, bureaucratic sites depend on the 
building of long and fragile chains so that action-at-a-distance 
may take place. As such they represent unique challenges to 
ethnographers (or praxiographers, for that matter), who tend to 
have to accept the boundaries of a self-defined ‘field’ - e.g. ‘the 
Court’ - and all too often lack the time and resources to follow all 
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these bureaucratic linkages, to speak to everyone engaged in case-
making, to trace a case from event to decision. This problem, of 
course, is one researchers share with judges: for them, too, the local 
epistemic problem is that they ‘were not there when it happened’ 
and that they were not there for all the little steps in the 
investigatory procedure. That is, they are dependent on their files. 
Subjecting their files to forensic readings, judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors are able to reconstruct decisions and routines - in 
other words, to use the document as a clue. If we are interested in 
apprehending this bureaucratic action-at-a-distance, this forensic 
sensibility with regards to documents promises an understanding 
of the distributed, temporal, and unfolding character of the unit 
of all this bureaucratic action: the case itself.  
4 Retaining Multiplicity, Deferring Totalization: Towards 
a Sociology of Hyper-Objects 
Although the preceding chapters are all rooted in the same 
pragmatic respecification of both description and ‘the Law’, these 
disparate chapters yield multiple realities, demonstrating how ‘the 
Law’ is enacted as a distribution machine, a both legal and moral 
being, a file-bound and rule-oriented practice, and a practice of 
making times and doing truth. To get to this multiplicity, I have 
moved from one epistemic situation to the next and to the next 
again; mine has been an ambulatory approach that never forgets 
that it moves across a terrain rather than glides across a 
frictionless plane. Conceptually, I have moved away from a 
purified understanding of the Law and Science towards an 
appreciation of the impure, the troublesome, and the hybrid. I 
have moved away from a conception of description as 
unproblematic mirroring of the world towards a more 
performative and mediated understanding of knowledge making. 
I have also collaborated with the things designated as ‘legal’ in 
many different ways, and in so doing have produced ‘the Law’ in 
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many different ways. For instance, with a sociological, cross-
sectional ‘view’ of the Law we lose all sense of legality at all, even 
though we may be happy to see many cases at once - or at least, 
the ‘factors’ of which they are composed and the outputs they 
yield. In the emphasis on the processes taking place in the 
quintessentially legal courtroom we encounter morals; the 
distinction between legal culpability and moral responsibility 
continually at stake. Judicial visualizations of the case prove 
reliant upon social and material infrastructures and bear witness 
to the entanglement of cognition and matter, minds and things. 
Last, with legal procedure, often branded so specifically legal, 
comes simultaneously the question of facts, truths, and the 
relationship between documentary as well as ‘actual’ realities. 
There are real multiplicities here, and facing that multiplicity it is 
tempting to ask just how they can be brought together once 
more.  
Bringing together multiplicities, Mol (2002) shows, is often 
effectuated with reference to a singular reality. Different ways to 
measure or diagnose a disease can, for instance, be calibrated and 
compared against each other in reference to a real, biological 
reality. Many scientific efforts do precisely this: which 
measurement comes closest to what we assume is an underlying, 
singular real? In the study of the Law, we have seen such an 
effort before. We have encountered it in appeals to ‘Law’s truth’, 
presumed to be hostile to description itself and only 
apprehensible in reference to a basic norm. Characterizing this 
mode of asking questions about multiplicity is that they presume 
the existence of an underlying, singular reality: in Mol’s case, the 
assumption made is that all measurements of disease refer back to 
a singular disease (Mol 2002). In my case, it has been the 
assumption that accounts of legal practices all refer back to that 
one true thing: the Law. This desire for hierarchization and 
ordering, then, is a question that tends to erect, once again, a 
‘real’ thing that precedes and transcends actual occasions of 
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collaboration and experimentation. Giving in to this tempting 
gesture, we might wonder how the four realities enacted in this 
book can be ordered. Which one is more accurate? Which one 
approaches the Law best? As such, singularization is also a 
gesture that desires both closure and totalization: when all is said 
and done, this or that is what the Law actually is. In that sense, it is 
a question that wants, again, a hyper-explanation (Dupret et al. 
2015): something definite, essential, and final about the object of 
study.  
In these last pages, I will not provide you with such a definite 
answer and produce a stop to these debates. After all, I am not in 
the business of writing arrêts. In fact, I will do the opposite. 
Instead of proposing an abstraction that captures something pure 
about the Law, I will hand you one that suspects totalization, 
defers finalization, and as such allows multiplicities to persist - in 
other words, a word that asks you to please go on. This is the 
notion of the hyper-object.  
Sociologies of the Hyper-Object: From Climate Change … 
Inspiration is found in unlikely places. I found mine in Morton’s 
Hyper-Objects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (2013), 
in which he sets out to understand the unique problems the 
object of climate change poses to human observers. A brief 
discussion is necessary here, for it is in this example - global 
warming - that we can detect ways to do justice to ‘the Law’ 
without, crucially, suggesting that we can ever have the last word 
about it.  
Global warming, Morton argues, is a thing so vast and 
complex that it challenges the way we tend to think about objects 
more generally: that is, the conception that objects are ‘out there’, 
that we can feasibly situate ourselves in an external position vis-à-
vis their objective reality, and that they have a stable existence 
across and within space and time. Hyper-objects such as climate 
change, however, defy such habits of thought. There is a mystery 
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to them we fail to grasp, however hard we might try: ‘The more 
data we have about hyper-objects the less we know about them - 
the more we realize we can never truly know them’ (Morton 2013: 
180). Global warming is so vast a thing that it encompasses us, 
making impossible a relation of (epistemic, political, ethical) 
exteriority: we are never quite outside of them. Hyper-objects like 
global warming, Morton argues, are also ‘molten’ and ‘non-local’. 
They exist not ‘in’ time and space but ‘emit’ these: they recon, 
shape, direct and disrupt flows of time and shapes of space. 
These material and temporal forms of mattering, to adopt a 
phrase from Barad (2003), are multiscalar, ‘phased’ and non-local: 
it is as if hyper-objects occupy a wholly different plane of reality 
than us mere mortals. These high dimensional phases are, 
Morton (2013) suggests, not directly available to human 
perception. Its multiple forms of temporalization - of natural 
cycles, of the durée of change over millennia - contrast with 
modes of doing time more familiar to us (e.g. a human life, a 
calendar year, a day). Climate change is non-local in that there is 
always something more to it than local manifestations. A rise in 
average temperatures or a rise in sea levels do not begin to 
account for the full complexities of global warming. Climate 
change also messes with the categories of causality and scale we 
are used to: ‘tiny’ events may have ‘large’ consequences. And 
human beings may not always be able to make differences and to 
act successfully in the face of this hyper-object: yes, we play a 
role, but climate change is also an inter-objective process, shaped 
by relations between ice, sun, oceans, vegetation, etc. With the 
impossibility of taking up a relation of exteriority comes also the 
impossibility of ever seeing them ‘in full’ or directly; instead, all 
we ever arrive at are glimpses of the traces it leaves: e.g. a rise in sea 
levels or average temperatures. This is the mystery of the climate 
change, and with that, of hyper-objects: they defy the possibility 
of looking at them ‘directly’ and seeing them ‘in full’. For that, we 
are far too limited and enveloped. Above all else, hyper-objects resist 
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hyper-explanation. There is no one ‘theory’ of climate change: 
climate change is itself far too distributed, multi-scalar, and 
phased to allow such singularization.  
… to the Law 
The kind of conception of legal practices I have been working 
towards will surely start to resonate with this conception of the 
hyper-object. Let’s start with the issue of multiplicity. Like climate 
change, ‘the Law’ is not one thing upon which one may have 
different perspectives. It is multiple: depending on our 
collaborations with it, it does not so much shift in appearance as 
change entirely. From a distribution machine, to a morally dense 
narrative practice, to a practice of paper-shuffling, to folding 
multiple temporalities: these are but four of the ‘beings’ of the 
Law, and by no means the only ones. None of these can lay claim 
to capturing the Law in its totality, but none of these are entirely 
divorced from its machinations either. What we have 
encountered along the way are glimpses of the traces ‘the Law’ 
leaves on bodies ordered, on words spoken and written, on time 
folded and refolded. Situated glimpses, mediated glimpses, but 
also glimpses that deny us a view onto the totality of ‘the Law’. 
Hyper-objects are also non-local: there is always something more 
than only the here-and-now of local enactments. Something 
escapes the here-and-now. This, too, is a dimension of ‘the Law’ 
in my account: every chapter created aporias, every chapter as 
such set the stage for another line of escape: there are always yet 
other offices, other doors to enter. That ‘the Law’ is both ‘here’ 
and ‘elsewhere’ is, for Deleuze and Guattari (1986), a sign not of 
the Law’s fictional, perhaps even transcendent character, but 
rather of its serial and contiguous character. If ‘the Law’ only 
provides glimpses, if in other words it hides, Deleuze and Guattari 
write, that is only an effect of it always partially taking place ‘in 
the office next door, or behind the door, on to infinity’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986: 45).  
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Like the hyper-object climate change, ‘the Law’ also shapes 
and reconfigures - ‘emits’ - time in many different ways. We have 
encountered not only the time of procedure, the time of events, 
the time of production and use of its artefacts, but there is also 
the image of a timeless Law that knows no beginning or end. The 
Law is a ‘phasing’ thing: time ‘percolates’ (Latour and Serres 
1995) in legal practices. Procedure allows for periodization, times 
and spaces are rendered absently present, there-and-thens 
become available in the here-and-nows of the court session so 
that - once all is said and done - a lasting, impersonal judgment, 
as if out of nowhere, can strike the accused. How are these ways 
of making and taking time related? I would venture the suspicion, 
here, that both the ‘Law’ as a folder of times and the Law’s 
placement outside of history are related: perhaps the image of 
ahistorical Law functions precisely as a way to ‘align its gears and 
make them function together with “perfect synchronicity”’ 
Latour and Serres 1995: 43). Syn-chronicity: the coming together in 
time - or of times? Indeed, if there is one way this book has made 
a contribution to situating Law’s claim to transcendence - to 
tracing how an appeal to transcendence ‘aligns gears and makes 
things function together’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 43) - it has 
been in its attention to the tension between the making and doing 
of multiple temporalities in legal practices, and Law’s paradoxical 
placement outside of chronological time. This is my suggestion: it 
is that timeless, transcendent ‘Law’ is precisely an effect of the very 
different ways of folding, sorting and ordering times. These 
practices of phasing, of ‘emitting’ time, are not an expression of 
‘the Law’; timeless ‘Law’ is their effect.  
The Law, finally, is both inter-subjective and inter-objective: it 
relies not solely on inter-subjective agreements between human 
actors (as a conception of the Law as a culture or institutions 
would have it) but on written reports, post-it notes, files, folders, 
staples, digital programs, law books, case files, desks, chairs, 
computers … These are the infrastructure of legal memory and of 
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legal action. The case file in particular is testament to the traces the 
hyper-object ‘Law’ leaves, its preferred trace being, of course, the 
signature. Referring back to its human authorizer and the mandate 
of impersonal (non-human) ‘Law’, the signature is the objective-
subjective nexus around which the legal machinery turns. 
Adopting the productive fiction of the hyper-object, we face a 
Law that is a many-scaled thing, parts of it too big to fully see, 
other parts immediately available, a thing that has no centre nor 
definite boundaries, a distributed and tentacular thing (ten Bos 
2015). It is also too big, or rather too multi-scalar, to ever ‘see in 
full’: there is no ‘outside’ of the Law, just like it has no ‘inside’. 
Instead, we can only hope to move through it and capture some 
of the traces it leaves. As such, the notion of the hyper-object 
makes hyper-explanation impossible, and does not hold out the 
promise of unmediated vision of totalities. It only asks us to 
consider opening yet another door, finding yet another burrow, 
another escape.  
5 Joseph K.’s Murder: A Note on Life and Death 
Nearing the end of this book I have but one (for now) last thread 
to follow up on. These concerns are related to the end of The Trial: 
the scene in which Joseph K is killed ‘like a dog’ at the hands of 
two shady representatives of the Law. While I have highlighted 
the differences between the ‘man from the countryside’, stuck in 
contemplation, and Joseph K.’s frantic travails, this ending of 
The Trial seems to collapse the distinction between the man from 
the countryside and Joseph K. After all, they both die.  
These two deaths seem to call into doubt my suggestion that it 
matters how, where and when we collaborate with things 
qualified as legal. I have insisted that we cannot ‘arrive at truth’ 
without departing and travelling roads. And in making ourselves 
ambulatory, we arrive at different truths and enact different 
realities depending on the tools we use and the situations in 
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which we find ourselves. This ambulatory attitude contrasts with 
the man from the country side’s contemplative approach. While 
static contemplation yields sterile abstractions, tautology, or 
reduction, Joseph K. teaches us that ambulatory action, by 
contrast, yields multiplicity, specificity, and concreteness. 
Different collaborations, in turn, yield multiple truths and 
realities. In other words: you must always travel roads - to pass 
meta hodoi - to make knowledge, and which roads you take will 
always matter to the realities produced.  
Yet irrespective of whether they prefer to contemplate or 
investigate, both the man from the countryside and Joseph K. 
meet their deaths. Is this, then, perhaps the Law’s final truth? 
That it does not matter what we do, for death awaits us in the 
end? In this interpretation, there is something vampiric about the 
Law: both deaths function as symptoms of Law’s timelessness, its 
immortality perhaps: ‘for in the exercise of violence over life and 
death more than in any other legal act’, Benjamin writes, ‘Law 
reaffirms itself’ (1978 [1921]: 286). Is this, perhaps, Law’s final 
and foundational capital-T Truth? Is its deathly grip on life itself, 
to speak with Benjamin (id.: 286), at its ‘rotten’ core?  
In essence, this is an interpretation that highlights the 
relationship between the Law, life, and violence. Benjamin (1978 
[1921]) especially zooms in on this aspect of the Law. The Law’s 
violence, Benjamin writes, is mythical: it does not express a will, 
neither a command, nor a project or plan, but first of all existence 
of the Law itself (id.: 294). Agamben’s elaboration on sovereignty 
and the Law displays a similar insistence on the relationship 
between violence and the Law: the sovereign, in a precise mirror 
image of ‘bare life’, stands both within and outside of the Law: 
within it, as ostensibly constrained by its imperatives, and outside 
it, as that body which is capable of suspending the Law itself in a 
state of exception (Agamben 1995). Investing bureaucracy with a 
similar violent capacity, Graeber (2015) suggests that those 
studying bureaucracy should not close their eyes for the fact that, 
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at the end of the day, bureaucracies rely on the legitimate 
mobilization of ‘men with guns’. Command theories in legal 
scholarship similarly seek behind the force of Law a ‘gunman’: 
Austin (1995 [1832]) notoriously suggests that Law consists 
fundamentally in the command of the sovereign, backed up by 
sanctions. Indeed, my approach to legal practices has been largely 
silent about this crucial operation of the Law: an operation 
Deleuze and Guattari (1986) define as simply the capacity to keep 
you from going about your own business. Rendering bodies in motion 
static: this is what the Law does, and this is what it grasped at with 
recourse to an emphasis on violence and sovereignty. Is this, 
then, the final truth I have failed to capture? A truth of violence, 
death and confinement? A truth of violence against life as such?  
I would argue, first, that to equal the Law with violence is a 
problematic gesture precisely because it is a way to purify our 
accounts once more: to distinguish between the mess and 
machinery of concrete practices and their guiding logos. In doing 
so we gloss over not only the concrete ‘remainder of things’ so 
crucial to this book - legal practices of truth-making, for instance 
- but may also end up mistaking the effects of ‘the Law’ for their 
foundational truth. Could the relation between ‘the Law’ and 
death not be drawn, however, in the other direction? Perhaps ‘the 
Law’s’ power over life and death is only a transcendent-seeming 
effect of a whole machinery of moving parts. In the words of Deleuze 
and Guattari: ‘the divisions of oppressor and oppressed, 
repressors and repressed, flow out of each state of the machine, 
and not vice versa’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 56-57). As death 
or confinement ‘flow out of’ this machine, they do not in and of 
themselves explain much about its machinations. Indeed, I think 
my sustained attention to the technicalities of ‘the force of Law’ - 
e.g. practices of police investigation, of producing, using, and 
circulating that which incriminates, of judgment and decision - 
speak precisely to the question as to how sovereignty and 
violence are done, drawing attention to ‘the Law’s’ concrete, 
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perhaps even banal, being. And as we know, it is only with an 
emphasis on banality that we become able to truly understand the 
affective texture of this compromised, bureaucratized world we 
live in (Cf. Arendt 1963). With that, this emphasis on concrete, 
moving parts that go into producing the effect of abstract ‘force’ 
or ‘power’ is perhaps better suited to come to an appreciation of 
our responsibilities within these worlds.  
Indeed, a second thing to consider in light of Benjamin’s 
emphasis (1978 [1921]) on the inevitability of violence in Law-
making and Law-positing is, crucially, what we want our accounts 
of this strange, seemingly interminable machinery of moving 
parts to be able to do. Even if death and violence are Law’s most 
fundamental truths, may we not want to refuse to build 
abstractions in their names? The problem, I think, is related to 
the cynicism that is our dominant affective response to hyper-
objects. Given their sheer size and scale (or multiple scales), 
hyper-objects not rarely inspire fatigue, complacence, or cynicism: 
after all, we are far too small to make a difference. Indeed, scaled-up 
analyses of the Law as an instrument of bourgeois, patriarchical, 
or neo-colonial powers not rarely inspire a similar kind of fatigue: 
for how might we hope to make a change for the better? For 
William James (1911: 226), this tired complacency is paradoxically 
also the precondition for us to be able to take a ‘moral holiday’. 
In this case, this moral holiday would look like a few days off in 
which we learn not to worry about the Law, waiting perhaps for 
Benjaminian divine violence to bring the Law, violence, suffering, 
to an end (Benjamin 1978 [1921]). In the meantime, we might as 
well lean back and enjoy the view. 
This attitude strikes me as wholly unsatisfactory. Only the 
most hardened cynic maintains that nothing matters for death 
awaits us all. Precisely because death gets us all in the end almost 
everything matters almost all of the time. Even if death and stasis 
are the keys to unlock Law’s mystery, we nevertheless have 
concrete living to do, concrete paths to seek out, concrete hurdles 
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to take. And this is where I think our primary ethico-political 
imperative comes in as researchers, that is as those charged with 
making knowledge. This imperative, in my view, is the demand 
that the moves we make, the abstractions we fabricate, and the 
accounts we give, serve the living (Schinkel 2014).  
While the Law’s deathly, rotten core may (or may not) be one 
fact, then so are our lives. And this, again, is why the hyper-object 
is a productive fiction: it accepts grand-theoretical failure and 
precisely in doing so makes us cling on to real things, concrete 
things, for dear life. It does not expunge all mysticism from life - 
for there is a mystery to the Law, but not a mystery that is ‘hidden 
by its transcendence’, but one that exists simply because there is 
always something in ‘the office next door, or behind the door, on 
to infinity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). This political and 
affective sensibility, which I can only characterize as stubbornly 
optimistic, only asks where transcendence is done, how mysticism 
is sustained, how abstractions are made and mobilized, and then 
goes on to wonder how such abstractions sustain what kinds of 
living. A sociology of hyper-objects, in my view, is a sociology for 
the living: it finds its impetus, its jurisdiction, its telos not in the 
realm of purification, contemplation and finalization, but in the 
only task we really share: that of living-with. Living with what, 
whom, how and when? Now, that’s a start. Please go on. 
NOTE
 
1 I might add to both ‘money and rooms’ a third infrastructure of value-
generation: the female body itself and the practices of caring for life so often 
delegated to the realm of the immaterial - mothering and caring practices 
that are ostensibly highly valued, of course, but remunerated badly. The 
relationship between material and immaterial labour in relation to both the 
physical environment and the virtuality of capital is too brief to explore here, 
yet it is worthwhile to point out that no Marxist understanding of 
production is adequate if it fails to include a concern with reproduction. See, 
for that last point, in particular Federici (2004).  
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Summary 
A Controversy 
In March 2012, a study into sentencing disparities shocks the 
Dutch Judiciary. Three researchers of the University of Leiden 
have demonstrated that defendants’ ‘foreign’ or Dutch 
‘appearance’, as well as their capacity to speak Dutch, influence 
judges’ sentencing decisions: defendants who both ‘appear 
foreign’ and who do not speak Dutch are more likely to be 
sentenced with a prison sentence that those who both ‘appear’ 
and speak Dutch (Wermink, de Keijser and Schuyt 2012a). 
Several actors in both politics and media seem to have made up 
their minds: the judiciary may promise to treat like cases alike, yet 
the data clearly suggest that the members of the judiciary are at 
least somewhat affected by discriminatory stereotypes. The three 
researchers suggest that the study’s results may be explained with 
reference to unconscious biases on the part of these judges. 
Judges themselves, however, are rather piqued. Two judges reply 
to the study’s findings in the Dutch Jurist’s Magazine, where they 
wonder whether the researchers have ‘any idea’ as to how judges 
decide on actual cases. The judges who I am to meet later on in 
my fieldwork similarly feel misunderstood, and for them too it is 
clear the researchers seem to lack sufficient insight into their 
every-day work. For the judges, a lot is at stake: not simply their 
professional pride, but also an essentially different conception of 
their own practices. Can we, as social scientific observers, do 
justice to these different conceptions? 
This controversy has been the start to a both theoretical and 
empirical journey. This journey was led by three central questions: 
What do these every-day practices of judging look like anyway? 
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How do judges deal with cases, that is: how do they evaluate 
evidence, construct or deconstruct different story-lines, how do 
they come to ‘see’ the case? And what do social scientific 
observers see and not see when they try to describe, understand 
and explain these practices, and how do their methodological 
choices and theoretical assumptions shape their conception of 
these practices? Third, what do I do when I try to research and 
describe these practices, that is: how do my own positionings, 
assumptions, and methodological choices affect the knowledge I 
produce? This book, then, is a reflexive study focused on 
different ways reality is apprehended in both the social sciences 
and criminal law. As such it focuses on different ways of case-
making.  
Conceptual Puzzles and a Pragmatic Respecification 
Upon closer examination the controversy just described raises 
both theoretical and empirical questions. In Chapter 1: 
Contemplating the Law I focus on the theoretical dimensions of this 
controversy by tracing how science and the law are distinguished 
from each other. After all, it is precisely this demarcation that is 
at stake in the controversy: on the one hand, judges feel judged 
(while scientists should only speak the truth) and emphasize their 
own unique knowledge of their practice and the cases they deal 
with (while scientists are usually the ones is charge of making 
knowledge). In this chapter I show how the distinctions between 
norm and fact, judgment and truth, are mobilized in order to be 
able to differentiate between ‘Law’ and ‘Science’. However, I also 
focus on the limitations of such exercises in demarcation. 
Because, although these demarcations may have some use, they 
do limit our capacity to do justice to the aforementioned 
controversy. After all, the limitations of these demarcation are 
evident in the controversy itself: on the one hand, social sciences 
speak of a reality judges do not recognize – they seem to do more 
than just provide the facts - and on the other, judges appeal to 
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their own knowledge of cases and practices of case-making - so 
that judges, too, are engaged in knowledge- and truth-making.  
In Chapter 2: A Guide for the Perplexed I offer conceptual tools to 
understand these two dimensions of the controversy. I call my 
intervention a pragmatic respecification, which is characterized by 
an emphasis on concrete practices. As the association of the 
norm with the law and fact with science are the product of 
exercises in abstraction, we will need an approach capable of 
addressing concrete practices of case-making, both in science as 
in law. Only then can social scientists remain accountable to the 
way they, by virtue of our methods and research designs, actively 
shape and delineate the world, and only then might they remain 
sensitive to the ways the defendants and the case are made 
known within legal practices. In this chapter I also explain why it 
is crucial to take objects into account, for instance, the 
measurement instruments social scientists use (surveys, 
observations, interviews) but also the instruments in the hands of 
the judges, especially the legal case file. These objects, much like 
our assumptions and cognitive capacities, are inextricable parts of 
our practices of case-making, and are consequential not only to 
our every-day work practices but to the very cases we are able to 
make. Of course, this emphasis on methods requires a reflexive 
approach to the methods I myself use in my fieldwork.  
Journeying 
Equipped with a sensitivity to concrete practices of case-making 
and the role played, in these practices, by instruments and 
objects, I can commence my journeying. In Chapter 3: Dealing with 
Difference: Doing Criminal Law and Social Order I return to the 
Leiden study once again in order to analyse the realities produced 
in this study. Crucially, the researchers draw on numerical and 
categorical data, so that legal cases are being treated as products 
of these case characteristics. Another effects of the methods used 
is that criminal law itself appears as an input and output system 
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that distributed punishment over different populations of 
defendants. These populations of defendants, be it the 
defendants with a foreign or a ‘native’ look, are a third salient 
effect of the researchers’ approach to these legal practices.  
In Chapter 4: Situating Remorse I take my first inquisitive steps 
among the criminal judges of a Dutch court and show that the 
realities produced by the Leiden study are quite different from 
the way judges conceive of cases. Drawing on observations of 
court cases and conversations with judges I show that judges do 
not understand cases as a collection of case-factors, but rather 
that they treat cases as stories. Nor is the defendant a bundle of 
fixed and given factors, but is rather a narrating person. In 
contrast with the sociological reality produced by the Leiden 
study, these practices do not assume the existence of populations. 
However, judges do see similarities between cases. They 
distinguish especially between more or less typical case narratives, 
like a typical ‘junkie’ charged with petty theft, a typical ‘angry 
young man’ charged with physical assault (often in public), and 
typical ‘explosive couples’, involving a man who is accused of 
domestic violence. These typical cases are characterized by typical 
story-lines that connect motive, character of the defendant, the 
punishable offense, and the circumstances of the offense. The 
extent to which the defendants show remorse, furthermore, is 
weighed differently in each of these three typical narratives: in the 
case of drug-addicted defendants, remorse is often taken as an 
empty promise (their addiction presumably being stronger than 
their resolutions); however, angry young men are very much 
expected to show remorse (they have to understand the gravity of 
what they have done); while, last, in the case of ‘explosive 
couples’ the female partner’s behaviour and character is weighed 
in the sentencing decision, and remorse on the part of the 
defendant is not always deemed necessary.  
Now, it is tempting to use these observations in court and 
conversations with judges in order to argue that these legal 
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practices are mostly about the spoken word and about story-
telling. While these practices certainly have a storied texture, we 
also know that methods have their consequences for the accounts 
we produce about practices. In Chapter 5: Visualizing Cases I show 
how observations of judicial practices ‘backstage’, in their offices, 
allow me to produce a rather different account or case. Backstage, 
it is rather quiet, and the defendant is absent. Only traces of other 
actors are present here, and they are present in the form of a legal 
case file. This chapter focuses on practices of file-work, and 
demonstrates how these work practices are instrumental in 
judges’ pre-trial attempts to ‘see the case clearly’. These file-work 
practices are shaped by and attuned to paper case files: both 
clerks and judges use paper, pen, pencil, stickers and post-its to 
order information and distinguish between signal and noise. No 
wonder, then, that the digitization of these case files over the 
summer of 2013 was cause for some consternation: all of a 
sudden, clerks and judges had to experiment with different ways 
to ‘visualize the case’! Paying careful attention to the way clerks 
and judges adapt their work practices to these digital files I ask 
for an appreciation of the materiality of ‘knowledge work’ in 
general, and of these judicial practices in particular. I also show 
how the professional boundaries between clerks and judges 
needed to be rearticulated as a result of digitization. Considered 
in this light, digitization is neither an unequivocal blessing nor a 
simple way to cut costs, but considerably impacts everyday work 
practices. 
In doing so I show how the case file is far from only a text; it 
is also a materially recalcitrant object: it resists and it affects the 
practices with it and around it. In Chapter 6: Folding Times, Doing 
Truths I emphasize another kind of recalcitrance of the case file, 
namely, its temporal recalcitrance. I start my inquiry here with 
making the assumption that time is not, or not only, a neutral 
container of action (so that it is possible to say that events 
happen ‘in’ time) but, in contrast, that there are different ways to 
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make different times. For instance, there is within legal practices 
the ‘time’ of procedure, but conversations with judges and 
observations also suggest that the case file is also instrumental in 
making two additional temporalities. First, the case file enacts the 
time of the event in question - when did what happen precisely? 
What is cause and effect? Who saw what, and when? - but the 
case file also renders certain dimensions of its history of 
production visible - for instance, when officers inadvertently 
draw attention to the context of the interrogation setting or their 
transcription practices. In this chapter, I show how these 
different temporalities are mobilized in the struggle over ‘the 
facts’ in court. Judicial practices, then, are neither only about 
stories, nor only a silent and file-bound practice, but also a 
practice of folding and refolding time.  
Chapter 7: Productive Fictions for the Study of the Law: From Hyper-
Explanation to Hyper-Object may be the last chapter in this book, 
but it is far from the last word on any of the subjects touched 
upon here. Here, I outline several theoretical and methodological 
lessons learned throughout my journeying, and want to 
emphasize the public relevance of these lessons. For instance, I 
point out that approaches that treat discrimination solely as an 
outcome of unconscious bias have serious limitations, and inquire 
whether we should not aim to develop more nuanced tools to 
understand the relationship between legal practices and the 
reproduction of social inequalities. I also emphasize the 
importance of understanding everyday legal practices: in order to 
truly engage with these legal practices, I argue, social scientists 
will have to pay attention to the way similarity and difference are 
enacted in legal settings themselves, and the role played there by 
more or less typical narratives. I also go on to wonder whether 
the fact that variable levels of importance are attached to 
defendants’ demonstrations of remorse in these practices is 
politically desirable (for instance in domestic violence cases, in 
which the victim’s character is implicated in appraisals of the 
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case). I stress, too, that digitization is a far-reaching and complex 
process, and that we hence cannot be led simply by a conception 
of legal practices as only taking place ‘inside the actors’ heads’. 
Knowledge work involves both ‘eye’ and ‘hand’! For other 
knowledge workers - academics, medical professionals, other 
professionals in the public sector - the material infrastructures of 
work play an important role in their everyday practices, and there, 
too, digitization is sure to have lasting effects. I also ask social 
scientists who study legal practices to remain mindful of this 
humble and relatively understudied object: the case file. After all, 
there is no case without a case file! Last, I pay attention to the 
matter of time and procedure. While lay audiences tends to be 
quick to dismiss concerns with procedure as empty formalism, I 
nevertheless want to emphasize the crucial role it plays in shaping 
both everyday concerns with legality and justice.  
These diverse lessons are drawn from diverse insights, which 
in their turn are based on different (combinations of) methods 
employed in different settings, e.g. conversations with judges, 
observations in court, observations of ‘back-stage’ work practices, 
and a detailed study of the unfolding of individual court cases. It 
is not easy, then, to say anything final about the practices studied 
here. After all, these legal practices make their appearance in 
many different ways. In Chapter 3, they appear as a distribution 
machine, while in Chapter 4, legal practices are first and foremost 
understood as narrative practices. In Chapter 5, however, these 
practices make themselves known as largely silent, file-bound 
activities, and in Chapter 6, these practices are characterized by an 
engagement with the multiple histories of the case file. Of course 
it is tempting to treat either one of these as a final, definitive 
truth. However, such a move would precisely be the same as the 
one towards purified abstractionism I identified in Chapter 1. 
Again, I would reduce the wildness and variety of these practices 
to one explanatory abstraction.  
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This solution is limiting, both to the social sciences and the law 
itself. Even if social scientists manage to agree, their efforts are 
better spent allowing different possible truths and different 
possible worlds to persist. The legal practices I studied, too, are 
not done justice when we aim to elect merely one explanatory 
abstraction: after all, what about the Law’s concrete robustness, 
what about the many different ways the abstraction ‘Law’ is 
enacted in actual practices? In order to void making this doubly 
cardinal mistake, I suggest we approach the law as a hyper-object. 
The hyper-object is an object so large, so recalcitrant, so 
stretched out, that we can never locate ourselves ‘outside’ of it to 
apprehend it in full. Instead, the hyper-object gives us glimpses, 
and those glimpses are inextricably linked with the ways we 
journey through this hyper-object and the methods we use while 
journeying. Of course, the hyper-object has a certain mystery: 
however much we research or discuss it, we can never quite 
manage to have the last word about it. With this concept, we 
might be able to do justice to the multiplicity that is ‘the Law’, as 
well as be able to do justice to the scientific task of asking good 
questions, and, always carefully, humbly, trying to formulate 
tentative answers.  
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Samenvatting 
Een Controverse 
In Maart 2012 wordt de Nederlandse rechtspraak opgeschrikt 
door een studie naar verschillen in straftoemeting. Drie 
onderzoekers van de Universiteit Leiden hebben aangetoond dat 
rechters het uiterlijk en de taal van de verdachte mee laten wegen 
in hun beslissingen over straftoemeting: zo worden verdachten 
met een ‘buitenlands uiterlijk’ en geen Nederlandse 
taalvaardigheid vaker bestraft met een gevangenisstraf dan 
verdachten die wel Nederlands spreken en een ‘Nederlands’ 
uiterlijk hebben (Wermink, de Keijser en Schuyt 2012a). Voor 
verschillende actoren in de media en een aantal parlementsleden 
lijkt het een uitgemaakte zaak: de rechtspraak kan dan wel 
beloven dat ze gelijke gevallen gelijk behandelt, maar dit 
onderzoek impliceert dat dit toch niet het geval is. De drie 
onderzoekers zelf suggereren dat de resultaten van de studie 
verklaard kunnen worden aan de hand van vooroordelen die 
rechters, wellicht onbewust, laten meewegen in hun 
straftoemetingsbeslissingen. Rechters zelf lijken echter vooral 
gepikeerd. Zo schrijven twee rechters een reactie op de studie in 
het Nederlands Juristenblad, en vragen zich daar af of de 
onderzoekers ‘enig idee’ hebben hoe rechters beslissingen maken. 
Ook de rechters die ik later leer kennen in mijn veldwerk, voelen 
zich niet begrepen. Voor hen is het duidelijk dat de onderzoekers 
te weinig kennis hebben van de dagelijkse praktijk van het 
rechtspreken. Er staat hier veel op het spel voor de rechters: niet 
alleen hun beroepseer, maar ook een daadwerkelijk ander begrip 
van hun eigen praktijken. Kunnen we hier als sociologen recht 
aan doen?  
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Voor mij is deze controverse het begin geweest van een zowel 
theoretische als empirische reis geleid door de vragen: Hoe ziet 
die dagelijkse werkpraktijk van rechters er eigenlijk uit? Hoe 
evalueren ze bewijs, hoe construeren of deconstrueren ze 
verschillende verhaallijnen, hoe ‘zien’ ze de zaak? En wat doen 
sociologen eigenlijk als ze die juridische praktijken proberen te 
beschrijven, begrijpen, en verklaren, en hoe hebben hun 
methodische keuzes en theoretische aannames weer gevolgen 
voor het beeld dat wij krijgen van deze juridische praktijken? En 
wat doe ik als ik die dagelijkse praktijken ga bestuderen, dat wil 
zeggen: wat zijn de consequenties van mijn eigen 
methodologische keuzes voor de kennis die ik maak? Zo is dit 
boek een reflexieve studie naar de verschillende manieren waarop 
in de sociale wetenschappen en in het strafrecht zelf zaken 
worden gemaakt; hoe, met andere woorden, beide praktijken grip 
proberen te krijgen op de wereld.  
Conceptuele Puzzels en een Pragmatische Respecificatie 
Bij nadere bestudering blijkt deze controverse namelijk zowel 
theoretische als empirische vragen op te roepen. In Hoofdstuk 1: 
Contemplating the Law richt ik mij op de theoretische kant van deze 
controverse door te traceren hoe er precies demarcaties worden 
gemaakt tussen de wetenschap aan de ene kant, en het recht aan 
de andere kant. Het is immers deze demarcatie die op het spel 
komt te staan: rechters voelden zich door wetenschappers 
veroordeeld (terwijl rechters juist het veroordelende werk doen) 
en zij beroepen zich op de eigen kennis van de eigen praktijk en 
de inhoudelijke kennis van de zaak (terwijl wetenschappers het 
patent hebben op kennis). In Hoofdstuk 1 laat ik dan ook zien 
hoe het verschil tussen norm en feit, oordeel en waarheid, 
instrumenteel wordt gemaakt in het onderscheiden van ‘het recht’ 
en ‘de wetenschap’ - maar richt ik me ook op de grenzen van 
dergelijke oefeningen in demarcatie. Want hoewel deze 
demarcaties een zeker nut hebben, beperken ze wel onze 
Samenvatting 
 297 
mogelijkheid recht te doen aan een aantal saillante onderdelen 
van deze controverse. De grenzen van dit denken worden 
namelijk belichaamd in de controverse zelf: aan de ene kant 
maken de sociale wetenschappers een realiteit waar de rechters 
zich niet in herkennen - wetenschappers doen meer dan alleen de 
waarheid spreken - en aan de andere kant beroepen rechters zich 
op hun eigen kennis van de specifieke zaak - ook rechters doen 
aan waarheidsvinding.  
In Hoofdstuk 2: A Guide for the Perplexed reik ik conceptuele 
instrumenten aan om deze twee dimensies van de controverse te 
duiden. Ik noem mijn interventie een pragmatische respecificatie, 
welke wordt gekenmerkt door een nadruk op concrete praktijken. 
Als de vereenzelviging van norm en recht enerzijds, en waarheid 
en wetenschap anderzijds, het gevolg is van oefeningen in 
abstractie, hebben we juist een benadering nodig die zich kan 
verhouden tot concrete praktijken van ‘zaken maken’, zowel in 
het recht als in de wetenschap. Alleen dan kunnen we als sociale 
wetenschappers rekening houden met de manier waarop wij, in 
de keuze voor specifieke methodieken en onderzoeksdesigns, 
actief een specifieke wereld ordenen (en daarmee vormgeven), en 
alleen dan kunnen wij gevoelig blijven voor de manier waarop er 
binnen juridische praktijken grip wordt gekregen op de feiten en 
de verdachte. In dit hoofdstuk leg ik ook uit waarom het zo 
belangrijk is om rekening te houden met concrete objecten en 
instrumenten, zoals de meetinstrumenten die sociale 
wetenschappers gebruiken (surveys, observaties, interviews) als de 
instrumenten die ter beschikking staan van de rechter, en dan in 
het bijzonder het dossier. Niet alleen onze assumpties en 
cognitieve vermogens, maar ook deze instrumenten maken 
immers onlosmakelijk deel uit van concrete praktijken van zaken 
maken, en hebben daarmee grote gevolgen voor de alledaagse 
werkpraktijk en voor de ‘zaak’ die uiteindelijk kan worden 
gemaakt. Natuurlijk leidt deze nadruk op methoden ook tot een 
Ways of Case-Making 
 298 
reflexieve houding ten opzichte van de methoden die ik toepas in 
mijn eigen veldwerk. 
Op Reis 
Uitgerust met deze gevoeligheid voor concrete praktijken van 
zaken maken, en de rol die instrumenten hier in spelen, kan ik 
mijn reis echt beginnen. In Hoofdstuk 3: Dealing with Difference: 
Doing Criminal Law and Social Order neem ik de Leiden Studie 
nogmaals onder de loep om tot een analyse te komen van de 
realiteiten die de onderzoekers vormgeven. Cruciaal is om 
allereerst te erkennen dat de onderzoekers, in hun gebruik van 
numerieke en categorale data, juridische zaken gaan behandelen 
alsof ze optelsommen zijn van zaak- en persoonsfactoren. Een 
ander effect van de gebruikte methode is dat het strafrecht 
verschijnt als een in- en output systeem dat straf distribueert over 
verschillende populaties van verdachten. Want die populaties van 
verdachten, zoals daar zijn verdachten met een ‘binnenlands’ dan 
wel ‘buitenlands’ uiterlijk, zijn een derde effect van de gebruikte 
onderzoekstechniek. Op die manier vormen ze een werkelijkheid 
waarin rechters, zo zullen we zien, zichzelf en hun werkpraktijk 
maar slecht herkennen.  
In Hoofdstuk 4: Situating Remorse waar ik mijn eerste stappen zet 
onder de strafrechters van een Nederlandse rechtbank, laat ik 
namelijk zien dat de realiteit waar rechters vanuit gaan een heel 
andere is. Uit observaties van rechtszittingen en gesprekken met 
rechters maak ik op dat ze de zaak niet zien als een bundel van 
factoren, maar eerder als een verhaal. De verdachte is evenmin 
een verzameling vaststaande gegevens, maar een vertellend en 
verhalend persoon. Anders dan de sociologische realiteit van de 
Leiden studie gaat de strafrechtelijke realiteit dus ook niet uit van 
populaties van individuen. Echter, dat wil niet zeggen dat rechters 
geen overeenkomsten tussen individuele zaken zien. Rechters 
maken onderscheid tussen meer of minder typische verhaallijnen, 
zoals de typische junk die wordt beschuldigd van kleine 
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diefstalletjes, de typische boze jongeman die openlijk geweld 
heeft gepleegd, en het typische explosieve stel, waarbinnen de 
man is beschuldigd van huiselijk geweld. Deze gevallen worden 
gekenmerkt door typische verhaallijnen, die motief, karakter van 
de verdachte, het strafbare feit en de omstandigheden van het feit 
met elkaar in verbinding brengen. Ook speelt de mate waarin de 
verdachte berouw toont een andere rol in de straftoemeting in 
deze drie typische verhalen: bij drugsverslaafde verdachten wordt 
berouw vaak gezien als een lege belofte (de verslaving is sterker 
dan de wil om het beter te doen); bij boze jongemannen is 
berouw van groot belang in de straftoemeting (ze moeten inzien 
wat ze hebben gedaan); en bij ‘explosieve koppels’ wordt vaak de 
vrouwelijke partner en haar karakter betrokken in de 
straftoemeting (onder het motto: ‘ze zal zelf ook geen lieverdje 
zijn’) en kan het zijn dat berouw aan de kant van de verdachte 
minder noodzakelijk wordt geacht. 
Nu is het gemakkelijk om op basis van deze observaties ter 
terechtzitting en gesprekken het idee te krijgen dat de rechtspraak 
vooral een talige en verhalende praktijk is. Nu is dat voor een 
groot gedeelte ook zo, maar we hebben al eerder gezien dat 
methoden gevolgen hebben voor de realiteit die we schetsen. In 
Hoofdstuk 5: Visualizing Cases laat ik dan ook zien dat observaties 
van de werkpraktijken van de rechters ‘backstage’, in hun 
kantoren, echter een heel ander beeld geven van juridisch werk. 
Hier is het stil, hier wordt weinig gesproken, en hier is de 
verdachte afwezig. Hier zijn alleen de sporen van het werk van de 
politie en de officier van Justitie aanwezig in de vorm van het 
dossier. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat deze werkpraktijken gericht 
zijn op het vormen van een ‘beeld’ van de zaak. Ze zijn gevormd 
door en afgestemd op het papieren dossier: griffiers en rechters 
gebruiken papier, pen, potlood, stickers en post-its om informatie 
te ordenen en om hoofd- en bijzaken te onderscheiden. Echter, 
toende dossiers in de betreffende rechtbank werden gedigitaliseerd 
leidde dit toch tot enige consternatie: ineens moesten griffiers en 
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rechters andere manieren bedenken om toch hun zaak te 
‘visualiseren’! Door aandachtig te observeren hoe en waar deze 
aanpassingen plaatsvinden vraag ik aandacht voor de materialiteit 
van ‘kenniswerk’ in het algemeen en juridisch werk in het 
bijzonder. Ook laat ik zien hoe de subtiele grenzen tussen griffier 
en rechter opnieuw bevochten moeten worden, en dat 
digitalisering, zo bezien, niet slechts een zegen of 
kostenbesparende maatregels is, maar ook ingrijpt op de 
dagelijkse werkpraktijk. 
Al met al laat ik zien dat het dossier dus niet alleen een 
container van tekst is, maar ook een materieel recalcitrant object: 
het verzet zich, het kan zich laten gelden, en beïnvloedt 
praktijken om zich heen. In Hoofdstuk 6: Folding Times, Doing 
Truths zoom ik in op een andere vorm van recalcitrantie, namelijk 
de recalcitrantie van het dossier in de temporele zin. Ik vertrek 
hier vanuit de assumptie dat tijd niet een neutrale container is van 
handelen (zodat je kan zeggen dat gebeurtenissen ‘in’ de tijd 
plaatsvinden) maar dat er verschillende manieren zijn om ‘tijd’ te 
maken. Zo is er natuurlijk, in het juridische veld, de ‘tijd’ van 
procedure (denk bijvoorbeeld aan juridische termijnen) maar 
observaties ter terechtzitting en gesprekken met rechters maken 
me ook duidelijk dat het dossier nog twee saillante tijden maakt. 
Ten eerste geeft het dossier toegang tot de geschiedenis van het 
feit – wanneer gebeurde er wat precies? Wat zijn oorzaak en 
gevolg? Wie heeft wat wanneer gezien of gedaan? - maar maakt 
het ook verschillende aspecten aan de geschiedenis van haar 
productie zichtbaar - bijvoorbeeld als agenten onverhoopt de 
aandacht trekken naar de context van de verhoorkamer of 
praktijken van het transcriberen van verbale communicatie. In dit 
hoofdstuk laat ik dan ook zien hoe de strijd over de feiten ter 
terechtzitting er een is waarbinnen deze verschillende 
geschiedenissen worden ingezet om de feiten dan wel te bewijzen, 
dan wel te ontkrachten. Zo is de juridische praktijk er niet alleen 
een van verhalen vertellen, noch alleen een van ‘stil’ dossierwerk 
Samenvatting 
 301 
met fysieke of digitale objecten, maar ook een zorgvuldig ordenen 
en vouwen van tijden.  
Laatste Woorden? 
In Hoofdstuk 7: Productive Fictions for the Study of the Law: From Hyper-
Explanation to Hyper-object wil ik zowel terugkijken als 
vooruitkijken. Het is het laatste hoofdstuk, maar wil eigenlijk geen 
laatste oordeel zijn - dat is immers meer iets voor de rechter, niet 
de wetenschapper! Met dat in mijn achterhoofd laat ik de zowel 
theoretische als methodologische lessen nog eens kort de revue 
passeren, en wil ik ook de publieke relevantie van deze lessen 
benadrukken. Zo zet ik vraagtekens bij een vertoog over 
discriminatie dat discriminatie primair als een onbewust 
fenomeen ziet, en vraag me af of het niet noodzakelijk is om op 
een genuanceerdere manier tot inzichten te komen over de rol 
van het strafrecht in het reproduceren van etnische verschillen. 
Ook stel ik de noodzaak tot begrip van de alledaagse werkpraktijk 
van rechters centraal in deze discussie: om daadwerkelijk tot een 
uitwisseling van relevante inzichten te komen met juridische 
actoren, zullen wetenschappers oog moeten blijven hebben voor 
de manier waarop verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen zaken 
vormgegeven worden in het strafrecht, en de rol die ‘typische’ 
verhaallijnen spelen in deze praktijken. Ook vraag ik me af of het 
wenselijk is dat berouw in sommige typen zaken meer of minder 
belangrijk wordt geacht (bijvoorbeeld in de huiselijk geweld 
zaken, waar het slachtoffer wordt betrokken in een oordeel over 
de verdachte). Daarnaast benadruk ik dat digitalisering een zeer 
ingrijpend proces is, en dat we ons niet zomaar kunnen laten 
leiden door een idee van kenniswerk als alleen maar mentaal werk 
dat plaatsvindt ‘in het hoofd’. We denken ook met onze handen! 
Ook voor andere kenniswerkers - denk academici, denk medische 
professionals, denk andere mensen werkzaam in de publieke 
sector - speelt de fysieke infrastructuur een grote rol in het 
vormgeven van het werk, en kan digitalisering grote praktische 
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gevolgen hebben. Ook vraag ik sociale wetenschappers oog te 
houden voor dat cruciale, maar toch minder bestudeerd object in 
juridische praktijken: het dossier (immers: zonder dossier geen 
zaak!). Als laatste vraag ik waardering voor de kwestie van tijd en 
procedure. Hoewel men vaak de juridische zorg om procedure 
laakt (zeker als het gaat om ‘vormfouten’) is procedure 
desalniettemin een voorwaarde voor het afbakenen van de feiten 
en daarmee een voorwaarde voor rechtmatigheid en soms zelfs 
rechtvaardigheid.  
Deze diverse lessen zijn elk gegrond in steeds andere inzichten, 
die op hun beurt gebaseerd zijn op net weer andere (combinaties 
van) methoden in verschillende settings: zo zijn er gesprekken en 
observaties ter terechtzitting, observaties en conversaties achter 
de schermen, en een gedetailleerde studie van een flink aantal 
individuele zaken en hun afwikkeling. Op basis van deze 
beweeglijke aanpak is het niet gemakkelijk om een laatste woord 
over deze praktijken uit te spreken. Immers, deze praktijken 
verschijnen steeds op een ander manier: dan weer als een 
distributiemachine (Hoofdstuk 3), dan als een morele en narratief 
gemedieerde praktijk (Hoofdstuk 4), dan weer als een stille 
dossier-gebonden praktijk (Hoofdstuk 5), en dan als een praktijk 
waarbinnen verschillende tijden worden gemaakt en 
gemobiliseerd (Hoofdstuk 6). Het is natuurlijk verleidelijk om een 
van deze verschillende versies als meer ‘echt’, als meer ‘waar’ te 
bestempelen. Echter, ik zou dan dezelfde beweging maken die ik 
in Hoofdstuk 1 problematiseerde: ook dan zou ik uit de weelde 
aan concrete praktijken slechts één abstractie kiezen en die 
verheffen tot de meest fundamentele waarheid over het recht.  
Deze oplossing doet echter zowel de wetenschap als het recht 
te kort. Zelfs als wetenschappers het met elkaar eens kunnen 
worden, dan nog zou de wetenschap zich moeten bezighouden 
met het laten voortbestaan van verschillende mogelijke 
waarheden en verschillende mogelijke werelden. Ook de 
juridische praktijken die ik heb bestudeerd worden zo 
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tekortgedaan: waarom zouden we het recht slechts één abstract 
bestaan toekennen? Dat kan toch geen recht doen aan haar 
concrete robuustheid, aan de veelheid van manieren waarop de 
abstractie ‘recht’ concreet wordt gepraktiseerd? Om dit probleem 
te omzeilen suggereer ik het recht te zien als een hyper-object. 
Een hyper-object is een object zo groot, zo recalcitrant, zo 
uitgestrekt, dat we er nooit ‘buiten’ kunnen staan om het in zijn 
geheel in ons op te nemen. In plaats daarvan geeft het hyper-
object ons alleen glimpen, en die glimpen zijn weer onlosmakelijk 
verbonden met de manier waarop we ons door dit hyper-object 
heen bewegen en de methoden die we gebruiken in onze 
ontdekkingsreizen. Het hyper-object heeft ook iets mysterieus: 
hoeveel we er ook over praten of hoeveel onderzoek we ook 
doen, we kunnen er niet het laatste woord over hebben. Met dit 
concept kunnen we tegemoet komen aan zowel de veelheid die 
het recht is - het recht is niet te reduceren tot slechts één 
verklarend abstractie! - als aan onze eigen belangrijke en 
bescheiden taak als wetenschappers: het stellen van goede vragen, 
en het voorzichtig, tentatief, altijd voorlopig, formuleren van 
antwoorden.  
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